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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies how different voter characteristics and elec-
toral rules affect the incentives and decisions to seek political office. The
focus is on generalizing standard approaches to observed differences in
the runoff rule and incorporating more accurate descriptions of voter be-
havior which may not be fully rational. In each chapter, I consider a model
of strategic entry by candidates for office in democratic elections.
In the first chapter, I incorporate the observed differences in thresholds
for first-round victory in a model of runoff elections. The set of equilib-
ria varies substantially with the threshold, indicating that the 50 percent
threshold used in most models is not innocuous. The set of equilibria
immediately contains equilibria that were thought to exist only under plu-
rality rule, whereas for thresholds above 50 percent, there is no change in
the set of equilibria. Additionally, for any threshold under one half, there
exist equilibria in which a candidate who loses with certainty still chooses
to run. The set of two candidate equilibria is invariant to all thresholds
under one third, and the set of multicandidate equilibria is invariant to all
thresholds above one half.
In the second chapter, I introduce aggregate uncertainty by making
candidates unsure of the distribution of voter preferences in the electorate.
The set of three candidate equilibria expands and equilibrium platforms
become more diverse. This provides a theoretical basis for Duverger’s Hy-
pothesis. Equilibria also feature two common empirical phenomena. For
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instance, some candidates choose to enter despite losing with certainty in
equilibrium. Also, in some equilibria, a Condorcet winning candidate (a
candidate who would win every pairwise election) fails to win the election.
In the third chapter, I generalize the citizen-candidate model to a mul-
tidimensional setting and characterize the set of equilibria. I later incorpo-
rate two well-documented violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erence in a model of plurality elections: the compromise and attraction
effects. Entry by an extreme candidate may shift the frame of reference for
some voters in ways which favor particular moderate candidates. Incorpo-
rating these preferences generate equilibria in which extremist candidates
enter plurality elections in order to attractively frame their preferred mod-
erate, even if the extremist has probability zero of obtaining office them-
selves.
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1 Chapter One: Candidate Entry in Non-Majority Runoffs
1.1 Introduction
In a runoff election, if no candidate’s vote share surpasses a predeter-
mined threshold for first round victory, voters are asked to cast a second
ballot over the two leading candidates. The candidate who obtains a ma-
jority of votes in the second round is the winner of the election. Runoffs are
ubiquitous, as a majority of countries which directly elect a president do
so through runoff elections, and the popularity of runoffs is growing over
time (Blais et al 1997, Golder 2005). Many elections at the state and local
level within the United States also use runoff rules (Bullock III and John-
son 1992, and Engstrom and Engstrom 2008). Despite the widespread
use of runoff rules, we have a limited understanding of how variation in
the threshold for first round victory affects candidate incentives.
In this paper I generalize a standard model of candidate entry in runoff
elections to allow for variation in the threshold for first round victory. De-
spite the popularity of runoff rules and the wide variety in the exact nature
of each rule, the literature has focused on the case of majority runoff rules
(Callander 2005, Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Lizzeri and Persico 2005).
The runoff rule, however, encompasses a wide variety of different thresh-
olds which may change the nature of political competition. For example, in
Costa Rica, the threshold for first round victory is forty percent of the vote.
Some runoff elections have thresholds as low as 35 percent (South Dakota,
Nicaragua) and have been observed as high as 60 percent (Sierra Leone).
The threshold is potentially important, as a decrease in the threshold from
50 to 40 percent would potentially render unnecessary over half of second
1
rounds (Bullock III and Johnson 1992).
Three main results arise from my model. First, I show that for non-
majoritarian runoff elections, as the threshold decreases, the set of both
two and three candidate equilibria expands to include equilibria previously
thought only to exist in plurality elections. For all values of the threshold
less than one half, reductions in the threshold support a (weakly) larger
set of two candidate equilibria. As the threshold decreases, two candidate
equilibria with a greater distance between the candidates can be supported
because centrist entrants are more easily deterred: attaining second place
as a centrist entrant is no longer desirable when elections are resolved in
the first round. Additional three candidate equilibria appear in the form
discussed below. The increase in two candidate equilibria may provide one
explanation for the mixed evidence with respect to Duverger’s Law.
Second, for all thresholds less than one half, three candidate equilibria
exist where a candidate has incentive to enter despite losing with cer-
tainty. In these equilibria the sure loser induces a tie between the other
two candidates by entering the race with a policy platform between their
opponents’ platforms. These equilibria exist in plurality elections as well,
and reappear in nonmajoritarian runoff elections when the threshold is
surpassed. These equilibria are a form of “squeezing” equilibria, where a
centrist loses the election due to two slightly more extreme competitors
bracketing her platform. In all of these equilibria, the sure loser is a Con-
dorcet winner and in all of these equilibria a Condorcet loser wins with
positive probability.
Third, there are important discontinuities in the set of equilibria as the
threshold crosses the key values of one half and one third. For any thresh-
2
old of one half or above, equilibria exist where all N candidates share the
ideal policy of the median voter. For any threshold below one half, these
equilibria do not exist. Insofar as an electoral system which generates
moderation in realized policy implementation may be normatively desir-
able, this result suggests that lower thresholds impose potentially signif-
icant policy costs. Additionally, the set of N candidate equilibria under
a runoff system with threshold less than 1N+1 is the same as under the
plurality system.
These theoretical results are empirically relevant. My results provide a
weak form of support for Duverger’s Hypothesis, the statement that runoff
elections lead to multipartyism, for majority runoff elections. The increase
in two candidate equilibria for lower thresholds, however, provides one ex-
planation for mixed empirical results (e.g. Engstrom and Engstrom 2008)
when considering the broad class of runoff elections. Nevertheless, the
special case of majority runoff elections, studied in Osborne and Slivinski
(1996), produces theoretical predictions of Duverger’s Law which match
the well-identified empirical results in Fujiwara (2011) and Bordignon and
Tabellini (2013).
1.2 Related Literature
A large body of literature has studied the effects of different voting in-
stitutions on candidate positioning and entry decisions. In particular, the
seminal contribution by Downs (1957) prompted a substantial research
program studying candidate positioning in spatial models of elections.
The citizen-candidate model was independently developed with slight vari-
3
ation by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). While
Besley and Coate use their version of the model to study the set of equilib-
ria in an election decided by plurality rule (also called “first past the post”),
Osborne and Slivinski compare equilibria in elections decided by plurality
rule with equilibria in elections decided by runoff. Runoff elections are
a two-round procedure; in the first round, the candidate with the largest
vote share wins the election outright if her vote share is larger than a pre-
determined threshold for first-round victory. If no candidate surpasses this
threshold, the two candidates with the largest vote shares are selected to
compete in a second election, which is decided by majority rule. In this
paper, I generalize the version of the citizen-candidate model presented in
Osborne and Slivinski to incorporate runoff elections where the threshold
for first-round victory is less than 50%. I demonstrate that: (1) a single
large cluster of candidates that is an equilibrium in the citizen-candidate
model with runoff elections with a 50% threshold is not an equilibriium
with lower thresholds; (2) symmetric clusters of candidates are substan-
tially less likely in equilibrium as the threshold decreases; and (3) the set
of two-candidate equilibria is identical for plurality elections and runoff
elections with a first round threshold of less than one third. Given that
the runoff threshold varies widely across elections, these results help to
explain the similarity observed in mean numbers of serious contenders
across plurality and runoff elections.
The major streams of literature related to my paper can generally be
classified according to the following two distinctions: (1) whether the model
features runoff elections or an alternative rule, usually plurality; and (2)
whether the model features endogenous candidate positioning, entry, both
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or neither. Formal models of runoff elections, however, have been rela-
tively neglected with respect to models of plurality elections. Much of the
early work in spatial voting models followed a familiar Hotelling (1929) type
model where an exogenously determined set of candidates chose to locate
themselves on a horizontal axis in order to attract votes. Black (1948)
first demonstrated that in a spatial model with a strict majority rule, the
preferred policy of the median voter is the unique policy which obtains
a majority over all other policies, now known as the Condorcet winner.
Downs’ (1957) famous median voter theorem soon illustrated a similar re-
sult in plurality elections. Black (1958) later showed that the unique Nash
equilibrium of a two-candidate Hotelling-Downs model is for the two can-
didates to position themselves at the ideal position of the median voter.
Cox (1985, 1987) studied multicandidate equilibria under different voting
institutions within the Hotelling-Downs framework, although not in the
context of runoff elections. In his papers Cox assumes sincere voting (i.e.
that voters vote for their most preferred candidate without conditioning
on the probability of their vote being pivotal), although he does not allow
candidates to choose to enter endogenously. Cox (1987) does, however,
find that in plurality elections with more than two candidates, in equilib-
rium these candidates do not choose to cluster at the median voter’s ideal
point. Feddersen, et al (1990) is one of the first papers to incorporate both
endogenous entry and positioning by candidates in the Hotelling-Downs
framework with a plurality election. In their model candidates are purely
office-motivated, and therefore all candidates must win with positive prob-
ability in equilibrium. As a result, all voters are pivotal between every
pair of candidates. These are undesirable features of the model, as they
5
contradict clear empirical evidence. Elections often feature “sure loser”
candidates, and the probability of any voter being pivotal in elections of
even moderate size is vanishingly small.1 2
The number of parties or candidates running for office may also de-
pend on the institutions governing the election. Duverger’s (1954) Law
states that plurality elections are related to two-candidate (or two-party)
contests, whereas Duverger’s Hypothesis is that runoff elections support
a larger number of entrants.3 More recent research on plurality elections
has focused on expanding the Hotelling-Downs model to endogenize can-
didate entry decisions and test the validity of Duverger’s Law both theo-
retically and empirically. Empirical evidence for Duverger’s Law is mixed,
however. Wright and Riker (1989), Golder (2006), Clark and Golder (2006),
for example, find evidence for Duverger’s Law. There are, nevertheless,
numerous counterexamples (see, e.g., Shugart and Taagepera [1994]) and
Cox (1997) cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean number of serious
contender candidates in plurality and runoff elections are equal using a
sample of 16 democracies in the 1980s. A substantial portion of my re-
sults are directly related to this question.
Theoretical models of runoff elections have been relatively less studied
than their plurality counterparts. Greenberg and Shepsle (1987) consider
elections in districts with multiple members and assume candidates try
to maximize the rank of their vote share. Wright and Riker (1989) assert
1Some parties have such low probabilities of obtaining office that they do not even
self-identify the prospect of winning the election as a reason they continue to run, e.g.
http://www.il.lp.org/campaigns/reasons2run.php.
2See, e.g., Appendix A1 of Bouton (2012) for calculations of pivot probabilities in a
Poisson electoral game.
3Henceforth I will refer to Duverger’s Hypothesis and Duverger’s Law simply as Du-
verger’s Law for parsimony.
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that the case of two-member districts captures the strategic incentives of
a runoff election. This ignores, however, the second stage of the runoff,
which decides the actual winner of the runoff election. Myerson (1993)
studies the runoff rule in the context of a distributive model of elections,
but does not consider endogenous numbers of candidates or policy diver-
sity in a spatial sense, and thus is not closely related to the work here.
Cox (1997) studies the incentives for strategic voting in a model of runoff
elections with an exogenous limit on the number of candidates and with
exogenously determined shares of voters conditional on entry (e.g. the lo-
cation of the candidates observed running for office in the implicit spatial
model is taken from an exogenously determined finite set of possible loca-
tions). Martinelli (2002) compares plurality elections with runoff elections
in a Poisson game where majority voters are divided by private signals
between two majority candidates, whereas a Condorcet losing minority
candidate is also in the election. He shows that in a runoff with a 50%
threshold, information aggregation in runoff elections is superior in the
sense that the more desirable majority alternative either wins the election
in the first round outright, or makes it into the second runoff stage. In ei-
ther case, the expected utility of the majority of voters increases. Callander
(2005) considers candidate incentives to enter runoff elections in a Down-
sian model with multiple first-mover candidates. Candidates are purely
office motivated in Callander’s model, however, while evidence suggests
that candidates are also policy motivated (see, e.g., Levitt [1996]). Br-
usco, et al (2010) study runoff elections with a variety of thresholds in a
Hotelling-Downs model where candidates are purely office-motivated. Br-
usco, et al generate centrist equilibria, where all candidates locate at the
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median voter’s preferred point, although in their model, as in mine, these
equilibria disappear when the threshold is lower than 50%. Moreover, with
purely office-motivated candidates, all candidates win with positive prob-
ability in equilibrium, which is at odds with observed behavior by candi-
dates. While Brusco, et al identify problems of equilibrium non-existence
when the threshold is lower than 50%, they do not provide conditions for
existence.
Several papers have also applied the citizen-candidate model to study
other political institutions which interact with the electoral process. Felli
and Merlo (2006) models endogenous participation in lobbying when of-
ficeholders are elected through the Besley and Coate version of the citizen-
candidate model. Felli and Merlo restrict their attention, however, to two-
candidate equilibria and plurality elections. Dellis and Oak (2006) con-
sider approval voting, a procedure where all voters can cast a vote for
every candidate they deem acceptable, in the context of the Besley and
Coate citizen-candidate model. Dellis and Oak show that approval voting
shares many similarities with plurality rule, including that there will be at
most two winning positions in equilibrium (i.e. Duverger’s Law) and failure
to elect the Condorcet winner.
Two papers are particularly closely related to the present paper. I adopt
the Osborne and Slivinski (1996) version of the citizen-candidate model
and add variation in the runoff threshold. Osborne and Slivinski consid-
ered their model both in context of plurality elections as well as in runoff
elections with a 50% threshold. In the citizen-candidate model, all candi-
dates are generated endogenously from the electorate, and therefore are
assumed to also have preferences over policy outcomes. Each player’s
8
type is common knowledge, and the elected official implements policy as
a dictator in the final stage of the game. Therefore, there is no endoge-
nous positioning in the citizen-candidate model, but rather endogenous
entry of exogenously positioned candidates. The citizen-candidate model
is, however, plagued by multiplicity of equilibria. I show that certain em-
pirically implausible equilibria in runoff elections with a threshold of 50%
or greater do not exist for any threshold strictly less than 50%. Further-
more, I show that lowering the threshold reduces the set of parameter
values which generate another set of equilibria which seem at odds with
the observed behavior of candidates. I also show that as the threshold de-
creases, the set of two-candidate equilibria in runoff elections expands; for
a sufficiently low threshold, runoff elections and plurality elections have
the same set of two-candidate equilibria. I discuss further the relationship
between my results and those in Osborne and Slivinski in section three of
this paper.
Bouton (2012) also examines runoff elections with low (less than 50%)
thresholds, although from the perspective of strategic voting rather than
strategic candidate behavior. Bouton models elections as a Poisson game
with a particular focus on elections where a strict majority of the voters
prefers either of two candidates to a third, but majority voters are divided
between which of the two candidates ranks first in their preference or-
dering. Bouton shows that runoff elections with strategic voters may ad-
mit two-candidate equilibria, which provides evidence against Duverger’s
Law, and that, with low thresholds, an “Ortega effect” causes the minority,
Condorcet losing candidate to win office in some equilibria.4 These Ortega
4The Ortega effect is named for Daniel Ortega, who won a three-candidate runoff elec-
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effect equilibria are noteworthy in that they are both individually rational
and expectationally stable, whereas under plurality rule, no expectation-
ally stable equilibrium exists where the Condorcet loser wins office. My
results are complementary to Bouton’s. While my model does not ad-
mit strategic voters, as each voter has a zero probability of being pivotal,
I endogenize candidate entry and positioning in a model of runoff elec-
tions with low thresholds. I confirm that with sincere voting and strategic
candidates, two-candidate equilibria still exist in runoff elections with low
thresholds. Moreover, I show that for every threshold less than 50%, there
exist distributions of voters such that a Condorcet losing candidate wins
the election with positive probability in equilibrium.
1.3 Model
In this paper I follow the form of the citizen-candidate model used by
Osborne and Slivinski (henceforth OS). Specifically, I assume that the elec-
torate is comprised of a unit mass of citizens with single peaked prefer-
ences over policy. Policies are represented by points on the real line, R.
The ideal points for the electorate are distributed along R according to an
arbitrary distribution F. I assume that F is continuous and has a unique
median, m. The game proceeds in three stages. First, all citizens choose
whether to enter the election (E) or not enter (N). Citizens do not make a
locational choice, as their ideal point is common knowledge. In the sec-
ond stage of the game, I assume all citizens vote sincerely and with full
turnout. The electoral rule is applied, and if there exists a winner, the
tion for the presidency of Nicaragua. Ortega was commonly agreed to be the Condorcet
loser in the election, but the two majority candidates divided their vote, and Ortega nar-
rowly surpassed the threshold in the first stage.
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elected official implements policy as a dictator.5 The third stage of the
game is reached if there was no winner in the first election. If no can-
didate reached the threshold vote share, then the top two candidates are
selected for a head-to-head election. The electorate, which does not vary
between rounds, votes sincerely, and with full turnout, and a winner is
chosen according to plurality rule. In all stages of the election, if two or
more candidates tie, the winner is chosen with equal probability from the
set of candidates who tied.
Citizens are policy-motivated and have no preference over the identity
of any candidate. Following the notation in OS, citizens who choose to
stand for office incur a utility cost c, and obtain office-related benefits b
(e.g. ”ego rents” as in Rogoff [1990]) if she is victorious. If a citizen who
chooses N has ideal point a and the winner has ideal point w, the citizen’s
payoff is
− |w− a| .
Note that a citizen who chooses N and whose ideal point is the same as
the ideal point of the winner obtains a payoff of zero. If a citizen chooses
E, however, I call her a candidate and her payoff is dependent on whether
she wins office and can be written
b− c if wins outright
− |w− a| − c if loses outright.
5I assume sincere voting for two reasons. First, the assumption that F is a continuous
cumulative distribution function makes the model extremely tractable, and also implies
that each individual citizen has a pivot probability of zero. Second, the purpose of this
paper is to investigate how varying the threshold will affect incentives for candidates
to behave strategically. Combining strategic entry and strategic voting in the citizen-
candidate model is left for further work.
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Each citizen obtains a payoff of −∞ if no citizen chooses to enter. Note
that the maximal payoff for a non-candidate is zero, if the election winner
shares her ideal point. The return to winning an election, b, is the payoff
above any policy dimension. The magnitude of b, therefore, represents the
relative weight of the incentives to run from holding office as compared to
the incentives given by the ability to affect policy.
The game is a complete information game. Every citizen knows F and
that all citizens share identical payoff functions. More simply, the game is
one where the set of players is described by F, the set of actions is {E,N},
and the payoff functions are as described above. Since the game is one of
complete information and simultaneous moves, the appropriate solution
concept is Nash equilibrium. A profile of strategies σ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if pii(σi, σ−i) ≥ pii(σ′i , σ−i) for all i and σ
′
i .
1.4 Results
I focus here on characterizing sets of pure strategy equilibria according
to the number of candidates choosing to enter the race. This way of de-
scribing equilibria is of particular interest in the comparison of electoral
rules. Duverger’s (1954) Law asserts that plurality elections systemati-
cally encourage two candidate elections, whereas Duverger’s Hypothesis
suggests that runoff rules contribute to multi-partyism (often understood
as three or more candidates entering). Therefore, characterizing equilibria
in entry games by number of candidates provides some theoretical guid-
ance as to the incentives provided by the two systems.
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1.4.a Three candidate equilibria
A natural starting point for considering the set of three candidate equi-
libria is when the threshold for first round victory is fifty percent. Majority
runoff elections are the most common form of runoff and the rule on which
most previous literature has focused. Conveniently, all thresholds of fifty
percent or larger generate the same set of incentives for citizens. Since
there are no multi-candidate equilibria with a sure winner, no candidate
can obtain more than half the vote in the first round of a runoff. As such,
increasing the threshold above a half never affects whether the election is
resolved in the first round or not. Therefore, I focus here on values of the
threshold equal to or below one half.
Since the threshold is used to determine whether a second round is
held or if the first round is evaluated by plurality, a natural intuition is
that a decrease in the threshold should make the set of equilibria more
closely approximate those of a plurality election. The first result formalizes
that intuition.
Proposition 1. All equilibria with three candidates under plurality rule are
equilibria under a runoff rule with τ < max vi.
The most direct interpretation of this result is that the threshold τ can
be thought of as a sliding scale between plurality elections, where τ = 0,
and majority runoffs, where τ = .5. It is not the case that all plurality
equilibria exist for all thresholds under one half, but rather that reducing
the threshold continues to admit weakly more three candidate equilibria as
it approaches one third. Since the smallest maximal vote share in a three
candidate equilibrium under plurality rule is one third, once the threshold
13
reaches this level, all plurality rule three candidate equilibria are equilibria
of this runoff election.
One particular interesting implication of this result is that some equilib-
ria under plurality rule have very different properties than those under ma-
jority runoff. In particular, majority runoffs deter entry by candidates who
are not competitive for office in three candidate equilibria. Since the me-
dian voter’s ideal policy remains the same over both rounds of the runoff,
any candidate who runs and loses with certainty is simply delaying the
inevitable result of the runoff. This is no longer the case for non-majority
runoffs.
Corollary 1. All three candidate, sure loser equilibria generated by a plural-
ity election are equilibria in a runoff election with τ less than the vote share
obtained by the candidates who are not sure losers.
In particular, these equilibria feature a centrist candidate entering and
losing with certainty in order to induce a first round tie between two com-
petitive, extreme candidates. These equilibria exist for a greater set of
parameter values as the threshold decreases. Necessary conditions for
existence depend on the sure loser being willing to pay c in order to enter
and change the expected policy outcome. As the threshold decreases, more
differentiated policy positions for the competitive candidates are possible
while satisfying the condition that the tie occurs at a vote share which
surpasses the threshold. This additional flexibility in terms of policy dif-
ferentiation also provides more incentive for the sure loser, as the distance
between competing candidates is closely related to her incentive to enter.
The existence of sure-loser equilibria in runoff elections is also a result
14
that depends sharply on a 50% threshold. For any threshold τ < .5, there
exist distributions and parameters b, c which generate equilibria with sure
losers. If τ = .5, however, there are no three-candidate sure-loser equilibria
for any values of b and c. A candidate who will lose with certainty in a
three candidate election is motivated to enter under plurality rule because
she induces an equal probability lottery over the other candidates and
avoids a certain victory by her least preferred candidate. Therefore, in the
second round of the runoff, her least preferred candidate will still win with
certainty. Since there are no equilibria with three candidates where any
candidate receives 50% of the vote, a runoff election with a 50% threshold
is guaranteed to reach the second stage, and the sure loser has no effect on
the outcome. If the threshold is even slightly lower than one half, however,
there exist distributions of voters where the sure loser induces an equal
probability lottery over the other two candidates which is decided in the
first stage. This is a best response for a sufficiently low cost of entry.
One interesting feature of sure loser equilibria is that a Condorcet loser
gains office with positive probability in each such equilibrium. Note that
the sure loser induces a lottery over the other two candidates by entering
between them and obtaining a greater vote share from her less preferred
candidate. The sure loser is, in fact, the Condorcet winner in these equi-
libria; if either external candidate were not to reach the second stage, the
sure loser would obtain all of that candidate’s vote share, plus her own
vote share from the first stage. This is a strictly larger vote share than ei-
ther of the two external candidates obtain in the first stage in equilibrium.
The sure loser’s preferred external candidate, however, is the Condorcet
loser. The sure loser must enter in order to induce an equal probability
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lottery over the two external candidates, and is only willing to do so if she
attracts more voters away from her less preferred external candidate than
her more preferred external candidate (i.e. she induces a better expected
policy outcome). This requires that her more preferred external candidate
would not win with certainty in equilibrium; since I also assume c > 0, en-
tering as a sure loser is not a best response if the sure loser has no effect
on the policy outcome.
Corollary 2. In some equilibria a candidate who is a Condorcet loser wins
the election with positive probability if τ < 12 .
Note that this is not the only way for a Condorcet loser to obtain of-
fice in equilibrium. If τ is sufficiently low, e.g. τ ≤ 13 , three candidates
can each obtain 13 of the vote while one of them is the Condorcet loser.
Consider candidates located at F−1(13)− δ1, F−1(13) + δ1 = F−1(23)− δ2, and
F−1(23) + δ2. The interior candidate is the Condorcet winner: she obtains
2
3
of the vote if either external candidate exits. The external candidate on the
right may also defeat the external candidate on the left, depending on the
distribution of voters. If the distribution is uniform and ε1 > ε2, for exam-
ple, the candidate on the right will obtain the median voter in a matchup
of the two external candidates. Note that this cannot happen in majority
runoffs. If a candidate is a Condorcet loser, she loses the election in ev-
ery second round she reaches. As a result, she is a sure loser and would
prefer not to enter as she has no effect on the outcome of the election.
Moreover, for any threshold less than one half, this equilibrium can be
supported by jointly choosing an appropriate distribution F and parame-
ters b and c. The relevant subset of parameter space is restricted to distri-
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butions which are not symmetric (within a large neighborhood) about their
median: the sure loser must steal more votes from the candidate further
from her ideal policy than she cannibalizes from her preferred candidate.
The distribution of voter preferences F also imposes an upper bound on the
cost of seeking office c; otherwise, the sure loser would not find it optimal
to run. Finally, a lower bound on b relative to c is necessary to incentivize
the competitive candidates to seek office. Nevertheless, these conditions
can be satisfied for all thresholds τ < 12 .
Proposition 2. For all τ < 12 , there exists a distribution of voters which
generates a three-candidate sure-loser equilibrium for sufficiently small c
and large b.
Having established the existence of plurality rule equilibria under non-
majority runoffs, another possible effect of reducing the threshold is that
equilibria under majority runoff may be more difficult to support. Indeed,
this is the case; runoff equilibria under majority rule may feature a candi-
date obtaining a plurality of the votes, but not a majority. These equilibria
continue to exist if and only if the threshold is larger than the maximal
vote share a candidate receives in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. All differentiated three candidate equilibria under the major-
ity runoff rule are equilibria under a non-majority runoff rule if maxi vi < τ.
A common equilibrium in many models of spatial competition features
all candidates sharing the ideal policy of the median voter. In two can-
didate models of location choice, these median voter equilibria are often
the unique equilibrium. Multicandidate median voter equilibria exist in
majority runoffs, but do not exist for any threshold below one half.
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Proposition 4. There exists an equilibrium where all k candidates share
ideal position m if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) The benefit of winning the election b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c].
(ii) The threshold required to win office in the first round of the runoff election
τ ≥ 12 .
Even slight decreases in the threshold for non-majority runoffs destroy
this equilibrium. The intuition for the result is straightforward. In order to
incentivize k identical, policy-motivated candidates to seek office and win
with equal probability, the office-related benefits must be large, and thus
b ≥ kc. On the other hand, they cannot be too large. If they were, another
median candidate would want to enter and take the same gamble as the
other candidates. Therefore, b ≤ (k+ 1)c. However, for any number of can-
didates, a slightly more extreme candidate to either side of the median can
enter and obtain a vote share arbitrarily close to one half. This candidate
would then win office in the first round of the election. Even though this
potential entrant has very similar policy preferences to the median can-
didates, the office-related benefits necessary to induce multiple median
candidates to run are more than enough to encourage her to seek office as
well.
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to conclude that, while the threshold in
runoff elections ordinarily operates as a sliding scale between plurality and
majority runoff elections, an important difference in the set of equilibria
occurs at the majority threshold. For any threshold less than one half, we
begin to see the introduction of plurality equilibria and median voter equi-
libria cease to exist. An important first choice in designing a runoff rule,
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therefore, is whether you should use a majority runoff or not. Following
that decision, the particular value of the threshold can be used to tune the
degree of differentiation from the plurality rule.
In majority runoff elections there is only one reason why a citizen might
choose to stand for office when two candidates are already on the ballot.
The incentive to enter comes if the citizen’s ideal policy is weakly closer
to the median voter than at least one opposing candidate, and she would
obtain at least the (weakly) second largest vote share, thereby reaching
the second stage of the election with positive probability and winning with
certainty in that stage. Since no candidate obtains more than half of the
votes in any equilibrium with k ≥ 2 candidates, the second stage is always
reached. OS therefore define er(F) as the threshold value of ε such that
any entrant between two candidates obtains a strictly smaller vote share
than the other two candidates. OS’s Proposition 7 holds for all thresholds
larger than one-half; this is a simple consequence of the electoral outcome
being invariant to the threshold if no candidate could possibly reach the
threshold in the first stage.
In a runoff election with a threshold less than one-half, however, the
incentives for a citizen to enter the election are more complicated. A citizen
may choose to enter in order to change the identity of the winner in a way
favorable to her preferred policy, or she may choose to enter in order to
win office with positive probability.
I turn immediately to considering equilibria with two candidates. OS
provide conditions for existence and characterize one-candidate (“victory
by acclamation”) equilibria; these conditions are invariant to whether the
electoral system is plurality or runoff, and, in the case of runoff elections,
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the level of the threshold for obvious reasons. Entrance by fringe candi-
dates, defined as those further from the median than the external candi-
dates in a given equilibrium, will provide a lower bound on differentiation
among candidates. Deterring entry by an internal candidate, however,
provides an upper bound on how differentiated the candidates might be.
Define es(F, τ) as the critical value of ε for which any entrant between the
two candidates must receive a vote share strictly smaller than the largest
vote share, and for which the largest vote share remains weakly greater
than τ. Let et(F, τ) be defined as max {er(F), es(F, τ)}. Furthermore, let
s(ε, F) be defined as the point between m − ε and m + ε where an entrant
with that ideal point would still generate equal vote shares for the other
two candidates.6
1.4.b Two candidate equilibria
Proposition 5. Assume τ < 12 .
(i) In any two-candidate equilibrium the candidates’ ideal positions are m− ε
and m+ ε for some ε ∈ (0, et(F, τ)].
(ii) An equilibrium in which the candidates’ ideal positions are m− ε and m+ ε
exists if and only if ε > 0, ε ≥ c− b2 , |m− s(ε, F)| ≤ c and either (1) ε < et(F, τ),
(2) et(F, τ) = es(F, τ) = ε ≤ 3c− b or (3) et(F, τ) = er(F) = ε ≤ 32c− b.
The next result shows that the set of two-candidate equilibria is the
same in runoff and plurality elections when the threshold for first round
victory becomes extremely small. This is intuitively obvious; any incentives
to enter due to the potential for a second stage are diminished by the
6If the distribution is symmetric and single-peaked around m, then s(ε, F) = m.
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extremely low probability of a second stage being reached. Another critical
value of ε is required here. OS define ep(F) as the critical value of ε where
if ε < ep(F), no entrant with ideal position d ∈ (m− ε,m+ ε) can enter and
win with positive probability, but if ε ≥ ep(F), a potential internal entrant
could obtain office.
Proposition 6. For all τ less than 13 , the set of two-candidate equilibria in
a runoff election is equal to the set of two-candidate equilibria in a plurality
election.
The set of equilibria with more than two candidates is much more in-
teresting for analysis of runoff elections, however. In practice, a runoff
election with only two candidates in the first stage is virtually identical
to a plurality election. The only difference between the two elections are
the incentives for new candidates to enter; while the threshold to win in
the first stage is relevant to these incentives, it ultimately does not have
much effect beyond creating a lower bound on the differences between
the two candidates: the difference between the two candidates is strictly
larger than zero for any threshold less than 12 . If the threshold decreases,
however, there is, in fact, a commensurate increase in permissible dis-
tance between the two candidates, but no corresponding increase in the
minimum distance. Even if the threshold is substantially lower than 12 ,
and the candidates are only an ε-deviation from the median, no external
candidate will choose to enter. An external candidate would surely reach
the threshold if they entered with an ideal point sufficiently close to one
of the equilibrium candidates, but this would merely allow the new en-
trant’s least preferred equilibrium candidate to win with certainty in the
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first stage.
A similar intuition that underpins the next result, Proposition 7, which
provides limits on the set of equilibria with symmetric clusters of can-
didates around the median (Proposition 9, “two-cluster multicandidate
equilibria under a runoff system” in OS). In all two-cluster multicandi-
date equilibria, there are groups of equal numbers of candidates located
symmetrically around the median at m − ε and m + ε. Define α(F, τ) and
α(F, τ) by F[α(F, τ)] = 1− F[α(F, τ)] = τ. Therefore, α(τ, F) represents the
ideal point which is located maximally far to the left of the median while
still obtaining the threshold number of votes for all configurations of can-
didates that lie strictly to the right of α(F, τ). Furthermore, define ekr(F)
analogously to er(F), where the superscript k indicates that the potential
internal entrant must be at most the k+ 1-th ranked candidate.
Proposition 7. If k ≥ 4 is even, 1k ≤ τ < 12 , and ε > 0, then there is a k-
candidate equilibrium in which the ideal position of k2 candidates is m − ε
and the ideal position of the remaining k2 candidates is m+ ε if and only if:
(i) max {|m− α(F, τ)|; |m− α(F, τ)|} < ε < ekr(F),
(ii) c ≥ |m− s(ε, F)|, and
(iii) b ≥ k(c+ ε).
Note that the addition of the lower bound on candidate differences has
profound effects on the set of equilibria. Suppose that k = 4, the minimum
value for k, τ = 14 , and citizens are distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] inter-
val. Then, in order to deter an external entrant from obtaining 14 +
δ
2 of the
vote, where δ = m − ε − 14 , and winning with certainty in the first round,
the two clusters must be located at 14 and
3
4 . In this case, however, an
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entrant at the median would obtain 14 of the vote and win with certainty in
the first round, since the candidates in the clusters would obtain 316 of the
vote each. In fact, the set of equilibria given by Proposition 7 is empty for
the Uniform [0, 1] distribution for all τ < .3. With six candidates arranged
in two clusters of three candidates each, this set of equilibria is empty for
all τ < 514 ; this constraint continues to bind tighter as the number of clus-
tered candidates grows. This is a weak form of support for Duverger’s Law:
these large clusters of candidates become increasingly unlikely as runoff
elections are more likely to be resolved by plurality rule in the first stage.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper I extend the citizen-candidate model of Osborne and Slivin-
ski to incorporate runoff elections where the threshold for first-stage vic-
tory can take on other values than 50%. Allowing the threshold to vary has
several important implications for Duverger’s Law and qualitative proper-
ties of the candidates who win office in equilibrium. Proposition 5 provides
conditions for the existence of equilibria with two candidates. These equi-
libria are not as common as in plurality election, which provides some
support for Duverger’s Law. Proposition 6 shows that for all thresholds
less than one third, the set of equilibria with two candidates is the same
in runoff elections and plurality elections. This result helps explain some
of the mixed empirical evidence for Duverger’s Law.
I also show that some of the conventional wisdom regarding candidate
differentiation in runoff elections does not hold in the citizen-candidate
model. In Proposition 2 I show that centrist equilibria, where all can-
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didates share the ideal position of the median voter, exist only if runoff
thresholds are 50% or larger. For any lower threshold, candidates must
be at least minimally differentiated. I show a similar result, Proposition 7,
applies to the set of equilibria featuring symmetric clusters of candidates
and provide both an upper and lower bound on the differentiation of the
two groups of candidates. Furthermore, as the hypothetical number of
candidates in each cluster increases, the upper bound binds tighter. For
some standard distributions, at reasonable values of the threshold the set
of equilibria with symmetric clusters is empty. These results suggest that
lowering the threshold below 50% and resolving more elections by plurality
rule in the first stage should, in fact, increase the amount of differentiation
between candidates, as opposed to providing centrist equilibria thought to
be prevalent in plurality elections. Furthermore, I show in Propositions
1 and 2 that equilibria where the Condorcet loser wins office with posi-
tive probability exist for runoff elections. In some of these equilibria the
Condorcet winner enters and loses with certainty in order to shift the ex-
pected policy outcome to be more similar to her own ideal policy. Because
candidates are not exclusively office-motivated, “spoiler” or “sure loser”
candidates appear in some equilibria, providing a theoretical basis for the
continued existence of small parties in runoff elections.
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2 Chapter Two: Aggregate Uncertainty in Runoff Elections and Open
Primaries
2.1 Introduction
In a runoff election, the candidate with the greatest number of votes
wins outright if she receives a predetermined fraction of the votes or more.
If no candidate surpasses the threshold for first round victory, the elec-
torate is asked to vote for a second time between the two candidates who
obtained the largest vote totals on the first ballot. The candidate who
obtains a majority of votes in the second round is the winner of the elec-
tion. Runoff elections are a widespread feature of political competition,
as a majority of countries that directly elect a president do so by a runoff
rule and the popularity of runoffs has grown over time (Blais et al 1997,
Golder 2005, Bormann and Golder 2013).7 Many elections at the state
and local level within the United States also use runoff rules (Bullock III
and Johnson 1992, Engstrom and Engstrom 2008). Despite their popu-
larity, however, we have a limited understanding of the incentives faced by
prospective candidates in constituencies governed by runoff rules.
In this paper I synthesize two common approaches used in the litera-
ture to consider the question of entry incentives in runoff elections with ag-
gregate uncertainty. Despite the shift towards implementing runoff rules,
few papers have considered the question of candidate incentives under
runoff rules. Moreover, the few models of candidate behavior in runoff
elections assume complete information about both the distribution of pref-
7In the 1950s approximately 5% of presidential elections were runoffs, as compared to
over 65% in the 2000s. Additionally, 61 of 91 countries which directly elect a president
do so through runoff elections.
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erences in the electorate and what subset of the electorate will exercise
their vote (Myerson 1993, Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Lizzeri and Persico
2005, Callander 2005). A better understanding of candidate behavior has
important consequences for the design of electoral institutions and policy
evaluation. For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) study policies
designed to promote candidate entry and diversify the characteristics of
candidates for office. Moreover, conducting additional rounds of the elec-
tion is costly.8 I show that aggregate uncertainty has significant effects
on candidate entry incentives and substantially improves the explanatory
power of standard models.
I build a tractable model of endogenous entry into runoff elections
where voters act sincerely, but the distribution of voter preferences dif-
fers between rounds in order to capture the uncertainty candidates face
when choosing to run for office. I assume that voters have horizontally dif-
ferentiated single-peaked preferences which differ across the two rounds
in a way that candidates do not foresee perfectly. Specifically, the location
of the median voter’s ideal policy varies depending on which of two states
is realized between rounds. The form of aggregate uncertainty I assume
does not encompass all uncertainty candidates face at the entry stage, but
does generate a very tractable model with novel and relevant incentives for
candidate behavior.
Runoff elections are also a natural environment in which to study ag-
gregate uncertainty in elections. The repeated voting structure of runoff
elections suggests that events occurring between rounds may provide dif-
8In 2013, New York City spent over 13 million dollars to hold a runoff for public advo-
cate, an office which has a budget of slightly more than 2 million dollars.
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fering incentives for candidates relative to elections where voters act only
once. The set of voters who choose to exercise their vote may vary widely
over the two rounds of the election (see Wright 1989, Bullock III and John-
son 1992, Morton and Rietz 2006 for empirical evidence) and events which
occur between rounds may reveal more information to voters than they
had in the first round of the election. While there is surely some uncer-
tainty before the first round as well, many results are relatively predictable.
In one example discussed below (the Republican party primary for US Sen-
ate in Texas in 2012), polls predicted the rank, relative vote shares, and
necessity of a second round remarkably consistently for a year preceding
the election. My focus, therefore, is on the unique feature which separates
the runoff rule from many other electoral systems.
Four main results arise from my model. First, I show that when candi-
dates face uncertainty the runoff rule does not necessarily promote policy
moderation. Traditionally, the runoff rule has been perceived to encourage
preference revelation while also minimizing the chances of a minority can-
didate obtaining office. I show that even in majority runoffs, a Condorcet
losing candidate (a candidate who would lose every pairwise comparison in
the first round) may obtain office in equilibrium. The possibility of a Con-
dorcet loser obtaining office in equilibrium is also empirically relevant; the
victory of Ted Cruz in the Texas Republican primary election for US Sen-
ate in 2012 is one example (discussed in more detail below). Additionally,
equilibria where all candidates enter with a platform of the median voter’s
ideal policy do not exist in runoff elections with aggregate uncertainty.
Second, in some equilibria, candidates still have an incentive to enter
despite losing with certainty. By choosing to enter the race, a sure loser
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may generate a lottery over the two competing candidates by forcing a
second round of the election, thus inducing a preferable expected policy
outcome for the entrant. To my knowledge, this is the first strategic expla-
nation of the presence of non-competitive candidates in runoff elections.
The presence of this phenomenon is of substantial empirical relevance;
over two thirds of local runoff elections in California feature a third can-
didate who trails by at least five percentage points in vote share. In some
equilibria, the candidate who loses with certainty is the Condorcet winner.
In these cases, what I call sure loser equilibria are also “squeezing” equi-
libria, where a centrist loses due to two slightly more extreme competitors
bracketing her platform. In some of these equilibria, the sure loser enters
to give a positive probability of victory to the Condorcet loser. The presence
of sure losers is a potential source of inefficiency in the electoral system as
second rounds can be extremely costly and may be unnecessary.9
Third, I show that under aggregate uncertainty the set of three candi-
date equilibria expands and is substantially more diverse than in models
with constant preferences. In the citizen-candidate model of Osborne and
Slivinski (1996), there are only two types of three candidate equilibria in
runoff elections: either all three candidates share an ideal policy with the
median voter or they all have particular distinct positions and each re-
ceives one third of the vote. While aggregate uncertainty eliminates me-
dian voter equilibria, many additional three candidate equilibria arise. In
addition to each candidate receiving one third of the vote in the first round,
9This is a primary justification for the many jurisdictions with thresholds less than
a strict majority. Often thresholds are set at 40 percent (e.g. New York City mayoral
races) or 45 percent (Argentinian presidential races) since a candidate obtaining close to
a majority in the first round is perceived as being highly likely to win in the second round
and the costs of having an additional election are large.
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which may occur with a variety of candidate locations in my model, equi-
libria also exist where one candidate obtains a plurality in the first round.
These additional equilibria match observed electoral outcomes much more
closely than the equilibria in canonical models of runoff elections. The
set of two candidate equilibria also features more differentiated equilibria
than in previous work, but two candidate equilibria exist for fewer param-
eter values. In that sense, the effect of aggregate uncertainty on the size of
the set of two candidate equilibria is ambiguous. I interpret my results as
generally supporting Duverger’s (1954) Hypothesis: “simple majority with
a second ballot [the runoff rule] favors multipartyism.”
Finally, the threshold for first round victory in a runoff election may
have important consequences on the set of equilibria. I consider the case
of the nonpartisan blanket (or “top two”) primary, currently used in the
US states of Alaska, California and Washington. Nonpartisan blanket pri-
maries are formally runoff elections with a threshold of 100 percent (i.e.
a second round is guaranteed to occur). I show that this electoral system
substantially reduces the set of two candidate equilibria relative to ma-
jority runoff elections and eliminates three candidate equilibria with sure
losers. Nonpartisan blanket primaries thus retain the increased incentive
to enter from majority runoffs and enhance electoral competition, but at
the cost of requiring a second round in every election.
My results indicate that aggregate uncertainty is an important compo-
nent of modeling runoff elections. Models of candidate entry or positioning
in runoff elections with sincere voting and perfect foresight generate a
much smaller and more precise set of equilibria, but a set which excludes
many empirically relevant outcomes. In addition to improving the predic-
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tive power of our models, my results indicate that runoff systems may have
some undesirable characteristics. Policy moderation may be a normatively
desirable feature of an electoral system; the traditional Hotelling-Downs
result of a median voter equilibrium does not exist in runoff systems, how-
ever, no matter how slight a change in preferences may occur between
rounds. Runoff systems also have the potential to generate spoiler can-
didates who enter for the sole purpose of inducing an extra round of the
election which may be costly.
2.1.a Empirical Relevance
The novel incentives for candidate entry generated by uncertainty over
voter preferences is not simply a theoretical curiosity. Generally, the ob-
served outcomes in runoff elections tend not to correspond to equilibria
in models without aggregate uncertainty. A common feature of models
where preferences are known with perfect foresight is that in all elections
with N ≥ 3 candidates, at least three candidates must win office with pos-
itive probability. Often, this requirement takes the form that at least three
candidates must tie for first place. This outcome would be relatively un-
usual. California county and municipal runoff elections from 1995-2014
with N ≥ 3 candidates feature a five percentage point or less margin be-
tween the second and third ranked candidates only around 30 percent of
the time.10
It appears unlikely that a variety of alternative explanations are capa-
ble of generating my results. Bouton and Gratton (2014) show that the
“push-over effect” (voting strategically for an inferior candidate in the first
10See the California Elections Data Archive for more information.
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round to increase the probability that a voter’s preferred candidate has
an easier second-round matchup) cannot occur in strictly perfect equilib-
ria in a Poisson voting game where the share of strategic voters matches
those estimated by, for example, Kawai and Watanabe (2013) or Spenkuch
(2014). Dynamic models where politicians may choose to enter and lose
due to future career concerns or models where politicians gain utility from
expressing a policy platform also likely do not produce predictions consis-
tent with stylized facts. These concerns should be equally relevant in other
electoral systems, including plurality elections; these alternative explana-
tions do not provide incentives which differ between single and multiple
ballot electoral rules. Nevertheless, well-identified estimates of the effects
of runoff rules on candidate entry (Fujiwara 2011, Bordignon, Nannicini
and Tabellini 2013) confirm Duverger’s Law (plurality elections generate
two party systems) and Duverger’s Hypothesis (runoff elections encourage
multipartyism). Thus, the empirical phenomena captured here are likely
closely linked to the two-round structure of runoff elections.
Vote patterns in runoff elections also provide powerful evidence of vary-
ing policy preferences between rounds. One reasonably common feature
of runoff elections where a second round is required is that one candidate
obtains fewer votes in the second round than she did in the first round
of the election, sometimes causing a reversal (the candidate who obtains
a plurality in the first round is not the winner in the second round). Re-
versals are even more common, occurring in approximately 30% of runoff
elections in the US (Bullock III and Johnson 1992). These results can-
not be explained by turnout; declines in vote totals also occur in elections
where voter turnout increases or remains constant over the two rounds,
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Candidate Round 1 votes Round 1 share Round 2 votes Round 2 share
David Dewhurst 627,731 44.6 480,126 43.2
Ted Cruz 480,558 34.2 631,812 56.8
Tom Leppert 187,900 13.3 – –
Craig James 50,569 3.6 – –
Glenn Addison 23,177 1.6 – –
Lela Pittenger 18,143 1.3 – –
Ben Gambini 7,225 0.5 – –
Curt Cleaver 6,671 0.5 – –
Joe Argis 4,674 0.3 – –
Total 1,406,648 100 1,111,938 100
Table 1: Vote totals, Republican US Senate Primary, Texas, 2012
suggesting that the distribution of voter preferences differs between elec-
tions.
Two examples of electoral results which are equilibria in my model, but
not in standard models, are depicted in Table 1, which summarizes the
outcome of the Texas Republican party primary election for US Senate
in 2012, and Table 2, which summarizes the results from the Brazilian
presidential election of 2006. Both elections feature a candidate receiving
fewer votes in the second round of the election than in the first, as well
as a substantial number of candidates who may be considered to be sure
losers. In the case of Table 1, Tom Leppert obtained sufficiently many
votes that had he chosen not to run, it is possible that David Dewhurst
could have obtained a majority in the first round of the election.11 The
constituents who voted for Leppert and Dewhurst constitute a majority,
although a divided one. Nevertheless, after Leppert forced a runoff pitting
Dewhurst against Ted Cruz, Dewhurst’s vote share dropped dramatically
and Cruz won the nomination. I show that aggregate uncertainty is not
11Polling data suggests Leppert supporters preferred Dewhurst to Cruz
at the time of the first round by a 77 percent to 13 percent margin.
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP Release TX 524.pdf
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Candidate Round 1 votes Round 1 share Round 2 votes Round 2 share
Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva 46,662,365 48.61 58,295,042 60.83
Geraldo Alckmin 39,968,369 41.64 37,543,178 39.17
Heloisa Helena 6,575,393 6.85 – –
Cristovam Buarque 2,538,844 2.64 – –
Ana Maria Rangel 126,404 0.13 – –
Jose Maria Eymael 63,294 0.07 – –
Luciano Bivar 62,064 0.06 – –
Total 95,996,733 100 95,838,220 100
Table 2: Vote totals, Brazilian Presidential Election, 2006
only a potential explanation for the results of this election, but that this
pattern of results is a possible equilibrium outcome.12
Notably, polls in Cruz’s primary victory suggest that this pattern of
votes shares is highly unlikely to be caused by strategic voting. In any
single-vote, single-winner electoral system, it is a weakly dominant strat-
egy for a voter to vote sincerely for their preferred candidate if there are
only two candidates for office. Polls conducted contemporaneously with
the first round of the election indicated that in the hypothetical (but ex-
tremely likely) second round matchup Dewhurst would obtain 59 percent
of the votes to Cruz’s 34 percent, with only seven percent undecided.13
Nevertheless, two months later Cruz obtained nearly 57 percent of the
votes to Dewhurst’s 43 percent.
While Dewhurst’s declining vote total may be explained by a decrease in
turnout (although it seems implausible), Geraldo Alckmin’s declining vote
total in the 2006 Brazilian Presidential election cannot be due to turnout.
In 2006, Lula Da Silva won reelection in the second round of a runoff
against his main challenger Geraldo Alckmin. Alckmin had obtained 41.64
12Bouton (2013) shows a similar result in a model with strategic voters, although his
result requires a threshold for first-round victory less than 50 percent, which is not the
case in this election.
13http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP Release TX 524.pdf
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Candidate Round 1 votes Round 1 share Round 2 votes Round 2 share
Rahm Emanuel 218,217 45.63 329,701 56.2
Jesus Garcia 160,414 33.55 257,101 43.8
Willie Wilson 50,960 10.66 – –
Bob Fioretti 35,363 7.39 – –
William Walls 13,250 2.77 – –
Total 478,204 100 586,802 100
Table 3: Vote totals, Chicago Mayoral Election, 2015
percent of the votes in the first round, approximately 40 million votes,
whereas Lula Da Silva received 48.61 percent of the votes, approximately
46.6 million. The third placed candidate, Heloisa Helena, obtained 6.85
percent of the votes; had she chosen not to run, it is possible that Lula Da
Silva would have won in the first round of the election. While in Table 1
the number of votes declined by approximately 300,000 between rounds,
voting in Brazilian federal elections is mandatory (with minor exceptions).
As a result, the total number of votes differed by less than 160,000 votes in
an election with nearly 96 million votes cast. Alckmin’s vote total declined
by over 2.4 million votes.
Perhaps the most persuasive example, however, is the 2015 Chicago
mayoral election. In the first round of the election, incumbent Mayor
Rahm Emanuel obtained a plurality with 45.63 percent of the votes. His
main challenger, Jesus Garcia was second with 33.55 percent of the votes.
Notably, the third place candidate, Willie Wilson, had been publicly quoted
as saying his “vote is for anybody except for this mayor.”14 Additionally,
after having decided to endorse Garcia in the runoff election, Wilson an-
nounced that his primary motivation for entering the runoff was to induce
a second round: “I have made a difference. If I had just stayed on line and
14http://capitolfax.com/2015/03/02/the-battle-for-willie-wilson/
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maybe just wrote a check to help a particular candidate, we wouldn’t be
in this runoff.”15 Wilson’s claim is that the counterfactual election without
his candidacy would have resulted in a first round victory for the incum-
bent Mayor Emanuel. Wilson’s assertion appears reasonable; had half of
his voters instead chosen to vote for Emanuel, that would be sufficient
for a first-round victory. Alternatively, had Wilson voters chosen not to
vote, Emanuel’s 218,217 votes would have constituted a strict majority
and thus a victory in the first round. While the second round lottery was
resolved in Emanuel’s favor, Wilson’s entry decision was driven by the de-
sire to induce a runoff with an uncertain outcome, exactly the motivation
for sure losers to enter in this model.
2.2 Related Literature
There are three principal strands of literature relating to my paper.
First, my model is a contribution to the large literature on candidate entry
incentives. Feddersen, et al (1990) is one of the first papers to incorporate
both endogenous entry and positioning by candidates in the Hotelling-
Downs framework with a plurality election. My result differ substantially;
in their model candidates are purely office-motivated, and therefore all
candidates must win with positive probability in equilibrium. As a result,
all voters are pivotal between every pair of candidates. Their model cannot
explain the presence of “sure losers,” nor the existence of lopsided elec-
tions, both of which are regularly observed outcomes.16 Haan and Volk-
15http://abc7chicago.com/politics/willie-wilson-endorses-jesus-chuy-garcia-for-
mayor-/554282/
16Some parties have such low probabilities of obtaining office that they do not even
self-identify the prospect of winning the election as a reason they continue to run, e.g.
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erink (2001) consider a Hotelling-Downs model of runoff elections with
entry. As in Feddersen, et al, free positioning and entry implies each voter
is pivotal; the addition of the runoff rule restricts their set of equilibria
to exclusively equilibria where all candidates select the ideal policy of the
median voter. In contrast, this equilibrium does not exist in my model for
even minute shifts in the distribution of voter preferences between rounds.
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) indepen-
dently developed the citizen-candidate model. My results extend Osborne
and Slivinski and substantially improve the predictive power of the set of
equilibria. Besley and Coate, instead, consider a version of the model with
a finite number of voters and do not examine entry incentives in runoff
elections. Brusco and Roy (2011) utilize the same form of aggregate un-
certainty as I do in a citizen-candidate model to study plurality elections.
Brusco and Roy show that aggregate uncertainty generates extremist par-
ties in the sense that in all two candidate equilibria, each candidate lies to
the outside of the interval formed by the two potential locations of the me-
dian voter. My model also generates more extreme two candidate equilibria
than in a model without aggregate uncertainty, but not all equilibria are
extremist. My results also complement Brusco and Roy’s in that I generate
substantially more diverse three candidate equilibria, including equilibria
with extremist candidates.
Second, my model contributes to a growing literature on the effects
of uncertainty in elections. Agranov (2012) considers a model of two-
stage elections where voters must infer candidates’ ideologies from signals
during the campaign and voter preferences differ across the two electoral
http://www.il.lp.org/campaigns/reasons2run.php.
36
stages. In contrast to my model, Agranov allows candidates to choose po-
sitions freely and change their positions across stages of the election. My
results differ in that I focus on entry and number of candidates, whereas
Agranov studies positioning in a model with an exogenous number of can-
didates. Some of our results are similar, though, in that we both generate
equilibria where the candidates for office do not share the position of the
(expected) median voter. Eguia (2007) considers a citizen-candidate model
of plurality elections under uncertainty about whether all votes will be
counted. My model differs from Eguia’s in both the assumptions I use and
the electoral rule considered. Eguia’s model has a finite number of strate-
gic voters and focuses on the question of existence of two candidate equi-
libria in plurality elections, whereas my model has a continuum of sincere
voters and I characterize the set of equilibria for different numbers of can-
didates. Eguia’s results can be read in part as a basis for Duverger’s Law,
whereas my results provide a theoretical basis for Duverger’s Hypothesis.
My model also contributes to the literature concerned with the differing
incentives generated by runoff elections. Bouton (2013) examines runoff
elections with varying thresholds including low (less than 50%) thresh-
olds, although from the perspective of strategic voting rather than strategic
candidate behavior. Bouton shows that runoff elections with strategic vot-
ers may admit two candidate equilibria, which provides evidence against
Duverger’s Law, and that a Condorcet losing candidate can win office in
some equilibria. My results are complementary to Bouton’s. I confirm that
with sincere voting, strategic candidates, and uncertainty over voter pref-
erences, two candidate equilibria still exist in runoff elections. I also show
that a Condorcet losing candidate, defined with respect to the first-round
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distribution of preferences, wins office with positive probability in some
equilibria. Moreover, I show that a Condorcet winning candidate, similarly
defined, may enter and win office with probability zero in equilibrium. In
my paper, none of these results require a runoff threshold less than 50%.
Buisseret (2014) studies a Hotelling-Downs model of non-majoritarian
runoff elections where the runoff rule may include margin of victory re-
quirements. Buisseret finds that non-majoritarian runoffs generate equi-
libria with fewer candidates, and may include entry deterrence even though
preferences are constant across rounds. While I show that aggregate un-
certainty may similarly allow for entry deterrence, on balance, aggregate
uncertainty contributes to candidate proliferation. Callander (2005) con-
siders candidate incentives to enter runoff elections in a Downsian model
with multiple first-mover candidates and no aggregate uncertainty. Candi-
dates are purely office-motivated in Callander’s model, however, while ev-
idence suggests that candidates are also policy-motivated (see, e.g., Levitt
1996). As a result, my model is capable of generating equilibria which fea-
ture candidates entering strategically despite being sure losers in addition
to equilibria where all candidates have positive probability of victory.
In addition to theoretical work, several papers have looked at empirical
evidence regarding Duverger’s Law and Hypothesis. The two most convinc-
ingly identified papers are Fujiwara (2011) and Bordignon, Nannicini, and
Tabellini (2013). Fujiwara (2011) exploits a discontinuity in Brazilian elec-
toral rules at the municipality level to identify the causal effect of a change
from plurality rule to a runoff rule. He finds that the vote share attributed
to third and lower ranked candidates increases by approximately 8.8 per-
centage points, or approximately 56%. Bordignon, Nannicini and Tabellini
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(2013) exploit a similar discontinuity in Italian municipal elections and
find that a switch from plurality rule to runoff rule increases the number
of mayoral candidates by approximately one and a half candidates. My
results are complementary; I provide theoretical evidence suggesting that
aggregate uncertainty generates dramatically more three candidate equi-
libria in runoff elections without a corresponding increase in the amount
of two candidate equilibria.
2.3 Model
I start with a version of the citizen-candidate model used by Osborne
and Slivinski (1996). I assume that the electorate is comprised of a unit
mass of citizens J with single peaked preferences over policy. Policies are
represented by points on the real line, R. The ideal point for a citizen j is
denoted τj, and the ideal points of the electorate are distributed along R
according to an arbitrary distribution F with associated probability density
function f . I assume that F is continuous, strictly increasing, and, in the
first round of the election, has a unique median, m. I also assume there ex-
ists a separate, non-voting mass of potential candidates with single peaked
preferences over policy distributed along R accoring to distribution func-
tion G. I assume that G is also strictly increasing and continuous, and that
support(G) = support(F). I denote the ideal point of a potential candidate i
by τi. The action set for potential candidate i is denoted Ai = {E,N} where
E represents entering the race, and N represents not entering. Types are
common knowledge, and no commitment technology is available to candi-
dates. Each time the populace is called to vote, all citizens do so sincerely
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and myopically.17 A strategy, therefore, is a mapping σi : τi −→ Ai. If a
potential candidate chooses to enter the race, I call her a candidate.
Citizens are policy-motivated and have no preference over the identity
of any candidate. Following the notation in OS, potential candidates who
choose to stand for office incur a utility cost c, and obtain office-related
benefits b (e.g. “ego rents” as in Rogoff 1990) if she is victorious. If a
potential candidate who chooses N has ideal point a and the winner has
ideal point w, the potential candidate’s payoff is
pii(N, σ−i; τi = a) = − |w− a|
which is identical to that of a citizen with the same ideal point. A potential
candidate who chooses N and whose ideal point is the same as the ideal
point of the winner obtains a payoff of zero, the maximal possible payoff for
a non-candidate. If a potential candidate chooses E, however, her payoff is
dependent on whether she wins office and can be written
pii(E, σ−i; τi = a) =

b− c if wins outright
− |w− a| − c if loses outright.
Each potential candidate obtains a payoff of −∞ if no one chooses to enter.
The return to winning an election, b, is the payoff above any policy prefer-
ences. The magnitude of b, therefore, represents the relative weight of the
17I assume sincere, myopic voting for two reasons. First, the assumption that F is a
continuous cumulative distribution function makes the model extremely tractable, and
also implies that each vote has a pivot probability of zero. Second, the purpose of this
paper is to investigate how aggregate uncertainty over voter preferences will affect in-
centives for candidates’ behavior. Combining strategic entry and strategic voting in the
citizen-candidate model is left for further work.
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incentives to run from holding office as compared to the incentives given
by the ability to affect policy. The vote share of candidate i is denoted vi. I
denote the candidate who receives the most votes in the first round of the
election by i∗ and the candidate who receives the second-most votes in the
first round by i∗∗. The winner of the election is denoted by iˆ.
I adopt the citizen-candidate model rather than a Downsian model for
several reasons. First, combining free entry and free choice of policy plat-
form in a model (e.g. a Hotelling-Downs model with free entry) generally
results in each candidate winning with positive, and often equal, proba-
bility (see, e.g., Brusco, Dziubinski and Roy 2012, Haan and Volkerink
2001). Since one goal of my model is to generate a more realistic set of
equilibria, including equilibria where candidates may have incentives to
enter strategically and lose with certainty, this Hotelling-Downs result is
a substantial restriction. Second, the structure of runoff elections forces
an arbitrary choice of the degree of policy commitment allowed to potential
candidates. In a standard Hotelling-Downs model, previous commitments
do not affect a candidate’s ability to commit to an alternative policy in the
general election. Two possible extensions to runoffs suggest themselves:
full commitment in the first round of the election, or repositioning between
rounds. In the citizen-candidate model, however, no commitment devices
are available to potential candidates; thus, the commitment technology
available to candidates remains consistent across electoral systems, and
facilitates easier comparative statics.
The electoral rule considered is as follows. Let K denote the set of
candidates: K = {i ∈ I : σi(τi) = E}. If, at any point in the election #K = 2,
the election is decided by plurality rule: iˆ = i∗. If #K > 2 and vi∗ > 12 , the
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election ends and the winner is the candidate who received the most votes:
iˆ = i∗. If, however, #K > 2 and vi∗ ≤ 12 , the set of candidates is reduced to
the two candidates with the largest vote shares, i∗ and i∗∗. Then a second
election is held between i∗ and i∗∗ evaluated by plurality rule. All ties are
broken with equal probability.
I model aggregate uncertainty over preferences by introducing two pos-
sible states of the world in the event of a second round of the election.
Denote the state space S = {L, R}. In state L, the distribution of voter
preferences is FL satisfying the same conditions as F, and with a unique
median mL, but with the additional requirement mL < m. In state R, voters’
preferences are distributed according to FR with unique median mR > m.
I assume that state L is realized with probability θ, whereas state R is re-
alized with probability 1− θ. Denote the shift in the median voter’s ideal
policy over states by m−mL = sL and mR −m = sR.
While the game has a dynamic structure necessary to capture the se-
quential nature of runoff elections, all of the non-trivial actions are taken
simultaneously at the start of the game. Therefore, the appropriate solu-
tion concept for this game is Nash equilibrium. In particular, a strategy
profile σ constitutes a Nash equilibrium for voters with a profile of types τ
if pii(σi, σ−i; τ) ≥ pii(σi′ , σ−i; τ) ∀ i ∈ I. Since I am concerned with the number
of candidates choosing to enter in equilibrium, I focus on characterizing
sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria with different numbers of candidates.
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2.4 Results
2.4.a Three Candidate Equilibria
Three candidate equilibria are of particular interest in the study of
runoff elections. Duverger’s Hypothesis predicts that runoff rules encour-
age multipartyism relative to plurality systems. Duverger’s Hypothesis is
intuitively appealing due to a perceived reward of finishing second in the
first round of a runoff election. In plurality elections, a second place finish
may suggest to voters that you (or your party) is a serious challenger, but
a second place finish is still a lost election. In a runoff election, however,
a second place finish may allow a candidate to continue competing for of-
fice. Uncertainty with respect to the distribution of voter preferences in
the second round captures this benefit in a way that models with fixed
preferences cannot. In a model where the second round distribution of
voters preferences is known ex-ante, for any configuration of candidates
the outcome of the election is perfectly anticipated (up to a tiebreaking
rule). Thus, in order to generate an equilibrium with multiple candidates,
the candidates’ vote shares must tie in at least one round of the election.
Aggregate uncertainty relaxes this constraint substantially. The remain-
der of Section 2.4.a is devoted to illustrating in exactly which ways this
constraint relaxes.
In a citizen-candidate model where the spatial distribution of citizens’
preferences is constant over time, equilibria with three candidates must
feature all candidates sharing the vote equally. This precise form can be
generated in two ways, either by a cluster of candidates with identical
policy preferences to the median voter or with differentiated candidates at
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a precise location. Intuitively, if any individual candidate obtains less than
a third of the vote in the first round, the consistency of preferences implies
that there must be a candidate who is a sure loser regardless of whether
she reaches the second round. Since the sure loser can save herself cost
c and shift the expected policy to be (weakly) closer to her ideal point by
exiting, this cannot possibly be an equilibrium. Equilibria where three
candidates all tie for first still exist in my model, although not with three
candidates clustered at the median voter’s ideal policy. The possibility of
the spatial distribution of preferences differing between rounds, however,
opens up a much more diverse set of equilibria. Denote by ai candidate i′s
ideal policy with a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3.
Theorem 1. For appropriate parameters (b, c, F), three types of equilibria
exist with the following first-round vote shares vi:
(i) v1 = v2 = v3 = 13 , a1 = F
−1(13) − δ1, a2 = F−1(13) + δ1 = F−1(23) − δ2, and
a3 = F−1(23) + δ2 where δ1, δ2 ≥ 0 and δ1 + δ2 = F−1(23)− F−1(13).
(ii) 12 ≥ vi > vj = vk.
(iii) 12 ≥ vi ≥ vj > vk.
There do not exist any other pure strategy equilibria with three candidates.
A full characterization of equilibria, including restrictions on parameter
values, is in Appendix A. I discuss parameter restrictions in more detail
while analyzing comparative statics in Section 2.5. For most parameter
values, there exist many equilibria of each type. These
Three candidate equilibria are diverse in both vote share and qualitative
properties. Equilibria of type (i) are the most similar to those generated
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by existing models; all candidates obtain equal vote shares in the first
round and obtain office with positive probability. Equilibria of type (ii)
are similar in that all candidates win with positive probability, but differ
in a qualitative sense. These equilibria feature a lone frontrunner and
two candidates competing to reach the second round of the election. An
equilibrium in Bouton (2013) where a divided majority fails to coordinate
on a candidate is analogous to this type of equilibrium. Equilibria of type
(iii) are distinct, however, in that they feature a candidate who obtains
strictly fewer votes than the alternative candidates and loses with certainty
in the first round. This type of equilibrium exists in plurality elections in
Osborne and Slivinski (1996), but my model is the first to generate such
equilibria in runoff elections.
2.4.b Equal vote shares
Equilibria of types (i) and (ii) are similar in that each candidate has a
positive probability of eventually obtaining office in equilibrium. Equilibria
of type (i) give each candidate an equal probability of reaching the second
round of the runoff, although the probability of obtaining office varies by
candidate depending on FL, FR and θ. Nevertheless, the candidate with
ideal policy a2, the centrist, never has the lowest probability of obtaining
office nor does she ever obtain the lowest payoff in equilibrium. These dif-
ferentiated equilibria are also somewhat representative of the electorate’s
preferences. Candidate ideal policies are to the left of the first tercile, be-
tween the first and second terciles, and to the right of the second tercile.
Qualitatively, each third of the electorate has a candidate with similar pol-
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icy preferences, and each candidate receives the support of the third of the
electorate they resemble.
As opposed to models without aggregate uncertainty, in these equilib-
ria candidate policies are not perfectly pinned down. In this sense, even if
equilibria with three contenders were the only three candidate equilibria,
aggregate uncertainty would still have increased the diversity of three can-
didate equilibria and parameter values for which a three candidate equi-
librium could exist. When the spatial distribution of preferences is fixed
over the two rounds of the runoff election, an additional restriction on the
values of δ1 and δ2 is required so that each fringe candidate has positive
probability of winning. This requirement, m− a1 = a3 − m, pins down the
exact ideal policies of each candidate in equilibrium. On the other hand,
under aggregate uncertainty, δ1 and δ2 are not unique for many distribu-
tions and values of b and c.
In equilibrium, payoff restrictions are generated from two sources: com-
peting in the election must be attractive enough to entice the equilibrium
candidates, but not so attractive to induce entry by additional candi-
dates. Equilibrium candidates obtain an office-related payoff ρib, where
ρi is the probability of candidate i obtaining office, and policy-related pay-
offs H(F)which depend on what the result of the race would be were they
to choose not to enter. These candidates must, however, pay cost c of
entering the race; therefore we require ρib+ H(F) ≥ c for each i to sustain
entry. If, however, b is sufficiently large and there exists another candidate
who could enter and win with positive probability, we cannot support this
equilibrium. Thus, restrictions may be required on F to prevent potential
candidates from entering and win with positive probability and jointly on
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F, θ and c to prevent candidates from choosing to enter, lose with certainty,
and obtain a preferable policy outcome.18
Uncertainty over the distribution of preferences has two effects, both
of which weaken the necessary condition for existence of these equilibria
relative to models without aggregate uncertainty. First, since the location
of the median voter will differ in the second round than the first, there is
additional freedom in the location of the candidates in equilibrium. This
relaxes the necessary condition on entry by generating equilibria where a
candidate has highly differentiated preferences and obtains a larger payoff
from the potential shift in policy outcome. Second, the form of aggregate
uncertainty here relaxes the probability of victory for fringe candidates
from exactly 16 to
θ
3 or
1−θ
3 in equilibrium. As a result, for θ 6= 12 , fringe
candidates can also obtain higher payoffs from the non-policy dimension
than in models without aggregate uncertainty.
One noteworthy aspect of equilibria where each candidate ties for first
place in the first round of the election is that this may not occur where all
candidates share the ideal policy of the median voter m. Centrist equilib-
ria may be normatively desirable; depending on the social welfare function
and the exact shape of the distribution of voters, the median voter’s ideal
policy may maximize social welfare. It may also be socially desirable to
choose an electoral rule that generates centrist and likeminded policy-
makers. The non-existence of centrist equilibria extends, in fact, to an
arbitrary number of candidates (larger than one). Theorem 2 is one piece
of evidence suggesting that even majority runoff rules do not necessarily
18In fact, these conditions are quite difficult to describe. For this equilibrium I charac-
terize just the necessary condition generated by payoff restrictions on equilibrium candi-
dates.
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promote policy moderation among candidates for office.
Theorem 2. There does not exist an equilibrium with all k ≥ 2 candidates
sharing ideal policy m.
If k identical candidates are seeking office, they must necessarily receive
equal vote shares in equilibrium. If k = 2, then the election is resolved by
plurality rule with an even-odds lottery. If, however, k > 2, the election
reaches a second round; each candidate is chosen for the second round
with probability 2k , then ties in the second round. Thus, such an equi-
librium requires b ≥ kc. If the ego-rents of office are too large, however,
another median candidate would seek office; thus a centrist equilibrium
also requires b ≤ (k+ 1)c.
Supposing those parameter values are satisfied, though, does not make
a centrist equilibrium possible. If the median voter’s ideal policy in the
second round of the election will be mL < m, where m − mL = e, with
probability θ > 1k , there exists a potential candidate with ideal policy a ∈
(mL,m) who can enter and reach the second round of the election with
certainty. This potential candidate, therefore, faces a θ to 1− θ lottery of
obtaining office. Since max {θ, 1− θ} ≥ 1k for all k ≥ 2, there always exists
a potential candidate for whom this is a strictly preferable lottery than the
centrist candidates are facing in the hypothetical equilibrium (due to a
slight shift in the expected policy towards this potential candidate’s ideal
policy), and this potential candidate will prefer to enter. This holds for any
θ. While this is a direct consequence of the assumption of a continuous
distribution of voters, it is readily apparent that the probability of such a
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citizen existing for a large but finite electorate is substantial.19
2.4.c First round plurality
Equilibria of type (ii) consist of configurations where a single candidate
obtains a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes in the first round and
the other two candidates tie for second place. These equilibria are quite
similar to those where all candidates obtain a third of the vote. There
are two principal differences between the sets of equilibria. One is that
there are fewer restrictions on the ideal policies of the candidates, which
makes equilibria with a first round plurality relatively easier to generate.
The other is that, in general, the candidates who tie for second will have a
lower probability of obtaining office in these equilibria than if candidates
had all received the same vote share. This makes satisfying the necessary
condition for existence relatively more difficult with a first round plurality
winner than when all candidates obtain equal vote shares.
Equilibria with equal vote shares or a first round plurality are consis-
tent with some across-round behavior of vote shares that is observed in
electoral data. Suppose that an equilibrium of type (ii) exists where the
candidates with ideal policies a1 and a2 each obtain 26 percent of the vote
and the candidate with ideal policy a3 obtains 48 percent of the vote. If
state R is realized in the second round, and it happens to be the case that
the candidate with ideal policy a1 is selected via the tiebreaking rule, it is
not unreasonable to suspect that her vote share will decrease across the
two rounds. If, on the other hand, state FL is realized and the candidate
19A similar argument establishes that centrist equilibria cannot exist in runoff elections
with thresholds less than 12 , even without uncertainty over second round preferences.
Proof available upon request.
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with ideal policy a1 wins office in the second round, this would constitute
an electoral reversal, another commonly observed feature of runoff elec-
tions (and the candidate with ideal policy a3 may also lose votes). Finally,
the relaxed restrictions on parameter values and ideal policies relative to a
model without aggregate uncertainty allows these equilibria to capture an
additional dimension of electoral competition in runoffs, the competition
to reach the second round and be the main challenger to the candidate
who obtains a first round plurality.
2.4.d Sure losers
I call equilibria of type (iii) “sure loser” equilibria since, in equilibrium,
one candidate chooses to enter despite receiving the third most votes in
the first round, thus losing the election with probability one. Sure loser
equilibria are of particular interest in the study of elections. Notably, mod-
els with free entry and full commitment imply that all candidates must
win with positive probability in equilibrium. Even in the canonical citizen-
candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski, limited commitment can only
generate sure loser equilibria in plurality elections. My paper presents the
first strategic explanation for the presence of candidates who lose with cer-
tainty in runoff elections. Models which imply all candidates win with pos-
itive probability are at stark odds with observed electoral outcomes, even
when restricting attention to candidates who are likely behaving strategi-
cally. Sure loser equilibria can be further separated into two sets of equi-
libria depending on the location of the ideal policy of the sure loser relative
to the two candidates who are contending to win the election. These two
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sets of equilibria feature either a “fringe” sure loser, or a “centrist” sure
loser.
In fringe sure loser equilibria, the sure loser has an ideal policy ai < aj
or ai > aj for all j 6= i ∈ K. Fringe sure loser equilibria require precise re-
strictions on the location of the ideal policies of the contending candidates.
Since any fringe sure loser will only be taking votes from one candidate by
entering, and that candidate is her preferred candidate of the two con-
tenders, it must be the case that this contender would not obtain a strict
majority in a two candidate election without the sure loser. Additionally, it
must also be the case that the other contender does not obtain a strict ma-
jority; if that was the case, the sure loser’s presence would not change the
outcome of the election. Thus, in any fringe sure loser equilibrium, the two
contenders must have ideal policies equidistant from the ideal policy of the
median voter in the first round of the election. Therefore, by entering and
inducing a second round to occur, the fringe sure loser is transforming an
even-odds lottery over the two contenders into a θ to 1− θ odds lottery over
the two contenders.
Equilibria with fringe candidates running as sure losers do not exist in
plurality elections in other models which generate sure losers. The exact
structure of the runoff rule here is crucial to existence, but the importance
of the structure of the runoff rule is a vestige of simplifying assumptions on
the domain of preferences. A slightly richer model with two-dimensional
preferences (e.g. payoffs are decreasing with Euclidean distance from the
ultimate winner) would easily admit an analogue to these equilibria. Sup-
pose citizens are distributed over the interval [0, 1]× [0, 1]. A configuration
with candidates at (12 − a, 12 − a), (12 + a+ ε, 12 + a+ ε), and (1, 0.1) could con-
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stitute an equilibrium given appropriate parameter values and distribu-
tions. The addition of the second dimension would allow the sure loser
located at (1, 0.1) to reduce both candidates’ vote shares strictly below the
threshold and thus cause a second round. The sure loser will choose to
do this for low c due to her preference for the candidate with ideal pol-
icy (12 + a+ ε,
1
2 + a+ ε). In this sense, fringe sure loser equilibria are less
of a knife edge case than may be apparent at first glance, since a multidi-
mensional model may be a more realistic depiction of political competition,
although a less tractable one.20
In centrist sure loser equilibria, the sure loser has an ideal policy ai ∈
(aj, ak). Centrist sure loser equilibria impose much less stringent restric-
tions on the ideal policies of the contending candidates since a centrist
sure loser will be reducing both contending candidates’ vote shares by
choosing to enter the election. In particular, a sure loser with a centrist
ideal policy may choose to enter in order to reduce the vote share of their
less-preferred contender to less than a strict majority. The main restric-
tions on ideal policies require that the contenders be sufficiently differen-
tiated so that no fringe candidate can enter and replace a contender and
still win office with positive probability.
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) generate centrist sure loser equilibria in
plurality elections without uncertainty, but under much stricter require-
ments than those of my model. First, without uncertainty, in plurality
elections, centrist sure loser equilibria only exist for non-symmetric dis-
tributions of voter preferences. This is due to a sure loser necessarily
20A multidimensional citizen-candidate model generating equilibria with fringe sure
losers is the subject of current work.
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stealing more votes from their preferred contender if the distribution is
symmetric. Vote-stealing from preferred contenders happens here as well,
but has no cross-round effects and thus may still be rational to do even
when voter preferences are symmetrically distributed. Second, centrist
sure loser equilibria do not exist in runoff elections, as there is no longer
any incentive for the centrist candidate to enter. If the sure loser induces
a first round tie, then either there would have been a tie in the first round
regardless of the sure loser’s candidacy or one candidate will win with cer-
tainty in the second round. In either case, the sure loser has paid c to
enter, but has no effect on the distribution of outcomes.
Centrist sure loser equilibria illustrate some undesirable features of
majority runoff elections. Note that in any centrist sure loser equilibrium,
the sure loser must be preventing a contending candidate from obtaining
a majority in the first round. In the absence of the sure loser, the election
would be resolved in the first round. Many countries use non-majority
runoff systems due to the significant cost of holding a second national
election; sure losers cause second rounds to happen more often than they
otherwise would.
Another undesirable feature of these equilibria is that the centrist sure
loser is a Condorcet winning candidate defined with respect to first round
voter preferences. This is because no candidate may obtain a strict major-
ity in equilibrium, and in these three candidate equilibria, the contending
candidates have the most extreme ideal policy positions. Therefore, the
sure loser must be obtaining the vote of the median voter; in any pairwise
competition, she would win the election without requiring a second round.
For sufficiently small differences in second round voter preferences, the
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sure loser would also be the Condorcet winner under those distributions
as well. Furthermore, the sure loser chooses to run in order to give a
Condorcet losing candidate a positive probability of victory.
A centrist sure loser is also an example of a moderate candidate being
“squeezed” by relatively extreme candidates. Bouton and Gratton (2014)
show a similar result for three candidate equilibria where voters are strate-
gic; I show here that only a moderate amount of between-round uncer-
tainty is necessary to exclude a Condorcet winner from the second round.
Runoff elections are commonly believed to generate a large mandate for
the elected candidate because they obtain a strict majority in at least one
round of the election. My results here cast significant doubt on the validity
of that belief.
2.4.e Two Candidate Equilibria
The existence of two candidate equilibria in my model is also of interest.
If two candidate equilibria are particularly prevalent, it would be difficult
to interpret the existence of three candidate equilibria as a strong theo-
retical basis for Duverger’s Hypothesis. While two candidate equilibria do
exist in my model, aggregate uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on the
quantity of two candidate equilibria. Two countervailing forces are at play
in my model. Aggregate uncertainty generates two candidate equilibria
which are more differentiated than in previous models because centrist
entrants may be deterred from entering. This expands the potential set of
two candidate equilibria. On the other hand, entry is now more attractive
to fringe candidates because they have positive probability of obtaining of-
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fice due to a favorable realization of uncertainty. This reduces the set of
parameter values for which a two candidate equilibria can be sustained.
Due to my model generating substantially more three candidate equilibria
than Osborne and Slivinski and having an ambiguous effect on two can-
didate equilibria, I interpret the result to strengthen their argument for
Duverger’s Hypothesis.21
Theorem 3. Fix a distribution of voter preferences F. For appropriate param-
eter values, there exists δ˜ > 0 such that in any two candidate equilibrium
the positions are m− δ and m+ δ, with δ ∈ (0, δ˜(F)]. Each candidate obtains
office with probability one half.
Two candidate equilibria all share a particular structure. We know that
in any two candidate equilibrium, the two candidates must be equidistant
from the median voter at a distance δ ≥ 0; otherwise, one of the candi-
dates would be a sure loser. Moreover, as argued in Theorem 2, multiple
candidates located at the median also does not constitute an equilibrium.
Clearly, these two candidates must also have distinct ideal policies. Were
the two equilibrium candidates to share the same ideal policy, at a location
a 6= m, a median candidate could enter and win with certainty in the first
round of the election. Nevertheless, diverging from the results obtained
21The existence of many two candidate equilibria in my model depends crucially on the
specification of the runoff rule used. If the vote share required to win in the first round
is strictly larger than the threshold and two candidate elections are not evaluated by
plurality rule, many two candidate equilibria disappear. This formalization of the runoff
rule corresponds to the legal definition in some jurisdictions, but other jurisdictions are
unclear. This assumption has no empirical relevance and the theoretical relevance is a
vestige of deterministic voting and a continuous distribution of a unit mass of voters.
Changing the runoff rule to requiring candidates to strictly surpass the threshold would
have no effect on three candidate equilibria other than eliminating those with fringe sure
losers while eliminating many two candidate equilibria, thus substantially strengthening
the prediction of Duverger’s Hypothesis.
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in Osborne and Slivinski, the possibility of a centrist entrant reaching the
second round will not necessarily disrupt a two candidate equilibrium in
my model.
Equilibrium candidates can deter entry by centrist challengers through
the prospect of entrants facing uncertainty regarding the outcome of the
second round of the election. Because of the particular structure of the
electoral rule, in any two candidate equilibrium, each candidate will win
with probability one-half.22 Instead, a potential centrist entrant may be
able to obtain a plurality and reach the second round, but may have a less
than one-half chance at obtaining a favorable realization of the state. The
wedge between equilibrium probabilities of victory and the entrant’s proba-
bility of victory thus generates the potential to deter entry. Therefore, when
compared to a model with perfectly consistent preferences, there may be
additional equilibria where a centrist citizen could reach the second round
and win with positive probability but chooses not to seek office. Never-
theless, equilibrium candidates cannot be unboundedly differentiated; if a
centrist entrant could obtain a strict majority by entering, she would win
in the first round and certainly choose to enter.
Two other potential candidates are particularly useful to highlight in
order to characterize the set of two candidate equilibria. Denote the two
equilibrium candidates’ ideal policies by a1 ≤ a2. Since the median voter’s
ideal policy will differ across the two rounds of the election, it may be
22This is a vestige of the assumption that any two candidate election is resolved by plu-
rality rule, whereas for three or more candidates, a candidate must win a strict majority
of the votes to resolve the election in the first round. My results are robust to allowing
two candidate elections to reach a second round. Regardless, this assumption has no
empirical content; I am unaware of any elections that have had a candidate exactly tie
the threshold for first round victory, and electoral legislation is unclear about how such
an event would be resolved in any case.
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the case that a fringe candidate desires to enter, knowing that she will
reach the second round, and hope for a favorable state to be realized.
Such a citizen will exist for all a1 such that F(a1) > F(
a1+a2
2 ) − F(a1) and
for all a2 such that 1− F(a2) > F(a2)− F( a1+a22 ). The addition of aggregate
uncertainty provides new incentive for these potential entrants to seek
office; since mL − a1 < a2 −mL, these entrants will win office in the second
round conditional on reaching the second round and drawing a favorable
realization of uncertainty. The presence of such citizens operates to reduce
the set of two candidate equilibria, contrasting with the deterrent effects
on centrist entrants noted above.
When compared to the baseline case without aggregate uncertainty and
candidates are not highly differentiated (there does not exist a centrist citi-
zen who can enter and reach the second round), there are fewer two candi-
date equilibria when candidates are ex-ante unsure about the distribution
of preferences in the second round. Similar to the case without aggregate
uncertainty, we must reward equilibrium candidates sufficiently much for
them to choose to seek office. There are, however, many more strategic
motivations for citizens to choose to enter in equilibrium. If an external
entrant could reach the second round and win in a favorable state, they
may choose to enter if the cost of seeking office is not too large. Addition-
ally, if the two states are not equiprobable, a citizen may choose to enter,
knowing that they would lose with certainty, but by doing so induce a sec-
ond round which gives a favorable lottery to her preferred candidate. This
motivation is not present in a model with preferences that do not vary over
the two rounds.
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2.5 Comparative Statics
In addition to being used in a majority of direct presidential elections,
runoff rules are also used in many lower stakes elections, including rel-
atively small town mayoral elections or primary elections where the win-
ner is not expected to be competitive (e.g. Democratic party primaries in
Republican-dominated districts). The wide variety of contexts for applica-
tion of the runoff rule and the multiplicity of equilibria in my model sug-
gest that performing comparative statics exercises are particularly useful
for generating more precise predictions for candidate behavior.
Since I do not characterize plurality results, my focus is on how the
properties of the runoff election and electorate will change the likelihood
of observing a particular type of equilibrium characterized above. Nev-
ertheless, it’s useful to first note that a citizen-candidate model without
aggregate uncertainty predicts that the set of two candidate equilibria in
a runoff is a subset of the set of two candidate equilibria in a plurality
election. My model generates a set of two candidate equilibria that is more
differentiated, but exists for a smaller set of parameters (b, c) while gen-
erating many more three candidate equilibria. Specifically, I require addi-
tional restrictions to deter external citizens from entering, as they would
now be competitive in the second round and win office with a favorable re-
alization of uncertainty. In that sense, my model suggests that Duverger’s
Law is likely to hold also in a setting with aggregate uncertainty. Differing
from Osborne and Slivinski (1996), my model can support a three candi-
date equilibrium for any distribution F satisfying the conditions in Section
2.3 given appropriate parameters (b, c). I turn now to exploring in which
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way the set of three candidate equilibria varies over the (b, c) parameter
space.
First, note that all three candidate equilibria are more difficult to sup-
port as (b, c) become large. Many necessary conditions for equilibrium
candidates to seek office share the form ρb+ H(F) ≥ c, where ρ is a proba-
bility of obtaining office and H(F) > 0. In essence, equilibrium candidates
trade off the cost of running for office c with an uncertain benefit ρb of
obtaining office and the shift in expected policy outcome closer to their
own ideal policy H(F). If b ∈ [ρ−1(c− H(F)), ρ−1c), the uncertain benefit of
obtaining office is not sufficiently large to compensate for the sure cost of
running for office. Thus, as (b, c) become large, for a fixed distribution F
these equilibria will cease to exist. If, however, b ≥ ρ−1c, increasing b and c
jointly has no effect on these conditions.
Increases in (b, c) do have a differential effect on the various types of
equilibria. For b ≥ ρ−1c, increases in the scale of (b, c) has no effect on the
existence of equilibria where all three candidates win with positive proba-
bility. Scaling up these two parameters diminishes the relative importance
of policy disagreement, but for sufficiently large b, the prospect of holding
office is sufficient to generate entry. When c become large, though, sure
loser equilibria cease to exist. The intuition is straightforward; in any sure
loser equilibrium, the sure loser must pay cost c to enter, but is moti-
vated exclusively by shifts in the expected policy: ρ = 0 for the sure loser.
As a result, for large (b, c), we should see only equilibria where all three
candidates obtain office with positive probability.
The difference in the set of equilibria as (b, c) increase generates a
testable prediction. Without loss of generality, suppose θ ≥ 1− θ. When
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b ≥ 41−θ c, there is no effect on the set of equilibria where three candidates
tie for first or on the set of equilibria where two candidates tie for second
(equilibria of types (i) and (ii) in Theorem 1) when increasing b and c. Thus,
the vote share of the first place candidate, conditional on being weakly
less than 12 is not informative. Sure losers, however, are never competi-
tive even for second place. Therefore, the vote share of the second place
candidate and the third place candidate should on average be closer in
three candidate elections with large cost of seeking office and large benefit
to obtaining office. An alternative way to interpret this comparative static
is that the model predicts that the probability of a “tie” (defined as vote
shares differing by less than some small margin) between the second and
third place candidates is more likely as (b, c) increase.
Comparative statics with respect to other parameters may also provide
sharper predictions about equilibrium behavior. Suppose that an elec-
torate has a systematic bias in which subset of voters exercises their vote
in the first round of the runoff election. This could be the case, for ex-
ample, in an electorate with a popular incumbent whose supporters are
confident that she will advance to the second round and thus choose not
to vote in the relatively less consequential first round. In my model, this
bias would be represented by θ 6= 12 .
If θ is sufficiently different from 12 , equilibria with three candidates are
difficult to support. In every three candidate equilibrium, the second
round is a certain occurrence. In equilibrium, at least one of the three
candidates has a probability of victory increasing in θ and at least one of
the three candidates has a probability of victory increasing in 1− θ. More-
over, the policy-related portion of each candidates’ payoff is also increasing
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in their probability of victory. The immediate implication of these facts is
that in an election where θ is close to 0 or 1, the benefit of obtaining of-
fice b must be very large relative to the cost of seeking office c in order to
induce at least one contender to remain in the race in a three candidate
equilibrium. Thus, in electorates where the shift in the median voter’s
ideal policy between rounds is relatively predictable, we should see fewer
elections with three candidates on the ballot.
Relatedly, bias in the shift of the median voter’s ideal policy affects the
sets of three candidate equilibria differently. If θ = 12 , no equilibria with
fringe sure losers can be supported since the presence of the fringe sure
loser has no effect on the contending candidates’ probabilities of victory.
However, If the shift is unbiased equilibria with centrist sure losers may
still exist. In electorates where the shift in the median voter’s ideal policy
between rounds is relatively unpredictable, in sure loser equilibria, candi-
dates who lose with certainty should have centrist policy platforms relative
to to the contending candidates.
While the bias in shifts in the distribution of voter preferences gener-
ates interesting testable predictions, observing and quantifying candidate
platform has traditionally been a difficult problem to solve. Methods based
on campaign finance such as in Bonica (2013) or survey data such as in
Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) are promising, but are currently
restricted to federal elections in the U.S. where runoff rules are unpopular.
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2.5.a Blanket Primaries
One special type of runoff election has gained attention in the United
States as an alternative to party primary elections. The states of California,
Washington and Alaska have all implemented an electoral system known
as a “nonpartisan blanket primary” for federal (not including presidential)
elections. In a nonpartisan blanket primary election, all candidates com-
pete for one of two places in the general election, which are not allocated
directly to parties. All voters receive one vote and may vote for any can-
didate, as opposed to closed primary elections, in which citizens must be
party members in order to vote in the party primary, or partisan open
primaries, in which parties hold party-specific primary elections but any
citizen may vote in the election regardless of party membership. Formally,
a nonpartisan blanket primary is a runoff election with a threshold for
first-round victory of 100 percent; in other words, a runoff election with
a guaranteed second round. This is a small change to the runoff rule
considered here, but one with strong implications for the set of equilibria.
Theorem 4. For appropriate parameter values, two candidate equilibria ex-
ist. In equilibrium, candidates have ideal policies a1 < a2 satisfying one of
the following conditions:
(i) a1 < m < a2, where |mL − a1| ≤ |mL − a2| and |mR − a2| ≤ |mR − a1|, or
(ii) a1 = mL − δ, a2 = mL + δ, or
(iii) a1 = mR − δ, a2 = mR + δ.
Requiring a second round has the effect of encouraging entry at many
locations on the distribution of preferences. Increasing the incentive to
enter has two countervailing effects on the set of two candidate equilibria.
62
One effect makes two candidate equilibria easier to support. Candidates
no longer win the election outright even when obtaining greater than half
the first round votes; thus, two candidate equilibria could exist where one
candidate obtains 40 percent of the vote in the first round but could win
following a favorable realization of uncertainty in the second round. On the
other hand, this same logic applies also to potential entrants. Thus, in two
candidate equilibria analogous to those in Theorem 3, the candidates must
be sufficiently differentiated to ensure that potential fringe entrants would
not be able to reach the second round. Moreover, no potential centrist
entrant can be deterred if they would reach the second round since they
will also win office with at least probability θ or 1− θ, the same probability
of obtaining office as one of the equilibrium candidates.
The certain occurrence of a second round also provides space for a
new type of two candidate equilibrium. As is often discussed in partisan
primary elections, candidates have an incentive to “move towards the mid-
dle” in the general election since the distribution of voter preferences has
changed. While in my model candidates cannot change platforms, a simi-
lar phenomenon occurs. If the probability of realizing one state, e.g. state
L, is sufficiently large (θ close to 1) then candidates may enter around the
likely second round median. In this case, a potential entrant to the right of
the equilibrium candidates could guarantee reaching the second round of
the runoff, but if the likelihood of realizing state L is sufficiently high, she
will be deterred from entering. Thus, with a significant enough bias in the
between-round shock, equilibria exist with two candidates symmetrically
located around the likely second round median voter. This phenomenon
should be observed in real elections if the set of voters participating in the
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blanket primary are systematically different from those in the general elec-
tion, e.g. if there is some correlation between policy preferences and how
invested voters are in political participation. A similar result, of course,
holds with respect to two candidate equilibria around mR. The increased
incentive to enter thus provides for an increased diversity of locations pos-
sible to support in equilibrium, but existence for a substantially restricted
set of parameters.
Notably, equilibria with sure losers no longer exist in a blanket primary.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. When considering a
runoff election with a threshold for first round victory of one half of the
votes, sure losers may have an incentive to enter the election in order
to force a second round, especially if the shock is biased towards their
preferred candidate. When the threshold cannot be surpassed in the first
round, however, no incentive to enter and lose with certainty exists; a
second round will occur regardless of vote shares, and thus in a three
candidate equilibrium a sure loser’s presence is irrelevant to the electoral
outcome. Since entering the election is costly, a citizen will always find it
optimal to not enter the election if they were to be a sure loser.
Theorem 5. There does not exist a three candidate equilibrium where one
candidate obtains office with probability zero.
Theorems 4 and 5 also provide testable predictions across runoff rules.
In particular, in two candidate equilibria with a majoritarian runoff rule,
the two candidates must each tie with vote shares of 12 . This is no longer
the case in blanket primaries. Let v∗ and v∗∗ denote the vote share of the
leading candidate and the runner-up respectively. For a given electorate,
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in two candidate elections under majoritarian runoff rules, v∗ − v∗∗ is less
than in two candidate elections in blanket primaries.
Additionally, we should expect to see more candidates in equilibrium
under the blanket primary relative to a majoritarian runoff rule. This is, in
some sense, an immediate implication of the substantial reduction in pa-
rameter values supporting two candidate equilibria. The result is corrob-
orated, however, by the continued existence of three candidate equilibria
which feature all candidates winning with positive probability. While I do
not characterize these equilibria here, the continued existence of equilibria
where more than two candidates all have positive probability of obtaining
office should be clear; the only aspects of these equilibria which would
differ in a blanket primary are the payoffs to the candidates in equilibrium
if they were to deviate and choose not to enter. For the more extreme can-
didates, this would be a change from guaranteeing the centrist candidate
victory to (potentially) a lottery over the centrist candidate and the remain-
ing extreme candidate, which must be payoff reducing for the potential
deviator. Thus, the necessary condition would relax for the extreme can-
didates. As a result, in a given electorate, the number of candidates for
office should be larger under a blanket primary than a majoritarian runoff
rule.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a citizen-candidate model where candidates face
some aggregate uncertainty over the distribution of voter preferences in
the second round of a runoff election. I show that the addition of ag-
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gregate uncertainty generates a substantially more diverse set of three
candidate equilibria which more closely matches observed electoral out-
comes than the set of equilibria in models with perfect foresight. Notably,
the existence of these equilibria and non-existence of median voter equi-
libria cast significant doubt on the belief that runoff elections encourage
policy moderation. I characterize equilibria where candidates choose to
enter strategically despite losing the election with certainty in order to in-
duce a second round which improves the odds of victory of their preferred
contender. In some of these equilibria the sure loser is a Condorcet winner
who enters to give positive probability of victory to a Condorcet loser. I also
show that equilibria exist where the candidate who obtains a plurality in
the first round loses in the second round; empirical evidence in Bullock III
and Johnson (1992) indicates that reversals occur in approximately 30%
of runoff elections in the US. Further, I show that nonpartisan blanket pri-
maries, which are identical to runoff elections with a guaranteed second
round, strengthen the conclusion that runoffs generate larger numbers of
candidates.
A principal limitation of my model is the assumption of a continuous
distribution of citizens. While this assumption buys some tractability for
the model, it also costs me the ability to consider strategic voting in my
framework. While estimates of the amount of misaligned voting tend to be
small, the same papers estimate that the proportion of strategic voters is
quite large (Spenkuch 2013, Kawai and Watanabe 2011). Nevertheless, it
appears unlikely that the addition of strategic voting is sufficient to repli-
cate the additional equilibria featured here. Strategic voting, however, may
plausibly expand or refine the equilibrium set generated here. The rela-
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tively small fraction of misaligned voters suggests that much of the effects
of strategic voting are on the set of candidates who choose to enter, thereby
making a setting with a finite number of voters who act strategically a nat-
ural extension.
An additional limitation of my model is the degree of aggregate uncer-
tainty I assume. While the formulation is relatively general in that I do
not impose many assumptions on the distributions in either state, I do
assume that the ideal policy of the median voter will differ from the first
round to the second round with certainty. Nevertheless, many of my re-
sults are robust to a model where the median voter’s ideal policy may
remain the same with some probability. Intuitively, the general incentive
to enter and force lotteries remains unchanged even with the possibility of
the median voter’s ideal policy remaining constant. The main difference in
such a model would be slightly more complicated payoff restrictions stem-
ming from the fact that there are now three possible states that may be
realized. As an example, Theorem 2 would be restated as “There does not
exist an equilibrium with all k ≥ 2 candidates sharing ideal policy m if the
probability of realizing either state L or state R is at least 1k .”
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3 Chapter Three: Extremist Politics and the Preference for Compro-
mise
23
3.1 Introduction
Violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (or Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives) have been extensively documented in choice from
menus across many domains. Two particular violations, the “compromise
effect” and the “attraction effect,” seem to be particularly robust features
of behavior. The compromise effect refers to a tendency of decision-makers
to avoid choices that are “extreme” in some feature in the choice set. The
attraction effect can be described as a tendency for decision-makers to
select an option which strictly dominates some other option in the choice
set if no other alternatives satisfy the same dominance relation.
In this paper, we extend the canonical citizen-candidate model to a
multi-dimensional policy space and consider how the presence of voters
who are subject to compromise and attraction effects change incentives
for candidate entry. Despite having observed these effects in many dif-
ferent contexts of choice from menus, the literature has largely ignored
how the presence of these behavioral effects change incentives for optimal
menu construction. In particular, while Pan, et al (1995) documented the
presence of these effects in political contests, the literature has yet to in-
corporate voter preferences generating compromise or attraction effects in
models of political competition. We show that incorporating these pref-
23This chapter is based on joint work with Alex Poterack.
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erences generates novel incentives for candidate behavior and provides a
strategic incentive for extremist candidates to run for office in equilibrium.
We build a tractable model of endogenous entry into plurality elections
where voters act sincerely, but have preferences subject to the compromise
and attraction effects. We model the compromise and attraction effects
via “frames of reference” as in Tserenjigmid (2015) and Poterack (2015).
Voters have horizontally differentiated single-peaked preferences along two
dimensions of policy, but different menus of candidates on the ballot can
generate different frames of reference and thus change how voters evaluate
the policy platforms of the candidates.
Elections are of particular interest in the study of supply-side responses
to the compromise and attraction effects. Candidates can be thought of as
single-product oligopolists competing for market share, but without access
to price as an instrument. Differing from competitive product markets,
however, there is a clear menu facing all consumers in the market which
is endogenously determined by strategic behavior. In many contexts in
traditional product market competition, understanding what menu a con-
sumer actually observes is difficult, yet integral to understanding these
effects. Thus, our model should be understood to provide some insight
into the forces introduced to oligopolistic product markets by these effects
while clearly leaving scope for further work.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we provide a tractable
model of spatial competition in elections with multiple dimensions of pol-
icy space. Failures of canonical models to generalize from single to multi-
dimensional policy spaces has plagued the study of electoral politics. In
particular, Plott (1967), Kramer (1973), McKelvey (1976) and others demon-
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strated that pure strategy Nash equilibria generally fail to exist when can-
didates compete over policy spaces with more than one ideological di-
mension. Solutions to this problem have included introducing uncer-
tainty to voter behavior in order to smooth payoff functions (Roemer 2004),
eliminating either the spatial structure or single-peakedness assumptions
on voter utility functions (Besley and Coate 1997), or adding candidate-
specific valence effects (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000). We require nei-
ther type of assumption and instead obtain our results by restricting the
degree of commitment available to candidates. This is a natural assump-
tion that reflects realities of political competition at high levels of elected
office. First, candidates do not, in reality, have commitment technologies
available to them. Second, voters likely have well-formed beliefs about the
policies a (for example, presidential) candidate would implement based on
an observed history of policymaking.24
Second, we show general results on the incentives generated by the
compromise and attraction effects in spatial models. We show, indepen-
dent of the chosen functional form of the representation, asymmetric ef-
fects of extremist entrants on moderate candidates. For symmetric distri-
butions of voter preferences, however, any particular extremist entrant has
an “equal and opposite” extremist who has exactly countervailing effects
on voter preferences over the moderate candidates. For skewed distribu-
tions of voter preferences, this equal and opposite extremist may not exist.
24One can think of our game as being a stage of a dynamic game where politicians in-
vest in being associated with a policy platform early in their career by voting for it when
in office. Later, voters would have more precise views about the candidates’ policy pref-
erences. So long as there is still a payoff to being associated with this policy after leaving
office (e.g. legacy concerns, transitioning to private lobbying work, etc.), politicians would
not deviate in this stage game either.
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Therefore, we conclude that distance from the mean voter’s preferred pol-
icy may be relatively more important than distance from the median voter’s
preferred policy in multicandidate elections.
Third, we implement a particular functional form of these effects char-
acterized by Tserenjigmid (2015) and Poterack (2015) and use that form to
study Nash equilibria of an entry game. We show that there exist linear
equilibria where extremists enter and obtain office with probability zero.
By entering, however, they positively frame their preferred moderate can-
didate, and thus shift the expected policy outcome closer to their ideal
point. This is a novel result in models of spatial competition. All previ-
ous models which generate sure loser equilibria either require them to be
centrist with respect to the competitive candidates in a “squeezing” equi-
librium (Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Solow 2015) or require violations of
single-peaked preferences (Besley and Coate 1997).
3.2 Related Literature
Multidimensional spatial competition has been of great interest histori-
cally, especially in the domain of supply-side behavior in elections. Unfor-
tunately, early work by Plott (1967), McKelvey (1976) and others demon-
strated that in Hotelling-Downs models of multidimensional competition,
pure strategy Nash equilibria generally do not exist. Despite this, multi-
dimensional competition seems important. Ahler and Broockman (2016)
argues that mapping voters’ preferences to a single dimension can mis-
characterize as moderate voters who hold immoderate views on a number
of issues, but are less correlated in their preferences than parties are.
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Theorists have employed a number of strategies to attempt to address
the problems with multidimensional Hotelling-Downs. Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2000) introduce valence, a vertical differentiation component, to
the model and show that valence issues restore equilibria. In all equilib-
ria, however, the candidate with a greater valence score wins the election
with probability one. Mckelvey (1986) utilizes a different solution tech-
nique for the game and shows that the uncovered set contains equilibrium
behavior under several different institutional structures. Roemer (2004)
studies the Hotelling-Downs model where voters behave probabilistically,
which smooths the discontinuities in candidate payoff functions which
cause Nash equilibria not to exist.
Our results here are complementary. Rather than introduce noise to
voter preferences or change the mode of differentiation, we restrict candi-
dates’ ability to commit to different policy platforms. As in Osborne and
Slivinski (1996), candidates are unable to credibly commit to a policy plat-
form different than their most preferred policy. We show that this lack
of commitment technology restores existence of equilibria and that some
of these equilibria address undesirable features of the set of equilibria in
other models. For example, all candidates who choose to enter despite los-
ing with certainty in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) must be centrist. This
is no longer the case in a multidimensional issue space. Additionally, the
multidimensional domain of competition allows us to study the attraction
and compromise effects.
The attraction effect was first demonstrated experimentally in the early
1980’s by Huber et al. (1982), and the compromise effect was demon-
strated first by Itamar Simonson (1989), whose paper also provided sup-
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port for the attraction effect. These papers are strictly concerned with ob-
serving the effects; neither of them attempt to construct a representation
incorporating these effects. Some effort to do so is undertaken by Simon-
son and Tversky (1993), whose model (unlike ours) depends on context
created by all elements in a menu, not just the worst along each attribute.
Kivetz et al. (2004) analyze the Simonson and Tversky model, and two
others, in terms of which best fit available experimental data.
Recently, there has been renewed interest in applying models of the
attraction and compromise effects to economic questions. In particular,
Ok et al. (2015), utilize their representation of the attraction effect to
derive the optimal menu of vertically differentiated products offered by a
multiproduct monopolist in the presence of consumers who exhibit the
attraction effect. Our contribution is complementary. We provide the first,
to our knowledge, study of horizontal differentiation in the presence of the
compromise effect. In addition, our framework is competitive rather than
monopolistic, although we do not study the implications of these effects
for pricing.
The most closely related paper to our application here is Pan, et al.
(1995). Pan, et al. argue that experimental subjects exhibit the attraction
effect when given menus of political candidates who have been scored on
various issues. The subjects were randomly assigned to menus where
different candidates had an asymmetric dominance relationship with a
third candidate. Despite subjects’ previous familiarity with the candidates
(e.g. presidential candidates), Pan, et al. recover evidence of the attraction
effect in voter choice.
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3.3 Model
We begin with the standard continuous citizen-candidate model of Os-
borne and Slivinski (1996). In any election, the electorate is comprised of a
unit mass of citizens I with single-peaked preferences over policy. Policies
are represented by the double (e, s); these two dimensions can be thought
of representing, for example, economic and social policies. The ideal point
for citizen i is denoted (ei, si), and the ideal points of the electorate are
distributed over R2 according to an arbitrary distribution function F. We
assume F is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments. In
Section 3.5 we will restrict F to be bounded and have support [0, 1]× [0, 1].
We also assume there exists a unit mass of potential candidates J with
single-peaked preferences over policy. Potential candidates are also dis-
tributed over R2 according to continuous, strictly increasing distribution
function G, where support(G) = support(F).25 The action set for potential
candidate j is denoted Aj = {E, N} where E represents entering the race,
and N represents not entering. Types are common knowledge, and no
commitment technology is available. Since there is a unit mass of citizens,
no single citizen may be pivotable between candidates, and therefore all
citizens vote sincerely. If a potential candidate chooses to enter the race,
we call her a candidate.
Citizens are policy motivated and have no preference over the identity
of any candidate (i.e. there are no valence effects). Potential candidates
are also policy motivated. In addition, those candidates who choose to
25We define the set of citizens and candidates separately in order to facilitate the analy-
sis of Section 3.5. Our results from Section 3.4 would be identical if candidates were also
allowed to vote. Our restriction on the supports is also an analytical convenience and not
required to retain the qualitative properties of our results.
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stand for office incur a utility cost c of running for office.26 Whichever
candidates wins the election obtains office-related benefits b (e.g. “ego-
rents” as in Rogoff 1990). We assume policy motivations take the form of a
linear cost function in the difference between the implemented policy and
a citizen or candidate’s ideal policy. Therefore, if the winner of the election
has ideal policy (ew, sw), citizens and all potential candidates who choose
N and have type τj = (ej, sj), obtain a payoff of
pij(N, σ−j; τj = (ej, sj)) = −((ej − ew)2 + (sj − sw)2) 12
A candidate who chooses to enter the race obtains an additional payoff
b in the event of winning the election, but pays cost c regardless of the
outcome. Therefore, for a candidate with ideal policy (ej, sj), her payoff of
choosing E is
pij(E, σ−j; τj = (ej, sj)) =

b− c if wins outright
−((ej − ew)2 + (sj − sw)2) 12 − c if loses outright.
Henceforth, we use d(x, y) to denote the Euclidean distance (policy relevant
portion of payoffs) between x and y. Each potential candidate obtains a
payoff of −∞ if no one chooses to enter. The office-related portion of the
payoff function, b, therefore represents the magnitude of the incentives to
run from obtaining office relative to the incentives to run from the ability
26The cost of running for office is better understood as the net cost of running for
office absent parameters modeled here. If candidates obtained, for example, dynamic
career benefits from running, that would appear in this model as a lower value of c. The
assumption we make of equal cost of running for office, therefore, excludes cases such
as term-limited candidates or a mapping from vote shares to post-electoral influence.
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to affect policy.
The game is a simultaneous move entry game. Thus, a strategy is a
mapping σj : τj → Aj.. As is typical in citizen-candidate models, we focus on
characterizing pure strategy Nash equilibria by the number of candidates
who choose to enter (e.g. the set of equilibria where two candidates choose
to enter the race). An equilibrium is given by pij(σj, σ−j) ≥ pij(σ′j , σ−j) for all
j and σ′j . Let the set of candidates be given by K =
{
j ∈ J : σj = E
}
and
let the vector of types for the set of candidates who have chosen to enter
be denoted τK. Denote by vj(τK) the vote share of candidate j, i.e. the
measure of voters who prefer j to all other candidates. We study plurality
elections. Therefore, the set of victors is given by W = {j : vj ≥ vk∀j, k ∈ K}.
3.4 Multidimensional Citizen-Candidate
As is traditional in citizen-candidate models, we characterize sets of
pure strategy Nash equilibria by the number of candidates who choose to
enter the race. The relative magnitudes of the set of two candidate equi-
libria and the sets of multi-party (three or more) candidate equilibria are
of particular interest. Duverger’s (1954) Law, the statement that plurality
rule generates two party systems, seems to hold empirically. Nevertheless,
three candidate equilibria do exist in plurality elections in the unidimen-
sional citizen-candidate model. Osborne and Slivinski (1996) show a form
of Duverger’s Law: for all distributions of voter preferences F, the set of
parameters b and c that support two candidate equilibria under the runoff
rule are a subset of those that support two candidate equilibria under plu-
rality rule. While we do not consider the runoff rule here, our analysis
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provides the first set of results necessary to compare the two rules in the
citizen-candidate model under multidimensional competition.
As is the case in all citizen-candidate models, we face a large multiplic-
ity of equilibria. Indeed, the move to multiple dimensions of competition
makes this problem worse, as there are more sets of candidate locations
that generate vote shares that may occur in equilibrium. The first step,
therefore, is to attempt to limit the potential positions that candidates can
take in equilibrium. In a single dimension, candidates who lose with cer-
tainty cannot be extreme amongst the set of entrants. This result is due to
the fact that a candidate who is losing with certainty, but extreme among
the set of entrants, either has no effect on the policy implemented or helps
her least preferred alternative candidate win the election. This no longer
holds in a two dimensional model, but the intuition of the result remains.
Lemma 1. There does not exist an equilibrium in which a candidate x loses
with certainty if ∀ i such that argmaxz∈K ui(ez, sz) = x, argmaxz∈K/{x} ui(ez, sz) =
y for some y ∈ K/{x}.
Lemma 8 formalizes the underlying logic of Lemma 1 in Osborne and
Slivinski (1996) and extends it to multiple dimensions. In this multi-
dimensional framework we can see clearly that the restrictions on posi-
tions of sure losers in equilibrium is not really about the relative extremity
of candidates, but rather about agreement of their voters on the next-best
alternative.
This is particularly relevant to models of strategic voting with exoge-
nous candidates which often study “divided majority” cases (e.g. Myerson
and Weber 1993). In a divided majority setting with three candidates, a
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majority of voters prefer either of candidates A or B to candidate C, but
disagree on their ranking of A and B. Our result suggests that if candi-
dates are policy motivated as well as office motivated, and agree with their
supporters on policy, the assumption of both candidates A and B choosing
to participate in the election is not innocuous.
We wish to characterize the set of multi-candidate equilibria. In order to
do so, we must first characterize vote shares for entry by arbitrary sets of
candidates. As in McKelvey (1986) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
our voters’ preferences here are Euclidean. Thus, the set of voters who are
indifferent between two candidates x and y is defined by the perpendicular
bisector of the vector τx − τy. Let M denote the set of all median lines, i.e.
all lines that divide F(.) into two regions of equal mass. Borrowing a term
from McKelvey (1986), let the “yolk” of the distribution be defined as the
smallest ball in R2 which intersects all median lines. When specializing
the distribution in later sections, we will return to the importance of the
yolk for existence of different equilibria.
In order to characterize the set of two candidate equilibria, we must
know the vote shares of all configurations with at least three candidates.
Suppose there exist three candidates, x, y, and z, with (ex, sx) = (12 + a,
1
2 +
b), (ey, sy) = (12 + c,
1
2 + d), and (e
z, sz) = (12 + f ,
1
2 + g). Without loss of gen-
erality, let b < d. The set of voters who are indifferent between candidates
x and y is given by si = a−cd−b e
i + 1+d+b2 − a−cd−b
(
1+a+c
2
)
, and therefore the set of
voters who prefer x to y are all voters with si ≤ a−cd−b ei + 1+d+b2 − a−cd−b
(
1+a+c
2
)
.
The set of voters who are indifferent between x and z is given by si =
a− f
g−b e
i + 1+d+g2 − a− fg−b
(
1+a+ f
2
)
. Finally, the set of voters who are indifferent
between y and z are given by si = c− fg−d e
i + 1+d+g2 − c− fg−d
(
1+c+ f
2
)
.
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Candidate i’s voters are given by the set of voters that prefer her to every
other candidate. If g > d,
νx = {i : si ≤ min{ a− fg− b e
i +
1+ b+ g
2
− a− f
g− b (
1+ a+ f
2
),
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
νy = {i : a− cd− be
i +
1+ d+ b
2
− a− c
d− b (
1+ a+ e
2
) < si ≤
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}
νz = {i : si > max{ a− fg− b e
i +
1+ b+ g
2
− a− f
g− b (
1+ a+ f
2
),
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
Similarly, if g < b,
νx = {i : a− fg− b e
i +
1+ b+ g
2
− a− f
g− b (
1+ a+ f
2
) < si ≤
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
νy = {i : si > max{ a− cd− be
i +
1+ d+ b
2
− a− c
d− b (
1+ a+ e
2
),
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
νz = {i : si ≤ min{ a− fg− b e
i +
1+ b+ g
2
− a− f
g− b (
1+ a+ f
2
),
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
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Finally, if b < g < d,
νx = {i : si ≤ min{ a− fg− b e
i +
1+ b+ g
2
− a− f
g− b (
1+ a+ f
2
),
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
νy = {i : si > max{ a− cd− be
i +
1+ d+ b
2
− a− c
d− b (
1+ a+ e
2
),
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}}
νz = {i : a− fg− b e
i +
1+ b+ g
2
− a− f
g− b (
1+ a+ f
2
) < si ≤
c− f
g− de
i +
1+ d+ g
2
− c− f
g− d (
1+ c+ f
2
)}
Therefore, vote shares vx, vy, and vz are given simply by integrating F(.)
over the subsets of policy space that prefer each candidate.
Consider two candidates, x and y, with ideal policies (ex, sx) and (ey, sy).
Without loss of generality, assume ex < ey and sx < sy. We call an entrant
z with ideal policy (ez, sz) extreme with respect to party competition if either
τz << τx or τz >> τy. Denote by d∗(F) the critical value of d(x, y) such that
if d(x, y) > d∗(F), there exists an entrant who is not extreme with respect to
party competition who can enter and win the election and if d(x, y) < d∗(F)
no such entrant exists.27
Proposition 8. 1. In any two candidate equilibrium, d(x, y) < d∗(F) and
si = s
x+sy
2 +
ex−ey
sy−sx
(
ei − ex+ey2
)
is a median line.
2. There exists a two candidate equilibrium with candidates x and y lo-
cated at (ex, sx) and (ey, sy) if and only if vx = vy = 12 , d(x, y) > 0, b ≥
2c− d(x, y), for all i such that vx(x, y, i) > vy(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(y, i)− d(x, i)]
27Note that given continuity of F(.), d∗(F) > 0.
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and for all i such that vy(x, y, i) > vx(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(x, i)− d(y, i)], and
either d(x, y) < d∗(F) or d(x, y) = d∗(F) and for all i who cause d∗(F) to
bind, b ≤ 3c− 12(d(x, i) + d(y, i)).
Two candidate equilibria share similar features with the unidimensional
model. In particular, the line dividing the two groups of voters must be an
element of M. In a single dimension, the candidates must be equidistant
from the median voter. As opposed to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),
there cannot exist a two candidate equilibrium where a candidate wins
with certainty. This is not the case with more than two candidates.
Equilibria with three candidates do exist in plurality elections as well.
Notably, the move to multiple dimensions generates three candidate equi-
libria where a single candidate wins the election with certainty. This equi-
librium is very similar to an example given in Besley and Coate (1996).
Our contribution is to show that their example is a much more robust po-
tential outcome and does not require the violations of single-peakedness
and narrow assumptions on preferences they use. Furthermore, we iden-
tify a constant and undesirable feature of this class of equilibria: all sure
winners in three candidate elections must be Condorcet losers among the
set of entrants.
Proposition 9. Let K = {x, L1, L2}. There exists a three candidate equilib-
rium with a sure winner, x, and sure losers, L1, L2, if and only if:
1. vx > max
{
vL1 ; vL2
}
.
2. ∀ z such that vz = maxk∈K∪{z} vk, b ≤ c− d(x, z).
3. ∀ z such that vLi = maxk∈K∪{z}, c ≥ d(x, z)− d(Li, z).
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4. c ≤ min {d(L1, L2)− d(L1, x); d(L1, L2)− d(L2, x)}.
5. x is a Condorcet loser, i.e. vx(x, L1) < vL1(x, L1) and vx(x, L2) < vL2(x, L2).
6. b ≥ c− d(x, L∗), where L∗ = argmaxLi vLi(L1, L2).
Additionally, there exist equilibria where a single candidate loses with
certainty. Here a crucial distinction with respect to unidimensional compe-
tition arises. As Lemma 8 hints, being extreme with respect to the center
of the distribution actually has no bearing on whether a candidate may
find it optimal to enter as a sure loser. Instead, what matters is that they
do not cannibalize vote share exclusively from their preferred alternative
candidate.
Proposition 10. There exists an equilibrium with three candidates, x, y,
and L, where only candidate L loses with certainty if and only if
1. vx(x, y, L) = vy(x, y, L) > vL(x, y, L).
2. d(x, L) 6= d(y, L).
3. b ≥ 2c− d(x, y).
4. If d(x, L) < d(y, L), vx(x, y) < vy(x, y) and d(y, L)− d(x, L) ≥ c.
5. If d(x, L) > d(y, L), vx(x, y) > vy(x, y) and d(x, L)− d(y, L) ≥ c.
6. f (vL) is not symmetric across the line si = s
x+sy
2 +
ex−ey
sy−sx (e
i − ex+ey2 ). If
d(x, L) < d(y, L), f (vL) is more dense closer to y, and if d(x, L) > d(y, L),
f (vL) is more dense closer to x.
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Items 4 and 5 from Proposition 10 imply that the sure loser, L, cannot
be extreme with respect to party competition. She can, however, be ex-
treme with respect to the center of the distribution. In particular, L may
be distant from the axis of party competition, but unless she is fully or-
thogonal and lies on the line si = s
x+sy
2 +
ex−ey
sy−sx (e
i − ex+ey2 ), she will still have
preferences over x and y. So long as the density set of her voters, f (vL), is
not symmetric over the dividing line between candidates x and y, she can
asymmetrically influence the vote shares of candidates x and y. Moreover,
those conditions also imply that the above line cannot be an element of M,
the set of median lines.
3.5 Compromise Effects
Citizen candidate models typically offer a visual representation of can-
didates’ positions, but voters translate the candidates’ positions into their
idiosyncratic issue space. Voters view candidates as bundles of issue po-
sitions in R2, and, for the purpose of framing effects analysis, have pref-
erences exhibiting the compromise and attraction effects, as in Poterack
(2015). Given a ballot of candidates, voters’ preferences are influenced by
the context created by the ballot. Specifically, the context is the vector
of worst issue positions among the candidates running, called the frame.
When comparing choices from ballots with the same frame, the decision
makers’ choices satisfy WARP; however, when comparing ballots with dif-
ferent frames, WARP may be violated. This implies the existence of a col-
lection of complete and transitive preferences indexed by frames. The com-
promise and attraction effects are encompassed when lowering the frame
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changes the preference to one where the indifference curves are rotated
clockwise, and moving the frame left gives new preferences such that the
curves are rotated counterclockwise.
f′
f′
s
ss
x
y
f
s
ss
x
y
fsz
sw
s s
Figure 1: Indifference Curve Rotation in Response to Frame Changes
A voter’s view of a candidate can be represented as a pair of negative
numbers: the candidate’s distance from the voter on economic issues, and
the candidate’s distance on social issues, both multiplied by negative one
(because a larger distance makes for a less attractive candidate). In other
words, voter a views candidate x as the bundle (−|x1 − a1|,−|x2 − a2|).
This can be illustrated in the candidate space by drawing horizontal
and vertical axes through the voter, and reflecting the candidates over
these lines until they are all below and to the left of them. A ballot of
candidates as follows would be translated to voter a’s preference space as
shown in Figure 2:
To see the impact of the compromise and attraction effects, consider a
voter space consisting of all possible combinations of economic and social
positions. Suppose this space can be represented by [0, 1]2. Furthermore,
suppose the underlying density is such that the yolk of the distribution is
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the point (12 ,
1
2). In other words, for both sets of issues,
1
2 is the median po-
sition. Consider two candidates, x and y, which are both equidistant from
the yolk and which both lie on a line passing through the yolk. Without
loss of generality, suppose (as pictured above) x is in the upper right, and
y is in the lower left.
Every voter in the upper right quadrant prefers x to y, because they
are closer to x on both dimensions. Similarly, every voter in the lower left
prefers y to x. If these quadrants contain the same measure of voters,
this means x and y are tied when excluding the upper left and lower right
quadrants. It is the votes in these quadrants which will break the tie.
Put another way, if the median is (12 ,
1
2), x = (
1
2 − n1, 12 − n2) y = (12 +
n1, 12 + n2), and a = (
1
2 − p1, 12 + p2), table 4 demonstrates how a views x and
y:
n1 > p1 p1 > n1
n2 > p2 x = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2) x = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2)
y = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) y = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
p2 > n2 x = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2) x = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2)
y = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) y = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
Table 4: Election view of voter a
This clearly indicates that a prefers x on one dimension, and y on the
other. So it is possible a prefers x, or y. a may even be indifferent. This
information is not useful.
However, consider a′, a rotated 180◦ around the median (a′ = (m+ p1,m−
p2)). a and a′ make a line segment whose midpoint is also the midpoint
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of the line segment connecting x and y. This fact creates a relationship
between a and a′’s views of the candidates. a′’s view of the candidates is in
table 5:
n1 > p1 p1 > n1
n2 > p2 x = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) x = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
y = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2) y = (−(n1 + p1), p2 − n2)
p2 > n2 x = (p1 − n1,−(n2 + p2)) x = (n1 − p1,−(n2 + p2))
y = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2) y = (−(n1 + p1), n2 − p2)
Table 5: Election view of voter a′
a′ has the exact opposite view of the candidates from a; a′ views x in the
same position that a views y, and vice versa. Furthermore, because they
perceive a ballot with the same bundles, just swapped, they both have the
same frame. In other words, if a prefers x, a′ prefers y, and vice versa.
Furthermore, if we assume the upper left and lower right quadrants have
the same number of voters, then there is an a′ in the lower right for every a
in the upper left. Therefore, any votes x gets in the upper left are matched
by votes for y in the lower right, and x and y tie.
Now, if a third candidate z enters, such that z is below and to the left
of y, it is no longer the case that a and a′ have equal and opposite views of
the election. They both view z in a position where the other perceives no
candidate. See Figure 3.
Because of this discrepancy, they perceive different frames. However,
they each perceive a frame which asymmetrically benefits y, relative to
the two candidate case. a perceives the frame as having shifted down,
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which benefits the lower candidate, while a′ perceives the frame as shifting
left, which benefits the leftmost candidate. This implies that while the
introduction of z may induce a candidate in the upper left or lower right
to switch from supporting x to supporting y, none of them will switch from
supporting y to supporting x. z thus induces a gain in votes for y and
reduction in votes for x. z also takes votes from y; some voters will prefer
z to y. (If the indifference curves have a typical convex shape, z will only
take votes from y, not x. z has incentive to enter if the votes they give y
outweigh those taken.
This result applies whether or not z is on the same line as x and y. If a
fourth candidate, w, enters on the line passing through z and the median,
such that w and z are equidistant from the median, this makes the frames
identical for a and a′ again. Thus, they then again have equal and opposite
preference over the candidates, and x and y again tie. This suggests a
natural equilibrium has four candidates of this form.
To characterize a specific equilibrium, we impose the functional form
for utility
U(ex, sx, ei, si; ei, si) = (|ei − ei| − |ex − ei|) 12 + (|si − si| − |sx − si|) 12
Moreover, assume that the support of F is given by [0, 1]2 and F(.) is sym-
metric over si = 1− ei.
Proposition 11. There exists a four candidate equilibrium where candi-
dates L1, L2, x, and y have ideal policies (0, 0), (1, 1), (12 − a, 12 − a), and
(12 + a,
1
2 + a) respectively, and L1 and L2 lose with certainty, if and only if
3
2d(x, y) ≥ c, b ≥ 2c− d(x, y) and the following distributional conditions:
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1. vx(L1, L2, x, y) = vy(L1, L2, x, y).
2. vx(L2, x, y) < vy(L2, x, y).
3. vy(L1, x, y) < vy(L1, x, y).
4. @i such that vi(L1, L2, x, y, i) > maxj∈{L1,L2,x,y} vj(L1, L2, x, y, i).
The conditions on vote shares necessary to sustain equilibrium are char-
acterized in the appendix. Most noteworthy, in this equilibrium there are
both upper and lower bounds on the number of voters who are in the
quadrants of the policy space orthogonal to the axis of party competition.
In essence, if voters are sufficiently correlated in their policy preferences
to lie on the same dimension as party competition, they find it too easy to
rank parties (one is strictly better than the other for a generic voter) and
cannot be influenced by the compromise effect. If, on the other hand, there
are sufficiently many voters who have preferences that are not represented
well by candidates, there are too many voters who can be influenced by the
compromise effect to sustain this equilibrium. In that case, a centrist en-
trant located at the yolk would obtain a plurality and win the election. For
example, a uniform distribution over the space [0, 1]2 would not sustain
this equilibrium, since an entrant at (12 ,
1
2) would obtain a strict majority.
The qualitative properties of the equilibrium characterized in Proposi-
tion 11 are of particular interest. Previous models which generate sure
losers either do so because they are unable to choose not to enter (An-
solabehere and Snyder 2000) or because they gain an advantage from
cannibalizing the votes of their less preferred candidate (Solow 2015 and
Section 3.4 of this paper). Instead, in this particular equilibrium, the sure
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losers are extreme with respect to party competition: they only receive
votes from voters with whom share a second favorite candidate. Instead,
their motivation to enter comes from changing the perception that mod-
erate voters have of their preferred candidate.28 Thus, candidates who
are extreme with respect to party competition may still favorably affect
their preferred moderate’s chance of victory despite cannibalizing votes
only from their preferred moderate. The second and third distributional
conditions require that the votes accruing to candidate x from L1 favorably
altering how she is perceived are more numerous than the votes L1 herself
receives.
While the equilibrium in Proposition 11 features maximally extreme
sure losers, there will generically exist equilibria with less extreme sure
losers. For example, symmetrically perturbing L1 and L2 closer to the yolk,
e.g. (e, e) and (1 − e, 1 − e), may still be an equilibrium. The potential
candidates at (0, 0) and (1, 1) may choose not to enter since they would
frame L1 and L2 more attractively and potentially have a detrimental effect
on candidates x and y. Nevertheless, if there exists a linear equilibrium
with extremist sure losers who are not maximally differentiated, then there
surely exists a linear equilibrium with maximally differentiated sure losers.
The intuition is straightforward: all potential candidates who are extreme
with respect to party competition on the line have utility of candidates x
and y winning the election the same as all other potential candidates in
28There is suggestive experimental evidence that this is the case. Eric Loepp,
writing in the Washington Post, cites preliminary results of an experiment he
is conducting that suggests that Republican voters change their evaluation of a
moderate candidate’s ideology when paired with an extreme conservative candi-
date. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/16/trump-
changes-how-voters-view-the-other-republican-candidates-heres-how/, accessed March
30, 2016.
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their neighborhood. Thus, if an extreme entrant who is not maximally dif-
ferentiated finds it optimal to enter as a sure loser, the payoff conditions
will also be satisfied for a maximally differentiated extremist. The maxi-
mally differentiated extremist, however, provides a more favorable frame to
their preferred moderate (since they are further away), and steals strictly
fewer votes. Therefore, the distributional conditions summarized in the
appendix are necessary conditions for any equilibria in this class.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a multidimensional citizen-candidate model of
entry into plurality elections. We show that limiting the degree of commit-
ment available to potential candidates restores pure strategy Nash equi-
libria which do not exist in a Hotelling-Downs model of multidimensional
spatial competition. Moreover, expanding the issue space past one dimen-
sion provides novel incentives for candidates. We characterize the first
multicandidate equilibria with a sure winner in a political entry game with
single-peaked preferences. This equilibrium has normatively undesirable
properties which occur even in examples without single-peaked prefer-
ences. In particular, the certain victor is a Condorcet loser among the set
of candidates for office.
We then utilize the multiple dimensions to study two well-documented
violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: the attraction and
compromise effects. We model these effects via frames of reference and
show that the behavior of extremists can have asymmetric effects which
favor their preferred moderate candidate. Moreover, we show that with
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the right distribution of preferences there may exist an equilibrium where
extremists enter despite losing with certainty solely to enhance the proba-
bility of victory of their preferred moderate through framing effects.
We do not, however, provide a full characterization of all equilibria of
this game, especially in the setting with behavioral voters. Of particular
interest in further research would be modifying the frame from the com-
posite minima we study to an alternative formulation that does not require
boundedness of the issue space. While equilibria with extreme sure losers
who are not on the boundary do exist in our model, expanding the issue
space will always give greater incentive for sure losers on the boundary.
This is an undesirable feature of our formulation.
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Figure 2: Translating from Candidate Space to Voter’s Idiosyncratic Pref-
erence Space
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Figure 3: Asymmetric Framing Effects
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A Proofs of Theorems
1.1 Chapter One
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, a candidate does not lose with certainty if either:
(i) There are other candidates with the same ideal position or
(ii) The ideal position of all other candidates are on the same side of her ideal
position.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose a candidate is losing with certainty and
shares an ideal position with at least one other candidate. By exiting,
she obtains a weakly better electoral outcome, as all her voters now vote
for a candidate with the same ideal point, and no other voters change their
votes. She also saves cost c, and is therefore strictly better off by exiting. A
similar argument holds for fringe candidates, except that their voters are
now transferred to the candidate closest to her ideal point. This is a weakly
better electoral outcome, since she is losing with certainty before exiting,
and also saves cost c. The one potential difference with respect to OS could
be an extreme candidate or a candidate with the same ideal point changing
an election resolved by plurality rule to one resolved by runoff, but if this
was the case, by exiting their most preferred candidate would still receive
all of their vote share, which implies it is their most preferred candidate
who would achieve the threshold, and therefore win with certainty. Thus,
the proof in OS covers this situation as well. 
Lemma 3. The set of k-candidate equilibria is invariant to τ for all τ ≥ 12
and for all τ < 1k+1 .
Proof of Lemma 3: Let vi denote candidate i’s vote share, and let I denote
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the set of candidates entering in equilibrium (such that k is the cardinality
of I). In order to be resolved by plurality rule, at least one candidate must
obtain vi > τ. Due to Lemma 5, in all k-candidate equilibria, at least n ≥ 2
candidates must tie for victory. Therefore, maxi∈I vi ≤ 12 . Second, since I
assume full turnout, if k + 1 candidates are involved in an election, then
maxi∈I vi ≥ 1k+1 and the election is resolved by plurality rule for all τ < 1k+1 .
Since my solution concept does not allow for bilateral deviation to break
equilibria, if k candidates have already entered, even a potential entrant j
retains maxi∈I∪{j} vi ≥ 1k+1 ⇔ maxi∈I∪j vi > τ for all τ < 1k+1 . 
Lemma 4. There does not exist a multi-candidate equilibrium where one
candidate obtains office with probability one.
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose there exists a multi-candidate equilibrium
where one candidate wins office with probability one. Then, there must
exist at least one other candidate who obtains office with probability zero.
In any N ≥ 2 candidate equilibrium, at least one candidate who loses with
certainty is extreme with respect to other candidates or shares a position
with other candidates. Therefore this is not an equilibrium by Lemma 5.

Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiated three candidate equilibria under
the majority runoff rule take one of two forms. Either v1 = v2 = v3 = 13
or vi > vj = vk. Consider first equilibria where all candidates tie with
one third of the vote share. In order for the extreme candidates to win
with positive probability, they must be equidistant from the median voter
from each other. The only positions which generate these vote shares
and are equidistant from the median voter are a1 = m + F−1(13) − F−1(23),
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a2 = F−1(13) + F
−1(23)−m and a3 = F−1(23) +m− F−1(13)
Proof of Proposition 2: I show sufficiency first. Suppose τ ≥ 12 . For k = 2,
the election is a plurality election, and each candidate obtains office with
probability 12 . For all k ≥ 3, each candidate obtains 1k of the vote and enters
the runoff with probability 2k . The two candidates who are selected for the
runoff win in the second stage with probability 12 , so each candidate gains
office with probability 1k . If b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c], each candidate obtains bk − c ≥
0 payoff from running, and zero if they exit. Since b ≤ (k + 1)c, another
candidate with ideal position m obtains a payoff of 0 by not running, and
would obtain a payoff of bk+1 − c ≤ 0 by entering, and therefore prefers not
to enter. Any potential candidate with ideal position different but close to
m reaches the second stage with certainty, but loses with certainty in the
runoff. Any potential candidate with ideal position far from m does not
even reach the second stage and loses with certainty, and would therefore
prefer not to run.
Necessity: Suppose there exists an equilibrium with exactly k ≥ 2 can-
didates seeking office and all k candidates share ideal position m. It is
straightforward to see that b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c] must be true: if b < kc, can-
didates are obtaining a negative payoff in equilibrium and would obtain
zero by exiting. Similarly, if b > (k + 1)c, another potential candidate
with ideal position m would prefer to enter and obtain bk+1 − c > 0. To
show that these equilibria require τ ≥ 12 , suppose for a contradiction that
τ = 12 − x where x > 0. Define ξ(τ, F) and ξ(τ, F) by F
[
1
2(m+ ξ(τ, F))
]
=
1 − F
[
1
2(m+ ξ(τ, F))
]
= τ. Any candidate who chooses to enter with an
ideal position in
(
m− ξ(τ, F),m+ ξ(τ, F)
)
\ {m} obtains at least a fraction
τ of the vote in the first stage, while the other k candidates share the re-
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maining 1 − τ of the vote. The potential external candidate can obtain
arbitrarily close to half of the vote, i.e. for any x > 0, ξ(τ, F) and ξ(τ, F)
are both strictly positive (due to the assumption that F(·) is continuous).
Thus, for all τ < 12 and b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c], there exists a candidate who does
not have ideal position m who would prefer to enter and win in the first
stage for any k ≥ 2 who all have ideal position m. This contradicts the as-
sumption that exactly k candidates with ideal position m is an equilibrium
for τ < 12 . 
Proof of Proposition 7: In an equilibrium with symmetric clusters, each
candidate obtains 1k of the vote in the first stage of the election. Therefore, if
τ ≥ 1k , each cluster must be located at least max {|m− α(F, τ)| ; |m− α(F, τ)|}
from the median voter. Otherwise, there exists an external entrant who
can obtain a vote share greater than τ in the first-stage and win with
certainty. Similarly, the upper bound on the clusters’ differentiation, ekr(F)
is required to exclude an internal entrant from entering and winning with
certainty, since b ≥ k(c + ε). This is a strict upper bound as an entrant
would reach the second stage with probability 2k+1 and obtain a payoff of
2b
k+1 − c− (1− 2k+1)ε. This is larger than −ε, and therefore she would prefer
to enter. Differing slightly from OS, I require b ≥ k(c+ ε) for all even k ≥ 4.
This is a consequence of the low threshold; if one of the four candidates
exits, she guarantees a win for the candidate with the same ideal point,
and therefore obtains a payoff of 0 by exiting. In OS, she would still face
an even odds lottery over the policy outcome, and therefore choose to enter
if b ≥ 4c. In an equilibrium with k ≥ 6 in OS, by exiting a candidate
guarantees that the second stage candidates are selected from the two or
more candidates remaining at her ideal point, and therefore a candidate
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with her ideal point wins with certainty. To keep all six candidates in the
race, therefore, we require bk − c− ε ≥ 0, or b ≥ k(c+ ε). In an election with
a threshold less than 12 , however, this is the case with four candidates
as well, and therefore for all equilibria with k ≥ 4 candidates arranged in
symmetric clusters, I require b ≥ k(c+ ε). 
Proof of Proposition 5: Most of Proposition 5(i) is a direct consequence of
Lemma 5 and Proposition 2. Lemma 5 implies that neither of the external
candidates can be losing with certainty, so they must be symmetrically
distant from the median voter. Additionally, Proposition 2 implies that if
τ < 12 , it must be the case that ε > 0 in order to deter entry by a fringe
candidate. The upper bound on ε of et(F, τ) is required to keep a citizen
with ideal point d ∈ (m− ε,m+ ε) from entering and winning with certainty.
I turn now to proving Proposition 5(ii). If a candidate were to exit the
race, she would obtain a payoff of −2ε, whereas by entering she obtains
a payoff of b2 − ε− c. Therefore, a two-candidate equilibrium requires the
condition ε ≥ c− b2 in order to keep the two candidates in the race. Second,
a two-candidate equilibrium requires ε > 0 in order to deter an external
entrant. Note that this does not vary with the threshold; regardless of
how small ε is, if ε > 0, any fringe entrant induces a win by her least
preferred candidate, who still obtains half of the vote. Third, suppose
an entrant with ideal position d ∈ (m − ε, s(ε, F)) enters. She obtains a
payoff d−m− ε− c rather than −ε. In order to deter entry by this citizen,
we require d − m ≤ c, which reduces to s(ε, F) − m ≤ c in order to deter
all such potential entrants. Symmetrically, an entrant with ideal position
d ∈ (s(ε, F),m+ ε) is deterred from entry if m− s(ε, F) ≤ c, generating the
condition |m− s(ε, F)| ≤ c.
98
Finally, suppose a potential entrant with ideal position d = s(ε, F) chooses
to enter and ε = et(F, τ); if ε < et(F, τ), this entrant loses with certainty and
does not affect the outcome. There are two possible cases with ε = et(F, τ)
which generate different probabilities of victory for the entrant. Suppose
et(F, τ) = er(F), and an entrant at s(ε, F) is the potential entrant that makes
er(F) bind. Then the entrant would obtain office with probability 23 : the
second stage of the election is always reached when et(F, τ) = er(F), and
the entrant ties for first with both other candidates.29 The entrant wins in
the second stage with certainty, and therefore obtains an expected payoff
of 23b − ε3 − c rather than a payoff of −ε. In order to deter this potential
entrant, it must be the case that ε ≤ 32c − b. In the other case, suppose
that et(F, τ) = es(F, τ) binds at s(ε, F). An entrant at s(ε, F) ties for first
with both other candidates in an election that is decided by plurality rule,
and therefore wins with probability 13 . Thus, to deter her from entering, I
require ε ≤ 3c− b. 
Proof of Proposition 6: The conditions on ε, c, b, and s(ε, F) in Proposition
5 are identical to those for a two-candidate equilibrium with plurality rule
in OS if et(F, τ) = es(F, τ). Furthermore, none of those conditions depend
on τ. It just remains to be shown that ∀ τ < 13 , es(F, τ) = ep(F) and ep(F) >
er(F). Then ∀ τ < 13 , et(F, τ) = ep(F), and the rest of the conditions are the
same.
Note that the requirement that the maximal vote share is larger than
τ for all potential internal entrants does not bind as τ → 0. Given full
29In their original paper, OS say these potential entrants enter the runoff with proba-
bility 12 , and then win in the second stage with certainty. If the distribution F is single-
peaked and symmetric about the median, however, a median candidate is the potential
entrant that makes er(F) bind. The median entrant obtains equal vote share to each of
the other two candidates, and therefore enters a runoff with probability 23 .
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turnout, in any two-candidate equilibrium the largest vote share must
be at least 13 regardless of the position of any potential entrant. For any
τ < 13 , therefore, es(F, τ) is simply a requirement that an internal entrant
does not obtain the (weakly) largest vote share, and moreover, es(F, τ) will
be determined exclusively by the distribution F and not the magnitude of
τ < 13 . This is exactly the same critical value as ep(F) as defined above. It
is straightforward to see that er(F) ≤ ep(F), as er(F) requires all entrants to
obtain at most the third largest vote share, whereas ep(F) allows entrants
to potentially obtain the second largest vote share. Therefore, for τ < 13 ,
et(F, τ) = ep(F). 
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume τ < maxi vi. By Lemma 4, at least two
candidates must attain vj = maxi vi. Suppose exactly two candidates ob-
tain the maximal vote share, and thus one candidate loses with certainty.
Denote the ideal policies of the two candidates who obtain the maximal
vote share by a1 and a2, with a1 ≤ a2. By Lemma 5, a1 and a2 must be
different, and the candidate who loses with certainty must have an ideal
policy ae ∈ (a1, a2). Therefore, any potential entrant can obtain votes from
at most one candidate who surpasses the threshold for first round vic-
tory. As such, no entrant can prevent the election from being resolved
in the first round and therefore faces the same entry incentives as under
pure plurality rule. Additionally, no equilibrium candidate can prevent the
election from being resolved in the first round by exiting, since the max-
imal vote share will strictly increase following exit. Thus, all candidates
who choose to enter in these equilibria face the same incentives as under
plurality rule.
The same arguments follow for the case where all three candidates ob-
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tain the maximal vote share. Here, potential entrants can reduce the vote
share of one or two candidates, but the third candidate still surpasses the
threshold. This is because all plurality equilibria with at least 3 candidates
must be differentiated (not all candidates may share the same position). 
Proof of Proposition 2: To see that there exist distributions of voters for
all τ < 12 , consider τ =
1
2 − ε. Let the three candidates positions, from left to
right, be denoted by a1, a2, and a3. Let a1 = m− e1 and a3 = m+ e2, with e1 >
e2. Furthermore, suppose F[a1] = 1− F[a3] = τ. This implies that F[a3]−
F[a1] = 2ε. The candidate at a2 is a sure loser for small ε. Let a2 = a1 + e3 =
a3 − e4. Assume without loss of generality that e3 < e4. This configuration
of three candidates is a candidate for a sure-loser equilibrium if F[12(a2 −
a1)] = 1− F[12(a3− a2)]. This requirement is essentially that the distribution
is more dense between a2 and a3 than it is between a1 and a2; many possible
distributions satisfy this condition. If e3 > e4, a symmetric condition on
the relative densities between a1 and a2 and a2 and a3 obtains. So long as
b ≥ 2c+ 2 |e1 − e2|, the external candidates still prefer to stay in the race. To
ensure that the sure-loser wants to stay in the race, we require her payoff
to be larger than if she exited, which reduces to the condition e4 − e3 ≥ 2c.
Since b and c are free parameters, let c = e4−e33 and b = c+ 3 |e1 − e2|. 
1.2 Chapter Two
Lemma 5. In equilibrium, a candidate does not lose with certainty if #K 6= 3
and either:
(i) There are other candidates with the same ideal position or
(ii) The ideal position of all other candidates are on the same side of her ideal
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position.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose #K 6= 3, a candidate is losing with certainty,
and she shares an ideal position with at least one other candidate. By
exiting, she obtains a weakly better electoral outcome, as all her voters
now vote for a candidate with the same ideal point, and no other voters
change their votes. She also saves cost c, and is therefore strictly better
off by exiting. A similar argument holds for fringe candidates, except that
their voters are now transferred to the candidate closest to her ideal point.
This is a weakly better electoral outcome, since she is losing with certainty
before exiting, and also saves cost c. If #K = 3, however, a fringe candidate
may choose to enter and lose with certainty because by doing so she forces
a second round that would not have otherwise happened. 
Lemma 6. There does not exist a multi-candidate equilibrium where one
candidate wins with certainty.
Proof of Lemma 6: For all multi-candidate elections with k 6= 3 candi-
dates, Lemma 5 implies there cannot be any sure winners. There are
two possible cases in which a candidate can win with certainty in a three
candidate election. Either (1) she obtains a strict majority in the first
round, or (2) she obtains a majority in the second round regardless of
which state is realized. Suppose there exists a multi-candidate equilib-
rium in which a sure winner has ideal policy w. In case 1, there exists a
candidate with ideal policy a who loses with certainty in the first round and
obtains payoff − |w− a| − c. She would obtain a payoff of − |w− a| by ex-
iting, which violates the requirement that she is best responding. In case
2, |mR − w| < |mR − ak| ∀k ∈ K/ {w} and |mL − w| < |mL − ak| ∀k ∈ K/ {w}.
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Since mL < m < mR, it must be the case that |m− w| < |m− ak| ∀k ∈ K
which may advance to the second round. If ak < w∀k ∈ K or ak > w∀k ∈ K,
then there must exist a candidate with ideal policy a1 satisfying |m− a1| <
|m− w|. The candidate with ideal policy a1 does not advance to the sec-
ond round, however. In this case, the remaining candidate obtains payoff
− |w− a2| − c by entering and − |a1 − a2| by exiting, and thus would prefer
to exit. If a1 < w < a2, then each candidate would obtain − |w− ak| − c in
equilibrium or − |w− ak| by exiting, and thus would prefer to exit. 
1.3 Three Candidate Equilibria
Lemma 7. In any three candidate equilibrium, in the first round the candi-
dates must be configured such that one of the follownig holds:
(i) all tie for first place and have locations a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3 where a1 = F−1(13)− ε1,
a2 = F−1(13) + ε1 = F
−1(23)− ε2, and a3 = F−1(23) + ε2 where ε1, ε2 ≥ 0, or
(ii) one candidate is alone in first place, but obtains fewer than half the votes,
or
(iii) two candidates tie for first place and the third place candidate is a sure
loser.
Proof of Lemma 7: If an equilibrium configuration of candidates yields a
sure winner with ideal policy a, then each sure loser with ideal policy w
obtains − |w− a| − c in equilibrium, and would obtain at least − |w− a| by
exiting. Since c > 0, sure losers cannot be best responding if there is a sure
winner. This rules out any configuration where a single candidate obtains
more than half the votes. Three candidates who tie for first with the ideal
policy of the median voter is also not an equilibrium. If max {θ, 1− θ} ≥ 1k
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and b ≥ kc, there exists a potential entrant with ideal policy d 6= m who can
reach the second round with certainty and win with at least probability
max {θ, 1− θ}. Without loss of generality, let θ ≥ 1− θ. One such entrant
obtains a payoff θb − (1 − θ) |m− d| − c > − |m− d| whenever θ ≥ 1k and
b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c]. Therefore if all three candidates tie for first, they must be
at the positions above in order to each obtain 13 of the vote. 
Proposition 12. In any three candidate equilibrium where each candidate
ties for first place in the first round of the election, the interior candidate
never has the uniquely smallest probability of winning or expected payoff.
Moreover, the candidates have ideal policies a1 = F−1(13)− δ1, a2 = F−1(13) +
δ1 = F−1(23)− δ2, and a3 = F−1(23) + δ2 where δ1, δ2 ≥ 0. If such an equilibrium
exists it requires
b ≥ min
{
3
θ
c− 2(F−1(2
3
)− F−1(1
3
));
3
1− θ c− 2(F
−1(2
3
)− F−1(1
3
))
}
.
Proof of Proposition 12: I begin by enumerating all possible configura-
tions of candidates that satisfy the requirement that each candidate ties
for first.30
If θ ≥ 12 , configuration 5 has the smallest equilibrium payoff for candi-
date 1; it combines her minimal chance of obtaining office with the max-
imal probability of candidate 3 obtaining office. If θ ≥ 12 , configuration 1
yields the smallest equilibrium payoff for candidate 3. If θ ≤ 12 , config-
uration 3 yields the smallest possible equilibrium payoff for candidate 1.
30Given the lack of information about the size of the shift and the distribution of prefer-
ences, an equilibrium configuration of candidates is described by which candidate would
win in a second round matchup against each of the other candidates, conditional on a
given shift in the distribution of preferences.
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Table 6: Potential Eq. Configurations, 3 candidates
Config. 1v2 state L 1v2 state R 2v3 L 2v3 R 1v3 L 1v3 R
1 1 wins 2 wins 2 wins 2 wins 1 wins 3 wins
2 1 wins 2 wins 2 wins 3 wins 1 wins 3 wins
3 2 wins 2 wins 2 wins 3 wins 1 wins 3 wins
4 2 wins 2 wins 2 wins 2 wins 1 wins 3 wins
5 1 wins 2 wins 2 wins 2 wins 3 wins 3 wins
6 2 wins 2 wins 2 wins 3 wins 1 wins 1 wins
Table 7: Candidates’ probabilities of victory in potential eq. configurations
Config. Number Cand. 1 Cand. 2 Cand. 3
1 23θ
2
3(1− θ) + 13θ 13(1− θ)
2 23θ
1
3
2
3(1− θ)
3 13θ
2
3θ +
1
3(1− θ) 23(1− θ)
4 13θ
2
3
1
3(1− θ)
5 13θ
2
3(1− θ) + 13θ 13
6 13
2
3θ +
1
3(1− θ) 13(1− θ)
Similarly, configuration 6 gives candidate 3 the lowest possible equilibrium
payoff if θ ≤ 12 . What remains is to determine the worst configuration for
candidate 2. Denote by ρi the probability that candidate i obtains office.
Candidate 2’s payoff to running is ρ2b − 2δ1ρ1 − 2δ2ρ3 − c, and her payoff
from not running is either −2δ1 or −2δ2. Since δ1 and δ2 are free parame-
ters in finding a potential equilibrium, configuration 2 must be the worst
possible configuration for candidate 2: if θ is very large, then we choose
an equilibrium configuration where δ2 = 0 and δ1 = F−1(23)− F−1(13). If θ is
very small, then we choose the opposite: δ1 = 0 and δ2 = F−1(23)− F−1(13).
Necessary conditions for equilibria include the following. Candidate 1’s
participation, θ ≥ 12 : θb ≥ 3c− θ2δ1+ 2δ2. Candidate 1’s participation, θ < 12 :
θb ≥ 3c − θ2δ1 + 4(1 − θ)δ2. Candidate 2’s participation: b ≥ 3c + 4θδ1 +
4(1 − θ)δ2 − 6δ∗. where δ∗ refers to whichever of δ1 or δ2 is the relevant
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distance from the winner if 2 exits. If δ∗ = δ1, this condition becomes
b ≥ 3c − (6 − 4θ)δ1 + 4(1 − θ)δ2, whereas if δ∗ = δ2, the condition is b ≥
3c − (6− 4(1− θ))δ2 + 4θδ1. Candidate 3’s participation, θ ≥ 12 : (1− θ)b ≥
3c− (1− θ)2δ2 + 4θδ1. Candidate 3’s participation, θ < 12 :(1− θ)b ≥ 3c− (1−
θ)2δ2 + 2δ1.
After choosing δ1 and δ2 subject to δ1+ δ2 = F−1(23)− F−1(13) to relax these
constraints as much as possible, these conditions reduce to the following.
Candidate 1’s constraint, θ ≥ 12 : θb ≥ 3c− 2θ(F−1(23)− F−1(13)). Candidate
1’s constraint, θ < 12 : θb ≥ 3c − 2θ(F−1(23) − F−1(13)). Candidate 2’s entry
constraint turns out not to vary with θ, but rather only with δ∗; regardless
of the value of θ, candidate 2’s constraint relaxes as δ∗ increases. If δ∗ = δ1,
this becomes b ≥ 3c+ 4θ(F−1(23)− F−1(13))− 6(F−1(23)− F−1(13)), whereas if
δ∗ = δ2, b ≥ 3c+ 4(1− θ)(F−1(23)− F−1(13))− 6(F−1(23)− F−1(13)). Candidate
3’s constraint, θ ≥ 12 : (1− θ)b ≥ 3c− 2(1− θ)(F−1(23)− F−1(13)). Candidate
3’s constraint, θ < 12 : (1− θ)b ≥ 3c− 2(1− θ)(F−1(23)− F−1(13)).
Reducing to eliminate redundant conditions, we obtain b ≥ 3θ c− 2(F−1(23)−
F−1(13)), b ≥ 3(1−θ)c − 2(F−1(23) − F−1(13)), b ≥ 3c + 4θ(F−1(23) − F−1(13)) −
6(F−1(23)− F−1(13)), and b ≥ 3c+ 4(1− θ)(F−1(23)− F−1(13))− 6(F−1(23)− F−1(13)).
To find a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs, I first find a lower bound
for candidates 1 and 3. Since there is no overlap between the payoff min-
imizing equilibria for candidate 3 and the payoff minimizing equilibria for
candidate 1, it’s apparent that candidate 1 must be earning a larger pay-
off in candidate 3’s worst equilibrium than in her own worst equilibrium.
Symmetrically, in candidate 1’s worst equilibrium, candidate 3 must be
earning a larger payoff than in her own worst equilibrium. Denote an
equilibrium payoff for candidate i by pi∗i , and let Π
∗
i be the set of equilib-
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rium payoffs for candidate i in this type of equilibrium. Suppose θ, b and
c are such that minpi∗3 ≤ minpi∗1 . Then, we know the relevant lower bound
on payoffs must be derived from candidate 3’s minimal equilibrium pay-
off, and symmetrically so for candidate 1 if minpi∗3 ≥ minpi∗1 . Therefore, if
min{pi1,pi3}∈Π∗1×Π∗3 {pi1,pi3} serves as a lower bound for candidate 2’s payoffs,
the lower bound on payoffs is also satisfied by candidate 2.
The relevant necessary condition depends on candidates’ marginal value
of entry. If θ ≥ 12 , candidate 3’s entry condition binds more tightly than
candidate 1’s due to her low probability of obtaining victory conditional on
entry. Simple algebra shows that the right hand side of candidate 3’s con-
straint (3c/(1 − θ) − 2(F−1(23) − F−1(13))) is always strictly larger than the
right hand side of candidate 2’s constraint. Thus, if θ ≥ 12 , any set of
parameters satisfying candidate 3’s constraint also satisfy candidate 2’s
constraint. The same argument holds for θ ≤ 12 and a comparison between
candidate 1’s constraint and candidate 2’s constraint. Therefore, the rel-
evant necessary condition for existence of an equilibrium where all three
candidates tie for first place in the first round is
b ≥ min
{
3
θ
c− 2(F−1(2
3
)− F−1(1
3
));
3
1− θ c− 2(F
−1(2
3
)− F−1(1
3
))
}
.

Proposition 13. In any three candidate equilibrium where a candidate ob-
tains the uniquely largest vote share and the other two candidates tie for
second place, the interior candidate never has the uniquely smallest prob-
ability of winning or expected payoff. Moreover, the ideal policies of the
candidates, denoted a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3, must satisfy F(12(a1 + a2)) ≤ 12 , F(12(a2 +
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a3)) − F(12(a1 + a2)) ≤ 12 and 1 − F(12(a2 + a3)) ≤ 12 . If such an equilibrium
exists, it requires
3
4
b ≥ 3
θ
c− 2(a2 − a1) and b ≥ 31− θ c− 2(a3 − a2)
or
b ≥ 3
θ
c− 2(a2 − a1) and 34 b ≥
3
1− θ c− 2(a3 − a2)
or
3
4
b ≥ 3
θ
c− 2(a2 − a1) and 34b ≥
3
1− θ c− 2(a3 − a2)
.
Proof of Proposition 13: The argument here follows that of Proposition 12
with only slight deviation. Note that each candidate has a positive prob-
ability of reaching the second round. Moreover, without more structure
on the equilibrium or the distributions of voter preferences, we cannot
characterize equilibrium configurations in ways other than Table 6. In or-
der to be an equilibrium that does not feature a sure loser, the possible
equilibrium probabilities of victory are almost identical; the lone difference
in the probability of holding office is that one candidate reaches the sec-
ond round with certainty, and the other two candidates reach the second
round with probability 12 instead of probability
2
3 . Since at least one of
the external candidates will tie for second in the first round, the centrist
candidate still does not have the uniquely lowest probability of winning
or expected payoff. Therefore, the conditions implied by equilibrium exis-
tence are identical to that in Proposition 12 with but two differences. First,
instead of F−1(23)− F−1(13) in the condition, we must substitute a3 − a2 and
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a2− a1 where relevant, i.e. a2− a1 to generate necessary conditions on can-
didate 1’s participation and a3− a2 to generate conditions on candidate 3’s
participation. Second, we require three pairs of conditions, only one pair
of which need be satisfied in a given equilibrium:
3
4
b ≥ 3
θ
c− 2(a2 − a1) and b ≥ 31− θ c− 2(a3 − a2)
or
b ≥ 3
θ
c− 2(a2 − a1) and 34b ≥
3
1− θ c− 2(a3 − a2)
or
3
4
b ≥ 3
θ
c− 2(a2 − a1) and 34b ≥
3
1− θ c− 2(a3 − a2)

Proposition 14. A three candidate equilibrium with a centrist sure loser ex-
ists for any configuration of candidates with ideal policies a1, al, and a2 if
and only if:
(i) c ≤ max {a2 − al, al − a1} − θ(|a1 − al|)− (1− θ)(|a2 − al|),
(ii) b ≥ max
{
1−θ
θ (a2 − al)− (al − a1) + c, θ1−θ (al − a1)− (a2 − al) + c
}
,
(iii) there does not exist a citizen with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1− 2sL, a2+ 2sR)/ {a1, a2}
who can reach the second round with certainty, and
(iv) Distributional Conditions:
1. If ∃ ae ∈ (a1, a2) such that v(a1,K ∪ {ae} ; F) = v(ae,K ∪ {ae} ; F), then
c ≥ θ2(b+ ae − a1).
2. If ∃ ae ∈ (a1, a2) such that v(a2,K ∪ {ae} ; F) = v(ae,K ∪ {ae} ; F), then
c ≥ 1−θ2 (b+ a2 − ae).
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3. If v(a1,K; F) > 2v(al,K; F), then θ2b ≤ c.
4. If v(a2,K; F) > 2v(al,K; F), then 1−θ2 b ≤ c.
5. If ∃ ae ∈ (a1, al) such that v(a1,K ∪ {ae} ; F) < v(al,K ∪ {ae} ; F), then
c ≥ θ(al − a1).
6. If ∃ ae ∈ (al, a2) such that v(a2,K ∪ {ae} ; F) < v(al,K ∪ {ae} ; F), then
c ≥ (1− θ)(a2 − al).
An equilibrium of this type exists for any a1 < m < a2 and al that satisfy
|mL − a1| < |mL − a2|, |mR − a2| < |mR − a1| and min {|a1 −m| , |a2 −m|} >
|al −m|. Moreover, if a2 − m > m− a1, then al − a1 > a2 − al and if m− a1 >
m− a2, then a2 − al > al − a1.
Proof of Proposition 14: I begin by noting that a1and a2 must satisfy the
conditions |mL − a1| < |mL − a2| and |mR − a2| < |mR − a1|. If these condi-
tions are not satisfied, at least one of the two candidates who reaches the
second round does not win in the second round after realizing a favorable
distribution of preferences, and therefore would prefer to exit saving cost
c and causing the sure loser to win in the first round, thus obtaining a
preferable policy outcome. The candidate located at a1 obtains a payoff
of θb− (1− θ)(a2 − al)− c by running, and a payoff of −(a1 − al) if she ex-
its. Therefore, to keep her from exiting we require b ≥ 1−θθ (a2 − al)− (al −
a1) + c. Symmetrically for the candidate with ideal policy a2, we require
b ≥ θ1−θ (al − a1) − (a2 − al) + c. In equilibrium, the sure loser obtains a
payoff of −θ(al − a1)− (1− θ)(a2 − al)− c, whereas she obtains a payoff of
−max {a2 − al, al − a1} if she exits and causes her least preferred candidate
to win. If by exiting she would cause her more preferred candidate to win,
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she would prefer to exit, thereby necessitating the condition that al be de-
termined by satisfying: (1) if a2 −m > m− a1, then al − a1 > a2 − al and (2)
if m− a1 > m− a2, then a2 − al > al − a1. Thus, for the sure loser to run, we
also require max {a2 − al, al − a1} − θ(al − a1)− (1− θ)(a2 − al) ≥ c.
If a citizen with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1 − 2sL, a2 + 2sR)/ {a1, a2} could enter
and reach the second round with certainty, they surely would: any poten-
tial entrant’s payoff to winning office is equal to that of the equilibrium
candidate they displace, and by entering they obtain a better expected pol-
icy outcome. If an entrant would tie with the candidate at a1 for second
place, they would have a θ2 probability of winning office instead of the can-
didate at a1 and therefore increasing their payoff by θ2(b+ ae − a1) but pay-
ing cost c. To deter their entry, it must be the case that c ≥ θ2(b+ ae − a1).
Symmetrically, if the entrant would tie with the candidate located at a2,
then we require c ≥ 1−θ2 (b+ a2− ae) for them not to seek office. An identical
entrant at a1 or a2 will choose not to enter if she is a sure loser since she
does not improve her expected policy outcome and also pays cost c. If,
however, F( a1+al2 ) > 2[F(
a2+al
2 ) − F( a1+al2 )], then we require that c ≥ θ2b for
an equilibrium. Symmetrically, if 1− F( a2+al2 ) > 2[F( a2+al2 )− F( a1+al2 )], then
we require 1−θ2 b ≤ c for an equilibrium. No other citizens with fringe ideal
policies would choose to enter as they would be sure losers and could only
have adverse effects on the expected policy. 
Proposition 15. A three candidate equilibrium with a fringe sure loser and
two candidates who win with positive probability located at distinct points
a1 and a2 at a distance δ ∈ (0, dr(F)) from the median exists if and only if
θ 6= 12 , c ≤ (12 − θ)(|a1 − al| − |a2 − al|),
111
b ≥ max { c1−θ − 2δ; cθ − 2δ}, and there does not exist a citizen with ideal policy
ae ∈ (a1 − 2sL, a1) ∪ (a2, a2 + 2sR) who can reach the second round. Moreover,
the sure loser is located at a distinct point al where al < m if θ > 12 and al > m
if θ > 12 .
Proof of Proposition 15: In any three candidate equilibrium with a fringe
sure loser, the candidates who win with positive probability must be sym-
metrically equidistant from the median voter. Suppose this is not the case
for a contradiction, and suppose without loss of generality that the fringe
sure loser has an ideal policy to the left of the median voter. If the can-
didate located at a1 is closer to the median voter, then the fringe sure
loser can exit and her preferred candidate will win with certainty in the
first round. This saves the sure loser cost c, and also results in an in-
creased probability of her preferred policy being implemented. If, instead,
the candidate located at a2 is closer to the median voter, then she wins
with certainty in the first round and both other candidates would prefer to
exit.
A fringe sure loser with position al would gain a payoff of −θ(|a1 − al|)−
(1− θ)(|a2 − al|) − c by running, and a payoff of −12(|a1 − al|) − 12(|a2 − al|)
by not running. Thus, we require c ≤ (12 − θ)(|a1 − al| − |a2 − al|). If θ > 12 ,
then 12 − θ < 0 and therefore the sure loser must be on the left fringe so
that (|a1 − al| − |a2 − al|) < 0, and symmetrically on the right fringe if θ < 12 .
The payoff to the candidate located at a1 in equilibrium is θb− 2(1− θ)δ− c,
whereas if she chooses not to run, her payoff is −2δ. Thus, these equilibria
require b ≥ cθ − 2δ. Symmetrically for the candidate at a2, it must be the
case that b ≥ c1−θ − 2δ, and thus we require b ≥ max
{ c
1−θ − 2δ; cθ − 2δ
}
. Note
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that no other sure losers have incentive to enter. Their payoffs strictly
decrease by c since the election is already guaranteed to go to a second
round.
It remains to be shown that no other citizen has an incentive to enter.
By restricting δ ∈ (0, dr(F)), there is no internal citizen who could reach
the second round with positive probability. Thus, all internal citizens are
sure losers if they choose to run, and therefore prefer not to as they have
no effect on the outcome of the election. We also require that there does
not exist a fringe candidate with an ideal policy within 2s of the equilib-
rium contenders’ policies who can reach the second round with positive
probability. This is because any such fringe candidate has the same prob-
ability of victory as the equilibrium contender they would replace in the
second round, yet a greater incentive to enter due to their increased disu-
tility from their least preferred contender winning. Thus, there does not
exist any set of parameter values which would incentivize the equilibrium
contenders to enter but not fringe candidates who can reach the second
round. Therefore, in order for an equilibrium of this type to exist, all fringe
citizens must be sure losers if they choose to run and thus would prefer
not to enter. 
Proof of Theorem 1: An immediate consequence of Propositions 12, 13,
14 and 15, and Lemmas 5, 6 and 7. 
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1.4 Two Candidate Equilibria
Some additional notation is useful for this set of proofs. Define δ¯(F) by
δ¯(F) = sup{δ : F(1
2
(a+m− δ)) > F(1
2
(a+m+ δ))− F(1
2
(a+m− δ)) and
1− F(1
2
(a+m+ δ)) > F(
1
2
(a+m+ δ))− F(1
2
(a+m− δ)),
∀ a ∈ (m− δ,m+ δ)}.
Let a+(δ, F) and a−(δ, F) be defined by
a−(δ, F) = arg sup
a∈(0,2(m−mL))
a× 1F(m−δ− a2 )>F(m)−F(m−δ) and
a+(δ, F) = arg sup
a∈(0,2(m−mR))
a× 11−F(m+δ+ a2 )>F(m+δ)−F(m).
where 1A denotes the indicator function. A final piece of useful notation is
to define s(δ, F) as the citizen who, if they chose to enter in a hypothetical
two candidate equilibrium, would take equal vote share from each of the
two equilibrium candidates (i.e. the two equilibrium candidates would still
tie). If f is symmetric about the median, then s(δ, F) = m.
Two other conditions will be useful:
Condition 1. If a−(δ, F) is a singleton,
c ≥ θ(b+ a−(δ, F)) + (2θ − 1)δ.
If a+(δ, F) is a singleton,
c ≥ (1− θ)(b+ a+(δ, F)) + (1− 2θ)δ.
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and
Condition 2. If d ∈ (m− δ, s(δ, F)) is the entrant who makes δ¯(F) bind,
c ≥ θ
2
(b+ δ) + (
3
2
θ − 1)(m− s(δ, F)).
If d ∈ (s(δ, F),m+ δ) is the entrant who makes δ¯(F) bind,
c ≥ 1− θ
2
(b+ δ) +
3θ − 1
2
(m− s(δ, F)).
If d = s(δ, F) is the entrant who makes δ¯(F) bind,
c ≥ 1
3
(b+ (1+ 4θ)δ)− 2
3
(1− 2θ)(m− s(δ, F)).
Proposition 16. 1. In any two candidate equilibrium where a centrist
entrant cannot guarantee reaching the second round, the candidates’
ideal policies are m− δ and m+ δ for some δ ∈ (0, δ¯(F)].
2. An equilibrium of this type in which the candidates’ ideal policies are
m − δ and m + δ exists if and only if δ > 0, δ ≥ c − b2 , and one of δ <
δ¯(F) and Condition 1 or δ = δ¯(F), c ≥ max {(1− 2θ)δ, (2θ − 1)δ} and
Conditions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 16: Lemma 5 applies for k = 2 candidates, and there-
fore each candidate must tie for first place in a two candidate equilibrium
(thus they must be symmetric and equidistant from m). Moreover, δ > 0
follows directly from Theorem 2. Each equilibrium candidate obtains a
payoff of b2 − c− δ in equilibrium, and would obtain a payoff of −2δ by ex-
iting. Therefore, we require b2 − c− δ ≥ −2δ, which reduces to δ ≥ c− b2 , to
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keep equilibrium candidates in the race.
Case 1: δ < dr(F). There is no internal entrant who can win with
positive probability, so we restrict attention to potential fringe entrants
(any fringe entrant has a weakly greater payoff to running conditional on
an internal entrant being a sure loser). Suppose a−(δ, F) and a+(δ, F) are
not singletons; then, there does not exist a fringe entrant who can win with
positive probability. A fringe entrant with ideal policy m − δ − a obtains
a payoff of −δ − a if she chooses not to run, or a payoff of −θa − (1 −
θ)(a+ 2δ)− c. In order to keep her from running, we require the condition
−δ− a ≥ −θa− (1− θ(a+ 2δ)− c⇔ c ≥ (2θ− 1)δ. Symmetrically, for a fringe
entrant with ideal policy m + δ + a we require c ≥ (1− 2θ)δ. If a−(δ, F) is
a singleton, then there exists a potential fringe entrant with ideal policy
m− δ− a > m− δ− 2s who can reach the runoff and win given a favorable
shift in the distribution of voters. Her payoff to not entering is −δ − a
and her payoff to entering is θb− (1− θ)(2δ+ a)− c. Therefore, to ensure
that she does not enter, we require −δ− a ≥ θb− (1− θ)(2δ+ a)− c ⇔ c ≥
θ(b+ a) + (2θ − 1)δ. The binding entrant is located at a−(δ, F), making the
condition c ≥ θ(b + a−(δ, F)) + (2θ − 1)δ. We also require c ≥ (1− 2θ)δ to
exclude a sure loser on the right. Symmetrically, if a+(δ, F) is a singleton
and a−(δ, F) is not, we require c ≥ (1− θ)(b + a+(δ, F)) + (1− 2θ)δ to keep
out the potential entrant at a+(δ, F), and c ≥ (2θ − 1)δ to keep out a sure
loser on the left. If both a+(δ, F) and a−(δ, F) are singletons, we require
c ≥ (1− θ)(b+ a+(δ, F)) + (1− 2θ)δ to keep out the entrant at a+(δ, F), and
c ≥ θ(b+ a−(δ, F)) + (2θ − 1)δ to keep out the entrant at a−(δ, F).
Case 2: δ = dr(F), and the internal entrant who can tie for second place
is located at d ∈ (m− δ, s(δ, F)). Note that all of the Case 1 conditions must
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still hold with respect to external entrants. The internal entrant obtains
a payoff of −δ if she chooses not to enter, and a payoff of θ2(b − d + m −
ε) + (1 − θ)(d − m − δ) − c if she chooses to enter. We therefore require
−δ ≥ θ2(b− d+ m− δ) + (1− θ)(d− m− δ)− c. Note that, since we assume
θ ∈ [13 , 23 ], this restriction binds tighter as d approaches s(δ, F). Therefore,
we require c ≥ θ2(b+ δ) + (3θ2 − 1)(m− s(δ, F)).
Case 3: δ = dr(F), and the internal entrant who can tie for second place
is located at d ∈ (s(δ, F),m + δ). Note that all of the Case 1 conditions
must still hold with respect to external entrants. The internal entrant
obtains a payoff of −δ if she chooses not to enter, and a payoff of 1−θ2 (b+
d−m− δ) + θ(m− d− δ)− c if she chooses to enter. Thus, we require −δ ≥
1−θ
2 (b + d − m − δ) + θ(m − d − δ) − c. Similarly to Case 2, since θ ∈ [13 , 23 ],
this requirement binds tightest as d approaches s(δ, F). The condition is,
therefore c ≥ 1−θ2 (b+ δ) + 3θ−12 (m− s(δ, F)).
Case 4: δ = dr(F), and the internal entrant who can tie for second place
is located at s(δ, F). Note that all of the Case 1 conditions must still hold
with respect to external entrants. The entrant at s(δ, F) obtains a payoff of
−δ if she chooses not to run, and a payoff of 13b− 23((1− 2θ)(m− s(δ, F) +
δ) − c if she chooses to run. The condition to keep her out, therefore, is
−δ ≥ 13b− 23((1− 2θ)(m− s(δ, F)+ δ)− c⇔ c ≥ 13(b+(1+ 4θ)δ)− 23(1− 2θ)(m−
s(δ, F)). 
Define δ˜(F) by
δ˜(F) = sup
{
δ : F(
1
2
(m+ δ+ ae))− F(12(m− δ+ ae) ≤
1
2
∀ ae ∈ (m− δ,m+ δ)
}
.
δ˜(F) provides an upper bound on differentiation possible in an equilibrium
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with two candidates. This upper bound is the maximal distance from the
median voter of the two equilibrium candidates such that a centrist en-
trant with ideal policy ae cannot obtain a vote share strictly greater than 12
for all ae ∈ (a1, a2) and win in the first round.
Finally, define E as the set of ideal policies of all citizens who could
enter and reach the second round with certainty
E = {ae : F(12(a2 + ae))− F(
1
2
(a1 + ae)) > F(
1
2
(a1 + ae))} ∪
{ae : F(12(a2 + ae))− F(
1
2
(a1 + ae)) > 1− F(12(a2 + ae))}
Let El be defined by El = E ∩ (m − δ, s(δ, F)) and Er be defined by Er =
E ∩ (s(δ, F),m + δ). The set El represents all citizens who, by choosing to
enter the race, would reach the second round of the election instead of the
candidate with ideal policy a1, and Er is the analogous group of citizens
who could replace the candidate with ideal policy a2. If E is nonempty, but
El and Er are both empty, the location of the citizen who can reach the
second round with certainty is s(δ, F).
Proposition 17. 1. In any two candidate equilibrium where a potential
centrist citizen could enter and reach the second round with certainty,
the candidates’ ideal policies are m− δ and m+ δ for some δ ∈ (δ¯(F), δ˜(F)].
2. An equilibrium with two candidates whose ideal policies are m− δ and
m+ δ for δ ∈ (δ¯(F), δ˜(F)] exists if and only if δ ≥ c− b2 , Conditions 1 and
2, and
(a) If El is nonempty, c ≥ (1− θ)(b+ δ)− θ(ae−m) and FL(12(ae+ a1)) ≥
1− FL(12(ae + a1)) for all ae ∈ El.
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(b) If Er is nonempty, c ≥ θ(b+ δ)− (1− θ)(m− ae) and 1− FR(12(ae +
a2)) ≥ FR(12(ae + a2)) for all ae ∈ Er.
(c) If s(δ, F) ∈ E , c ≥ 12(b+ (1− 2θ)m− s(δ, F) + 3δ) and both FL(12(a1 +
s(δ, F))) ≥ 1− FL(12(a1 + s(δ, F))) and
1− FR(12(a2 + s(δ, F))) ≥ FR(12(a2 + s(δ, F))).
Proof of Proposition 17: This proof follows the argument for Proposition
16 closely. Note that the incentives for the equilibrium candidates are
exactly the same in both types of equilibrium, and furthermore, so are
the incentives for a potential fringe candidate. The only players for whom
the payoffs change are the potential centrist entrants who could reach the
second round of the election. Thus, all conditions of Proposition 16 are
relevant here except conditions (b). Let a1 and a2, a1 < a2, represent the
ideal policies of the equilibrium candidates, and let ae represent the ideal
policy of a potential centrist entrant, ae ∈ (a1, a2). Define E as the set of
ideal policies of all citizens who could enter and reach the second round
with certainty
E = {ae : F(12(a2 + ae))− F(
1
2
(a1 + ae)) > F(
1
2
(a1 + ae)) and
F(
1
2
(a2 + ae))− F(12(a1 + ae)) > 1− F(
1
2
(a2 + ae))}
Let El be defined by El = E ∩ (m − δ, s(δ, F)) and Er be defined by Er =
E ∩ (s(δ, F),m+ δ). Given the distributional restriction 1− FR(12(ae + a2)) ≥
FR(12(ae + a2)) for all ae ∈ Er, if Er is nonempty, a citizen with ideal policy
ae ∈ Er obtains a payoff of −θ(ae − (m− δ)) + (1− θ)b− c by entering, and
a payoff of −δ if she does not enter. Thus, to deter such a citizen from
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entering, we require c ≥ (1− θ)(b+ δ)− θ(ae −m) for all ae ∈ Er. Similarly,
if El is nonempty, a citizen with ideal policy ae ∈ El obtains a payoff of
θb− (1− θ)(m+ δ− ae)− c by entering, and −δ by choosing not to enter given
the distributional restriction FL(12(ae+ a1)) ≥ 1− FL(12(ae+ a1)) for all ae ∈ El.
Thus, if El is nonempty, we require c ≥ θ(b + δ) − (1 − θ)(m − ae) for all
ae ∈ El. If a citizen with ideal policy s(δ, F) can enter and reach the second
round with certainty, she obtains a payoff of 12(b+(1− 2θ)m+ δ− s(δ, F))− c
by entering and a payoff of −δ by choosing not to enter. Therefore, we also
require c ≥ 12(b+ (1− 2θ)m− s(δ, F) + 3δ). Finally, it must be the case that
δ > δ¯(F) in order for a centrist citizen to reach the second round with
certainty, and it must be the case that δ ≤ δ˜(F) in order for a potential
centrist entrant to not win with certainty in the first round. 
Proof of Theorem 3: Immediate consequence of Propositions 16 and 17.

1.5 Equilibrium Clusters
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c] and the median voter will be
the same in both rounds (no uncertainty and no shift). Then a k-candidate
configuration with all candidates located at m yields an expected payoff of
b
k − c ≥ 0. Another entrant at m would obtain a payoff of bk+1 − c ≤ 0, and
therefore choose not to enter. An entrant at d 6= m could reach the second
stage with certainty, but then face an opponent who is the median voter,
and therefore lose with certainty in the second round and obtain a payoff
bounded above by −c.
Now, suppose there exists a k-candidate equilibrium where all k candi-
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dates share ideal policy m. If b < kc, candidates obtain a payoff of bk − c < 0
in equilibrium, and obtain a zero payoff by exiting. If b > (k+ 1)c, another
citizen with ideal policy m could enter and obtain a payoff of bk+1 − c > 0.
Therefore, we require b ∈ [kc, (k+ 1)c]. Suppose that there will be a shift in
the distribution of voters between rounds of size s, but that shift is known
with perfect foresight. Without loss of generality, assume that the shift
is to the left. Since F is continuous and non-atomistic, there exists and
ideal policy d 6= m such that a citizen with ideal policy d could choose to
enter and obtain a vote share of F(12(d + m)) =
1
2 − e2 . Moreover, for any
s > 0, there exists a d ∈ (m− s,m) such that this citizen reaches the second
round with certainty. That citizen wins in the second round with certainty,
since she will be located between any potential opponent and the median
voter. This is a best response for the citizen with ideal policy d since b ≥ 2c.
Finally, suppose the distribution shifts by a distance s, but that shift may
happen in either direction. Let the probability of the distribution shifting
left be θ and the probability of the distribution shifting right be 1− θ. If
max {θ, 1− θ} ≥ 1k and b ≥ kc, there exists a potential entrant with ideal
policy d 6= m who can reach the second round with certainty and win with
at least probability max {θ, 1− θ} and obtain a payoff Π > bk − c ≥ 0. 
1.6 Blanket Primaries
Proposition 18. 1. In any two candidate equilibrium where the ideal poli-
cies of the candidates are not equidistant from mR or mL, the two can-
didates are located at positions a1 and a2, with a1 < m < a2, such that
F(a1) ≤ F( a1+a22 )− F(a1), 1− F(a2) ≤ F(a2)− F( a1+a22 ), and there does not
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exist a d ∈ (a1, a2) such that
F( a2+d2 )− F( a1+d2 ) > min
{
F( a1+d2 ), 1− F( a2+d2 )
}
.
2. An equilibrium of this type exists if and only if min
{ 2c
1−θ ,
2c
θ
} ≥ b ≥
max{ c1−θ − (a2 − a1), cθ − (a2 − a1)}. If there exists a d ∈ (a1, a2) such
that a citizen with ideal policy d could enter and tie for second place,
b ≤ min{ 2c1−θ − (a2 − d), 2cθ − (d− a1), 3c− θ(d− a1)− (1− θ)(a2 − d)}.
Proof of Proposition 18: In any two candidate equilibrium, each candi-
date must win with positive probability. Denote the candidates’ ideal poli-
cies as a1 and a2, with a1 ≤ a2. If the two candidates both share position m,
by continuity of F there exists a citizen with ideal policy a ∈ (mL,mR) who
can enter and obtain arbitrarily close to half of the votes in the first round.
One such citizen will win with at least probability max {θ, 1− θ}, which is
bounded below by one half. Thus, if it is optimal for the two median can-
didates to enter and win with probability one half, it must also be optimal
for this citizen to enter. Therefore, the two candidates may not share ideal
policy m. Given that F(mL) > 13 and F(mR) <
2
3 , a similar argument holds
for any shared ideal policy a 6= m. For any a ∈ [mL,mR], there exists a citizen
with ideal policy d < a who could enter and obtain office with probability
θ. Similarly, there exists a citizen with ideal policy d > a who can obtain
office with probability 1− θ. If a 6∈ [mL,mR], then there exists a citizen who
can enter and win with certainty: if a < mL, a citizen with ideal policy mL
wins in both states; if a > mR, a citizen with ideal policy mR wins in both
states. A similar argument holds for any potential entrant with ideal policy
ae ∈ (mL, a1) ∪ (a2,mR). If the two candidates do not share an ideal policy
and a potential entrant can reach the second round with certainty, she
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will obtain a payoff equal to that of one equilibrium candidate by enter-
ing. Since it must be optimal for the equilibrium candidates to enter, it is
also optimal for such an entrant. Therefore, to exclude these entrants, we
require F(a1) ≤ F( a1+a22 )− F(a1) and 1− F(a2) ≤ F(a2)− F( a1+a22 ).
In equilibrium, the candidate with ideal policy a1 obtains office with
probability θ and receives payoff θb− (1− θ)(a2− a1)− c. She would receive
a payoff of −(a2 − a1) if she chose not to enter. Thus, we require b ≥ cθ −
(a2− a1). Similarly, the candidate with ideal policy a2 wins with probability
1− θ and receives a payoff of (1− θ)b − θ(a2 − a1)− c in equilibrium. She
would obtain a payoff of −(a2 − a1) by exiting. Therefore, we also require
b ≥ c1−θ − (a2 − a1), or to summarize, b ≥ max
{ c
1−θ − (a2 − a1), cθ − (a2 − a1)
}
.
Since the vote shares received by candidates in equilibrium are strictly less
than 23 , a citizen with the same ideal policy as an equilibrium candidate
can enter and reach the second round with probability 12 . A citizen with
ideal policy a1 obtains a payoff of 12θ − (1− θ)(a2 − a1)− c by entering, and
−(1− θ)(a2 − a1) if she does not enter. Similarly, a citizen with ideal policy
a2 obtains a payoff of 12(1− θ)b− θ(a2 − a1)− c by entering, and −θ(a2 − a1
if she chooses not to enter. Thus, to exclude these citizens we require
b ≤ min { 2c1−θ , 2cθ }.
In the event that there exists d ∈ (a1, a2) such that F( a2+d2 )− F( a1+d2 ) =
F( a1+d2 ) < 1− F( a2+d2 ), then a citizen with ideal policy d can enter and tie for
second in the initial round of the runoff with the candidate having ideal
policy a1. Such a potential entrant receives a payoff of 12θb − (1− θ)(a2 −
d)− 12θ(d− a1)− c by entering, or −θ(d− a1)− (1− θ)(a2− d) in equilibrium.
Thus, to prevent this citizen from entering we require b ≤ 2cθ − (a2 − d).
In the event that there exists d ∈ (a1, a2) such that F( a2+d2 ) − F( a1+d2 ) =
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1− F( a2+d2 ) < F( a1+d2 ), then a citizen with ideal policy d can enter and tie for
second with the candidate having ideal policy a2. Such a citizen obtains
payoff 12(1− θ)b− θ(d− a1)− f rac12(1− θ)(a2− d)− c by entering and −θ(d−
a1)− (1− θ)(a2 − d) if she chooses not to enter. Thus, to deter this citizen
from entering we require b ≤ 2c1−θ − (a2 − d). If there exists d ∈ (a1, a2) such
that F( a2+d2 ) − F( a1+d2 ) = F( a1+d2 ) = 1 − F( a2+d2 ), then a citizen with ideal
policy d can enter and tie with each of the equilibrium candidates. Such
a citizen obtains payoff 13θb+
1
3(1− θ)b− 23θ(d− a1)− 23(1− θ)(a2 − d)− c by
entering, and −θ(d − a1) − (1− θ)(a2 − d) if she chooses not to enter. To
prevent this citizen from entering, we require b ≤ 3c− θ(d− a1)− (1− θ)(a2−
d). 
Proposition 19. A two candidate equilibrium where the ideal policies of the
candidates are a1 = mL − ε and a2 = mL + ε for some ε ≥ 0 exists if and only
if 42−θ c ≥ b ≥ 2θ c− 2ε, c ≥ θε and:
1. • For all ae > a2 such that |ae −mR| < |a2 −mR| and 1 − F(12(ae +
a2)) > F(12(ae + a2))− F(mL) > F(mL), b ≤ c1−θ − (ae − a2)− θ1−θ ε
• For all ae > a2 such that |ae −mR| < |a2 −mR| and 1 − F(12(ae +
a2)) > F(mL) > F(12(ae + a2))− F(mL), b ≤ c+ε1−θ − (ae −mL).
2. ε < ep(FL) or ε = ep(FL) and b ≤ 2θ c − ε and F(12(a1 + ae)) = F(12(a2 +
ae)) − F(12(a1 + ae)) < 1− F(12(a2 + ae)) or b ≤ 2c − θε − (1− θ)(a2 − ae)
and F(12(a2 + ae))− F(12(a1 + ae)) = 1− F(12(a2 + ae)) < F(12(a1 + ae)).
Proof of Proposition 19: Denote the two candidates’ ideal policies by
a1 = mL − ε and a2 = mL + ε. In equilibrium, candidate 1 receives a payoff
of θ2b − ( θ2 + (1− θ))(2ε) − c and candidate 2 receives a payoff of ( θ2 + (1−
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θ))b− θ2(2ε)− c. For any value of θ, candidate 2’s payoff is bounded below
by candidate 1’s. Moreover, each candidate receives a payoff of −2ε if they
choose not to enter. Therefore, for both of the equilibrium candidates to
choose to enter, we require b ≥ 2cθ − 2ε.
Note that no candidate with ideal policy ae < a1 can win the election
with positive probability. Even if such an entrant were to reach the second
round, she is strictly further from the median voter in both states than ei-
ther of the equilibrium candidates. Moreover, since the candidate located
at a2 has a vote share of 1− F(mL), she will reach the second round given
entry to the left of a1. Thus, any potential entrant with ideal policy ae < a1
shifts the expected policy outcome to be a2 and will find it optimal not to
run. Similarly, an extremist candidate with ae sufficiently larger than a2
so that |ae −mR| > |a2 −mR| will also lose with certainty. For some F, and
some ε, she may replace the candidate with ideal policy a1 in the second
round, thus shifting the expected winner to her preferred candidate. To
deter such entrants we require c ≥ θε. If, however, there exists an ae > a2
such that |ae −mR| < |a2 −mR| and an entrant with such an ideal policy
could reach the second round, we require two further conditions. First,
if 1− F(12(ae + a2)) ≥ F(12(ae + a2))− F(mL) > F(mL), the entrant with ideal
policy ae would face the candidate with ideal policy a2 in the second round.
The entrant obtains a payoff of −(1 − θ + θ2)(ae − a2) − θ2(ae − a1) in equi-
librium and would obtain a payoff of (1− θ)b − θ(ae − a2) − c by entering.
To deter her entry, we require b ≤ c1−θ − (ae − a2) − θ1−θ ε. If, on the other
hand, ae satisfies 1− F(12(ae+ a2)) ≥ F(mL) > F(12(ae+ a2))− F(mL), then the
entrant would replace candidate 2 by entering. Such an entrant would re-
ceive a payoff of −(1− θ + θ2)(ae − a2)− θ2(ae − a1) in equilibrium and would
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obtain a payoff of (1 − θ)b − θ(ae − a1) − c by entering. Thus, we require
b ≤ c+ε1−θ − (ae −mL) to deter her entry.
It remains to exclude any citizens with ideal policy ae ∈ [a1, a2]. A citizen
with ideal policy ae = a2 can enter and obtain office with probability 12(1−
θ+ θ2), whereas a citizen with ideal policy ae = a1 can enter and obtain office
with probability 12(
θ
2). To exclude another candidate with ideal policy a2
from entering, we require 12(1− θ+ θ2)b− θ2(2ε)− c ≤ − θ2(2ε), or equivalently
b ≤ 42−θ c. To exclude a candidate with ideal policy a1 from entering, we
require 12(
θ
2)b− (1− θ+ θ2)(2ε)− c ≤ −(1− θ+ θ2)(2ε), or b ≤ 4θ c. Since 4θ > 42−θ ,
excluding these entrants requires b ≤ 42−θ c.
To exclude an entrant with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1, a2), there are two sce-
narios to consider. First, if ε < eL(F), where eL(F) is the maximal dif-
ferentiation such that no entrant can receive as large of a vote share
as either equilibrium candidate, no entrant with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1, a2)
would choose to enter. Such an entrant would not obtain enough votes
to reach the second round and thus would have no effect on the out-
come of the election. Second, if ε = eL(F), there exists a potential en-
trant with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1, a2) who can reach the second round with
probability one half. If 1 − F(12(ae + a2)) = F(12(ae + a2)) − F(12(ae + a1)) <
F(ae + a1), then the citizen with ideal policy ae would tie with the can-
didate with ideal policy a2. Thus, by entering she would obtain a pay-
off of 12b − θ4(ae − a1) − 12(1− θ + θ2)(a2 − ae) − c whereas in equilibrium she
receives a payoff of − θ2(ae − a1) − (1 − θ + θ2)(a2 − ae). Thus, to deter this
citizen from entering, we require b ≤ 2c − θε − (1− θ)(a2 − ae). If, on the
other hand, the citizen who makes eL(F) bind satisfies F(12(a1 + ae)) =
F(12(a2 + ae))− F(12(a1 + ae)) < 1− F(12(ae + a2)), then the citizen with ideal
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policy receives payoff of θ2b− θ4(ae − a1)− (1− θ + θ4)(a2 − ae)− c by entering
and − θ2(ae − a1) − (1 − θ + θ2)(a2 − ae) in equilibrium. Thus, to deter this
citizen from entering, we require b ≤ 21−θ c− ε. 
Proposition 20. A two candidate equilibrium where the ideal policies of the
candidates are a1 = mR − ε and a2 = mR + ε for some ε ≥ 0 exists if and only
if 41+θ c ≥ b ≥ 21−θ c− 2ε, c ≥ (1− θ)ε and:
1. • For all ae < a1 such that |ae −mL| < |a1 −mL| and F(12(ae + a1)) >
F(mR)− F(12(ae + a1)) > 1− F(mR), b ≤ c− 1−θθ ε.
• For all ae < a1 such that |ae −mL| < |a1 −mL| and F(12(ae + a1)) >
1− F(mR) > F(mR)− F(12(ae + a1)), b ≤ c+εθ − (mR − ae).
2. ε < ep(FR) or ε = ep(FR) and b ≤ 2c− (1− θ)ε− θ(ae − a1) and F(12(a1 +
ae)) = F(12(a2 + ae)) − F(12(a1 + a3)) < 1− F(12(a2 + ae)), or b ≤ 21−θ c − ε
and 1− F(12(a2 + ae)) = F(12(a2 + ae))− F(12(a1 + a3)) < F(12(a1 + ae)).
Proof of Proposition 20: Denote the two candidates’ ideal policies by
a1 = mR − ε and a2 = mR + ε. In equilibrium, candidate 1 receives a payoff
of (θ + 1−θ2 )b − (1−θ2 )(2ε) − c and candidate 2 receives a payoff of (1−θ2 )b −
(θ + 1−θ2 )(2ε)− c. For any value of θ, candidate 1’s payoff is bounded below
by candidate 2’s. Moreover, each candidate receives a payoff of −2ε if they
choose not to enter. Therefore, for both of the equilibrium candidates to
choose to enter, we require b ≥ 2cθ − 2ε.
No candidate with ideal policy ae > a2 can win the election with pos-
itive probability. If such an entrant were to reach the second round,
she would have an ideal policy strictly further from the median voter in
both states than the candidate with ideal policy a1. Note that she would
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face the candidate with ideal policy a1 since that candidate’s vote share
is F(mR) > 12 . Thus, any potential entrant with ideal policy ae > a2 shifts
the expected policy outcome to be a1 and thus finds it optimal not to en-
ter. Similarly, an extremist candidate with ae sufficiently smaller than a1
such that |ae −mL| > |a1 −mL| will also lose with certainty. However, such
an entrant will replace the candidate with ideal policy a2 in the second
round if F( ae+a12 ) > 1 − F(mR) and F(mR) − F( ae+a12 ) > F(mR). In such a
case, the entrant will shift the expected policy outcome to be a1, which
she prefers. To deter such entrants we require c ≥ (1− θ)ε. If, however,
there exists ae < a1 such that |ae −mL| < |a1 −mL| and an entrant with
such an ideal policy could reach the second round, we require two further
conditions. First, if F( ae+a12 ) ≥ F(mR) − F( ae+a12 ) > 1− F(mR), this citizen
would replace the candidate with ideal policy a2 in the second round of
the election. She would obtain a payoff of θb− (1− θ)(a1 − ae)− c by enter-
ing, and −(θ + 1−θ2 )(a1 − ae)− (1−theta2 )(a2 − ae) if she chooses not to enter.
In order to deter such a citizen from entering, we require b ≤ c− 1−θθ ε. If
F( ae+a12 ) ≥ 1− F(mR) > F(mR)− F( ae+a12 ), then the potential entrant would
replace the candidate with ideal policy a1 in the second round of the elec-
tion. She would obtain a payoff of θb− (1− θ)(a2 − ae)− c by entering, and
−(θ + 1−θ2 )(a1 − ae)− (1−theta2 )(a2 − ae) if she chooses not to enter. To deter
such a citizen from entering, we require b ≤ c+εθ − (mR − ae).
It remains to exclude citizens with ideal policies ae ∈ [a1, a2]. A citizen
with ideal policy ae = a1 can enter and obtain office with probability 12(θ +
1−θ
2 ; she obtains a payoff of
1+θ
4 b− (1−θ2 )(2ε)− c by entering, and −(1−θ2 )(2ε)
by choosing not to enter. To prevent her from entering, we require b ≤
4c
1+θ . A citizen with ideal policy ae = a2 can enter and win with probability
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1−θ
4 . She obtains a payoff of
1−θ
4 b− (θ + 1−θ2 )(2ε)− c by entering and −(θ +
1−θ
2 )(2ε) in equilibrium. To deter this citizen from entering we require b ≤
4c
1−θ . Since
4c
1−θ >
4c
1+θ , only the condition b ≤ 4c1+θ is required to deter both
these citizens from entering.
To exclude an entrant with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1, a2), there are two cases.
First, if ε < eR(F), where eR(F) is the maximal differentiation such that no
entrant can receive as large of a vote share as either equilibrium candidate,
no entrant with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1, a2) would choose to enter. Such an en-
trant would not obtain enough votes to reach the second round and thus
would have no effect on the outcome of the election. Second, if ε = eR(F),
then there exists a citizen with ideal policy ae ∈ (a1, a2) who can enter and
tie for second place with one equilibrium candidate. Such an entrant will
reach the second round with probability one half. If 1 − F(12(ae + a2)) =
F(12(ae + a2))− F(12(ae + a1)) < F(ae + a1), then the citizen with ideal policy
ae would tie with the candidate with ideal policy a2. Thus, by entering she
would obtain a payoff of 12(1− θ)b− 12(1−θ2 )(a2 − ae)− 12(θ + 1−θ2 )(ae − a1)− c,
whereas she obtains a payoff of −(1−θ2 )(a2 − ae)− (θ + 1−θ2 )(ae − a1) in equi-
librium. To deter this citizen from entering, therefore, we require b ≤
2c
1−θ − ε. If, on the other hand, the citizen who makes eR(F) bind satisfies
F(12(a1 + ae)) = F(
1
2(a2 + ae)) − F(12(a1 + ae)) < 1 − F(12(ae + a2)), then she
would tie with the candidate with ideal policy a1. This citizen obtains
a payoff of 12b − 12(θ + 1−θ2 )(ae − a1) − 12(1−θ2 )(a2 − ae) − c by entering, and
−(1−θ2 )(a2 − ae) − (θ + 1−θ2 )(ae − a1) in equilibrium. To prevent this citizen
from entering we require b ≤ 2c− (1− θ)ε− θ(ae − a1). 
Proof of Theorem 4: Immediate consequence of Propositions 18, 19, and
20. 
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Proof of Theorem 5: Suppose for a contradiction that there exists an
equilibrium where one candidate loses with certainty. Let this candi-
date’s ideal policy be denoted by ae, and let the other two candidates’
ideal policies be denoted by a1 and a2. Without loss of generality, let
a1 ≤ a2. Note that in equilibrium, there does not exist a candidate who
wins office with probability one; thus each of the other two candidates
obtains office with probability θ or 1 − θ if a1 6= a2 or one half if a1 =
a2. In equilibrium, the candidate with ideal policy ae obtains the follow-
ing payoff −θ(|ae − a1|) − (1− θ)(|ae − a2|) − c if she enters and a1 6= a2 or
−θ(|ae − a1|) − (1− θ)(|ae − a2|) if she does not enter. If a1 = a2, the can-
didate with ideal policy ae obtains payoff −12(|ae − a1|) − 12(|ae − a2|) − c if
she enters and a1 = a2 and −12(|ae − a1|)− 12(|ae − a2|) if she does not enter.
Since c > 0, the candidate located at ae would obtain a higher payoff by
choosing not to enter, which contradicts the assumption that this is an
equilibrium. 
1.7 Chapter Three
Lemma 8. There does not exist an equilibrium in which a candidate x loses
with certainty if ∀ i such that argmaxz∈K ui(ez, sz) = x, argmaxz∈K/{x} ui(ez, sz) =
y for some y ∈ K/{x}.
Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose for a contradiction that there does exist an
equilibrium where candidate x loses with certainty, and the above con-
dition is satisfied. The condition ∀ i such that argmaxz∈K ui(ez, sz) = x,
argmaxz∈K/{x} ui(ez, sz) = y requires that all voters who vote for candi-
date x agree on their second choice, candidate y. Note also that candi-
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date x reaches their bliss point (in policy) at her own position, and thus
d(x, y) < d(x, z) ∀z ∈ K, z 6= x, y.
In this equilibrium, candidate x obtains a payoff of −c− d(x, k∗), where
k∗ is the ideal policy of the winner. If candidate x exits, candidate y obtains
all of her previous voters. Thus, the new winner of the election is either
candidate k∗ who won when x had entered, or candidate y. Since y is
preferred to k∗ by x, the policy outcome of this election when x exits is
weakly preferred by x. Since c > 0, x obtains a strictly higher payoff by
exiting and therefore this equilibrium does not exist. 
Corollary 3. In all two candidate equilibria, vx = vy = 12 .
Definition 1. An equilibrium is linear if there exists a function f : e→ s such
that for all j ∈ K, sj = aej + b for constants a, b.
Corollary 4. There does not exist a linear equilibrium with a sure loser z
where (ez, sz) << (ey, sy) ∀y ∈ K, y 6= z or (ez, sz) >> (ey, sy) ∀y ∈ K, y 6= z.
Note that Lemma 8 recovers Lemma 1 of Osborne and Slivinski (1996)
as a special case (Corollary 4).
Proof of Proposition 8: Start with Proposition 8 (3). By Lemma 8, we
know that there cannot be a sure loser in two candidate elections. There-
fore, in any two-candidate equilibrium, vote shares must be vx = vy = 12 .
Furthermore, the candidates cannot be identical, i.e. d(x, y) > 0. Sup-
pose, in equilibrium, the two candidates shared the same ideal policy.
Then each candidate has a payoff of 12b− c. If either candidate chose not to
enter the race, her payoff would be 0, as the winner would share her ideal
policy. Therefore, it must be the case that b ≥ 2c. However, if the two can-
didates share the same position, then by continuity there exists another
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potential candidate with a distinct ideal policy who can enter and obtain
arbitrarily close to half the votes. Let such a candidate be denoted by z. In
equilibrium, she obtains payoff of −d(x, z), but by entering would win with
certainty and obtain payoff b − c. Since b ≥ 2c, this potential candidate
would not be best responding. Thus, d(x, y) > 0.
Since d(x, y) > 0 and vx = vy, each candidate obtains a payoff of 12b−
1
2d(x, y) − c in equilibrium. If a candidate chose not to enter, she would
obtain a payoff of −d(x, y). Therefore, for candidates to choose to enter
in equilibrium, we require 12b − 12d(x, y) − c ≥ −d(x, y), or b ≥ 2c − d(x, y).
Therefore, for b < 2c, there exists a strictly positive lower bound on how
differentiated candidates will be in all two candidate equilibria.
No potential candidate who is extreme with respect to party competi-
tion would like to enter. They obtain a strict subset of one equilibrium
candidates’ voters, and therefore lose the election. Furthermore, by enter-
ing they induce a victory by their least preferred equilibrium candidate. If
d(x, y) > d∗(F) then there exists a candidate who can enter and win the
election. Since b ≥ 2c
To prove Proposition 8(1), note that the requirements for all i such
that vx(x, y, i) > vy(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(y, i)− d(x, i)] and for all i such that
vy(x, y, i) > vx(x, y, i), c ≥ 12 [d(x, i)− d(y, i)] guarantee that no candidate who
can enter and influence the identity of the winner find it optimal to do
so. If b ≥ 2c, any distance d(x, y) ∈ (0, d∗(F)) (a nonempty interval) pro-
duces an equilibrium. If b < 2c, there exists an equilibrium if and only if
d∗(F) ≥ 2c− b. 
Proof of Proposition 9: In order for x to be a sure winner, it must be the
case that she obtains a larger vote share than any other candidate, and
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therefore vx > max
{
vL1 ; vL2
}
. Condition two requires that there does not
exist a citizen who can enter and win with certainty, and would prefer to
do so. If there exists a potential candidate z who could enter and win the
election with certainty, then they would earn payoff b− c by entering. In
equilibrium, when choosing not to enter, z earns a payoff of −d(x, z). Thus,
if b − c ≤ −d(x, z), this candidate would choose not to enter. Therefore,
for any citizen who can win with certainty by entering, we require b ≤
c − d(x, z). By continuity, if there exists a citizen who can enter and win
with probability p < 1, then there exists a citizen who can enter and win
with certainty. The payoff for a citizen j who can enter and win office with
probability p is pb− c− (1− p)d(x, j), and therefore the payoff restrictions
in condition two also exclude entrants who are not sure winners.
Candidates L1 and L2 obtain payoff of −c − d(L1, x) and −c − d(L2, x)
respectively. For L1 to prefer to enter, it must be the case that she obtains
a higher payoff by doing so. Suppose candidate x is still the winner when
L1 exits. Then, L1 has no effect on the outcome by entering and thus
would save c by exiting. Therefore, for this equilibrium to exist, it must
be the case that L2 wins if L1 chooses not to enter. By exiting, L1 obtains
payoff −d(L1, L2). Thus, for entry to be a best response, it must be the case
that c ≤ d(L1, L2) − d(L1, x). The same conditions hold symmetrically for
candidate L2. These requirements imply conditions three and four.
Depending on the positions of each candidate, there may exist a citizen
z who, when entering, extracts more votes from x than other candidates
and can cause Li to win the election. If such a citizen exists, he obtains
−d(x, z) in equilibrium, and −c− d(Li, z) by entering. Thus, to deter such a
citizen from entering, it must be the case that c ≥ d(x, z)− d(Li, z) for all Li
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such that vLi = maxk∈K∪{z}.
Finally, x obtains payoff b− c in equilibrium. Let L∗ denote whichever
of L1 or L2 would win the election in the event that x exited. Candidate x
would therefore obtain a payoff of −d(x, L∗) by exiting. Therefore, for this
to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that b ≥ c− d(x, L∗). 
Proof of Proposition 10: First, note that if vx(x, y, L) 6= vy(x, y, L), this
equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 9. Second, it must be the case
that d(x, L) 6= d(y, L). If not, candidate L obtains −12d(L, y) − 12d(L, x) − c
in equilibrium and either −d(L, y) or −d(L, x) by exiting. Since d(L, y) =
d(L, x), for L to be best responding, it must be the case that −c ≥ 0. Given
c > 0 by assumption, this cannot be.
Candidates x and y obtain 12b− 12d(x, y)− c in equilibrium and −d(x, y)
by exiting. Thus, to sustain this equilibrium, it must be the case that
b ≥ 2c − d(x, y). If d(x, L) < d(y, L), candidate L prefers x to y. For this
equilibrium to hold, it must be the case that candidate L cannibalizes
more vote share from candidate y than candidate x. Thus, f (vL) must
be more dense closer to y than to x and cannot be symmetric over the
line which characterizes the set of indifferent voters between x and y, si =
sx+sy
2 +
ex−ey
sy−sx (e
i − ex+ey2 ). It must also be the case that d(y, L) − d(x, L) ≥ c
for candidate L to be willing to enter. Similar arguments hold in the event
candidate d(x, L) > d(y, L).

Lemma 9. Assume that there exists two candidates with ideal policies (0, 0)
and (1, 1). Assume that there exists two candidates x and y with ideal poli-
cies (12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a), a ∈ [0, 12) respectively. ∀i such that ei ≥ 12
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and si ≤ 12 , and ∀i such that ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 , i votes for x or y.
Proof: Fix ei ≤ 12 , si ≥ 12 . The utility of voter i from voting for a candidate in
this election is
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1− 2ei + ex) 12 + (sx) 12 ei > ex
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1− ex) 12 + (sx) 12 ei ≤ ex
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1− ey) 12 + (2si − sy) 12 si < sy
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (1− ey) 12 + (sy) 12 si ≥ sy
Ui(0, 0, ei, si) = (1− 2ei) 12
Ui(1, 1, ei, si) = (2si − 1) 12
For all i with ei > ex, it is clear that Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) > Ui(0, 0, ei, si). If
ei ≤ ex,
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (1− (12 − a))
1
2 + (
1
2
− a) 12 .
Note that Ui(0, 0, ei, si) = (1 − 2ei) 12 ≤ 1. If Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) ≥ 1, we can
conclude that x  L1∀i such that ei ≤ 12 , si ≥ 12 . This condition is satisfied if
(1− (1
2
− a)) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 1
(
1
2
+ a)
1
2 + (
1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 1
1
2
+ a+
1
2
− a+ 2(1
2
+ a)
1
2 (
1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 1
2(
1
2
+ a)
1
2 (
1
2
− a) 12 ≥ 0
Since (ei, si) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], this condition always holds. For these voters,
it remains to be shown that they will never choose to vote for L2. Since
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Ui(1, 1, ei, si) = (2si − 1) 12 , the utility a voter receives from voting for L2 is
bounded above by 1. If si ≥ sy, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 , and the
above argument follows exactly. If si < sy, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) is bounded below
by (12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 1) 12 = (12 − a)
1
2 +Ui(1, 1, ei, si). Thus, all voters with ideal
policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≤ 12 , si ≥ 12 vote for x or y. It remains to be shown
that all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 vote for x or y.
For all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 , the utility
of voting for a candidate in this election is
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (ex)
1
2 + (1+ sx − 2si) 12 si > sx
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (ex)
1
2 + (1− sx) 12 si ≤ sx
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (ey)
1
2 + (1− 2si + sy) 12 ei > ey
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (2ei − ey) 12 + (1− 2si + sy) 12 ei ≤ ey
Ui(0, 0, ei, si) = (1− 2si) 12
Ui(1, 1, ei, si) = (2ei − 1) 12
If sx < si, Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (ex)
1
2 + (1+ sx − 2si) 12 whereas Ui(0, 0, ei, si) =
(1− 2si) 12 . Since ex and sx ≥ 0, for these voters, x  L1. Note that Ui(0, 0, ei, si)
is bounded above by 1. If sx ≥ si, Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ≥ 1 as
shown above. Thus, x  L1 for all voters with ideal policy (ei, si) satisfying
ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 .
If ei ≥ ey, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (12 + a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si + a)
1
2 , which is bounded
below by 2(12 + a)
1
2 . Similar to above, Ui(1, 1, ei, si) = (2ei − 1) 12 is bounded
above by 1. Thus, for voters with ei ≥ ey, y  L2. If ei < ey, Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) =
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si + a)
1
2 , which is bounded below by (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 .
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As shown above, for voters with ei < ey, y  L2. Therefore, all voters with
ei ≥ 12 , si ≤ 12 choose to vote for either x or y. 
Lemma 10. Assume that there exists two candidates L1 and L2 with ideal
policies (0, 0) and (1, 1) respectively. Assume that there exists two candi-
dates x and y with ideal policies (12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a) respec-
tively. L1 obtains votes from all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 satisfying
si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 + a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2. L2 obtains votes from all voters with ei > 12
and si > 12 satisfying s
i > 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2. Voters with ideal
policies satisfying ei ∈ [12 − a, 12 + a] vote for x if si ≤ 1− ei and vote for y if
si > 1− ei. Voters with ideal policies satisfying ei < 12 − a vote for x if si ≤ 12 + a
and they do not vote for L1 and are indifferent between x and y if si > 12 + a.
Voters satisfying ei > 12 + a vote for y if s
i > 12 − a and they do not vote for L2
and are indifferent between x and y if si ≤ 12 − a.
Proof: Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12: Note that these voters will either
vote for L1 or x. Their frame (ei, si) is given by (1, 1); for a fixed frame,
voters utility of voting for a candidate is decreasing in the difference in
ideal policies. Thus, these voters strictly prefer both L1 and x to y and L2.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 have utility (1− 2ei)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 of voting
for L1. This set of voters differs in their utility of voting for x by whether
they have ei ≥ 12 − a, si ≥ 12 − a, both or neither. Their utility is given by
Ui(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1, 1) =

2(12 + a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
(12 + a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a, si > 12 − a
(32 − 2ei − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
(32 − 2ei − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a, si > 12 − a
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Since 32 − a > 1, for all voters with ei > 12 − a and si > 12 − a, x is preferred
to L1. For voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 − a, their utility of voting
for x is (12 + a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 , whereas their utility of voting for L1 is
(1 − 2ei) 12 + (1 − 2si) 12 . Their utility of voting for L1 is bounded above by
1+ (1− 2si) 12 , whereas the utility of voting for x is constant in ei. Consider
the voter with si = 12 . His utility of voting for x is (
1
2 + a)
1
2 +(12 − a)
1
2 > 1 for all
a < 12 , whereas his utility of voting for L1 is 1. For all values of a ∈ [0, 12), this
voter strictly prefers x. Now consider the voter with si = 12 − a. His utility of
voting for x is 2(12 + a)
1
2 , and his utility of voting for L1 is 1+ (2a)
1
2 . If a = 0,
he strictly prefers voting for x to voting for L1. If a = 12 , he is indifferent
between x and L1. By continuity and monotonicity of U(.) in a, this voter
strictly prefers x to L1 for all a ∈ [0, 12). Thus, all voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and
si > 12 − a strictly prefer x to L1. By symmetry, this is also true for voters
with ei > 12 − a and si ≤ 12 − a. Finally, voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≤ 12 − a
have utility 2(12 + a)
1
2 of voting for x and utility of (1− 2ei) 12 + (1− 2si) 12 of
voting for L1. The set of indifferent voters is given by si = 12 − 12(2(12 + a)
1
2 −
(1− 2ei) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for L1 is decreasing in both ei and si,
and the utility of voting for x is constant with respect to ei and si for these
voters, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 + a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2 vote for L1, whereas
voters with si > 12 − 12(2(12 + a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≥ 12: As above, the fact that U(.) is mono-
tonically decreasing in difference in ideal policies from a candidate implies
that these voters vote for L2 or y.
These voters have utility U(1, 1, 0, 0) = (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 of voting for
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L2 and
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0, 0) =

(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a, si > 12 + a
(12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a, s
i ≤ 12 + a
2(12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a, s
i > 12 + a
of voting for y.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 + a and si ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 −
a)
1
2 of voting for y and (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 of voting for L2. Since a ∈ [0, 12),
these voters all prefer y to L2. Voters with ei ≤ 12 + a and si > 12 + a have
utility (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 of voting for L2 and (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 of
voting for y. Note that (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 is bounded above by (2ei −
1)
1
2 + 1. Suppose ei = 12 ; this voter has utility (
1
2 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 of voting
for y which is strictly larger than his utility of voting for L2 which is 1.
If ei = 12 + a, this voter has utility 2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 of voting for y and 1 + (2a)
1
2
of voting for L2. If a = 0, the utility of voting for y is strictly larger than
that of voting for L2. If a = 12 , he obtains utility 2 of voting for both y
and L2 and is indifferent. Since a ∈ [0, 12) and continuity of U(.) in a,
all voters with ei = 12 + a and s
i > 12 + a prefer y to L2. By continuity
and monotonicity of U(.) in ei for these voters, all voters with ei ≤ 12 + a
and si > 12 + a prefer y to L2. Symmetrically, voters with e
i > 12 + a and
si ≤ 12 + a prefer y to L2. Voters with ei > 12 + a and si > 12 + a have utility
2(12 + a)
1
2 of voting for y and (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 of voting for L2. The set of
indifferent voters is given by si = 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2. Since these
voters’ utility of voting for y is constant and increasing in si and ei for L2,
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voters with si > 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote for L2, whereas those with
si < 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei > 12 and s
i ≤ 12: By Lemma 9, no voters with ei > 12 and
si ≤ 12 vote for L1 or L2. These voters have utility of voting for x and y given
by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 1) =

(12 − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 si > 12 − a
(12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 − a
and
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0, 1) =

(12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a
respectively. Voters with (ei, si) satisfying ei > 12 + a and s
i ≤ 12 − a have
utility of (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 of voting for each candidate, and are thus in-
different. Voters with ei > 12 + a and s
i > 12 − a have utility (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2
of voting for y and utility (12 − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 of voting for x. Since
their utility of voting for x is bounded above by their utility of voting for y,
these voters therefore vote for y. Symmetrically, voters with ei ≤ 12 + a
and si ≤ 12 − a have strictly larger utility of voting for x. Voters with
ei ≤ 12 + a and si > 12 − a have utility (12 − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 of voting for
x and (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is
given by (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 = (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 , which simplifies to si = 1− ei. Since
the utility of voting for x is decreasing in si and the utility of voting for y is
increasing in ei, voters in this subpopulation with si > 1− ei vote for y and
those with si < 1− ei vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12: By Lemma 9, no voters with ei ≤ 12 and
si > 12 vote for L1 or L2. These voters have utility of voting for x and y given
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by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1, 0) =

(12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a
(32 − a− 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a
and
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 1, 0) =

(12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 si > 12 + a
(12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 + a
respectively. For voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 + a, the utility of voting for
x and y is the same, and they are indifferent. Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≤
1
2 + a have utility (
1
2 + a)
1
2 +(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x and (12 − a)
1
2 +(2si− 12 − a)
1
2
of voting for y. Since (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 is bounded above by (12 + a)
1
2 for this
subpopulation of voters, they prefer x to y. Symmetrically, voters with
ei > 12 − a and si > 12 − a prefer y to x. Voters with ei > 12 − a and si ≤ 12 + a
have utility (32 − a− 2ei)
1
2 +(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x and (12 − a)
1
2 +(2si− 12 − a)
1
2
of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters is given by (32 − a − 2ei)
1
2 =
(2si − 12 − a)
1
2 , which reduces to 1− ei = si. Since the utility of voting for x is
decreasing in ei for these voters and the utility of voting for y is increasing
in si, voters with si > 1− ei vote for y and those with si ≤ 1− ei vote for x. 
Lemma 11. Assume there exists candidates L1 and L2 with (ei, si) = (0, 0)
and (1, 1) respectively. Assume there exists a candidate y with (ei, si) = (12 +
a, 12 + a). L2 receives votes from all voters with e
i > 12 and s
i > 12 satisfying
si > 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2. L1 receives votes from voters with ei ≤ 12
and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2, voters with ei ≤ 12
and 12 < s
i ≤ 12 + a satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((1− 2ei)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2, and voters
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with 12 < e
i ≤ 12 + a and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2.
The remaining voters vote for y.
Proof: First, note that the frame is the same for all voters as in the previous
two lemmas. By Lemma 9, y is preferred to L2 for all voters with ei ≤ 12 and
si > 12 and all voters e
i > 12 and s
i ≤ 12 . By Lemma 10, L2 receives votes from
all voters with ei > 12 and s
i > 12 satisfying s
i > 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12. These voters have utility of voting for y
given by
U(ey, sy, 1, 0) =

(12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 si > 12 + a
(12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 + a
and utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0, 0, 1, 0) = (1− 2ei) 12 .
Since (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 > 1 for all a < 12 , and (1− 2ei)
1
2 ≤ 1, all voters with
ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 + a vote for y. The set of indifferent voters between L1
and y is given by voters with si ≤ 12 + a satisfying si = 14 + a2 + 12((1− 2ei)
1
2 −
(12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically increasing in
si and the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in ei, voters
with si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((1 − 2ei)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for L1 and those with si >
1
4 +
a
2 +
1
2((1− 2ei)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei > 12 and s
i ≤ 12. These voters have utility of voting for y
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given by
U(ey, sy, 0, 1) =

(12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a
and utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0, 0, 0, 1) = (1− 2si) 12 .
Since (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 > 1 for all a < 12 , and (1 − 2si)
1
2 ≤ 1, all voters
with ei > 12 + a vote for y. For voters with e
i ≤ 12 + a, the set of indifferent
voters between y and L1 is given by si = 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2.
Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically increasing in ei and the
utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in si, voters with si ≤
1
2 − 12((2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for L1, and those with si > 12 − 12((2ei −
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12. These voters have utility of voting for y
given by
U(ey, sy, 1, 1) = 2(
1
2
− a) 12
and utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0, 0, 1, 1) = (1− 2ei) 12 + (1− 2si) 12 .
The set voters who are indifferent between y and L1 is given by si =
1
2 − 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is constant
with respect to ei and si, and the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically
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decreasing in both ei and si, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2
vote for L1 and voters with si > 12 − 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2 vote for y. 
Lemma 12. Assume there exists candidates L1 and L2 with (ei, si) = (0, 0)
and (1, 1) respectively. Assume there exists a candidate x with (ei, si) = (12 −
a, 12 − a). L1 receives votes from all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 satisfying
si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 + a)
1
2 − (1 − 2ei) 12 )2. L2 receives votes from all voters with
1
2 − a < ei ≤ 12 and si > 12 satisfying si > 12 + 12((32 − a− 2ei)
1
2 +(12 − a)
1
2 )2, voters
with ei > 12 and
1
2 − a < si ≤ 12 satisfying si > 34 − a2 − 12((2ei − 1)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2,
and voters with ei > 12 and s
i > 12 satisfying s
i > 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei− 1) 12 )2.
The remaining voters vote for x.
Proof: Note that the frame is the same for all voters as in the preceding
lemmas. By Lemma 9, x is preferred to L1 for all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si >
1
2 and all voters with e
i > 12 and s
i ≤ 12 . By Lemma 10, L1 receives votes from
all voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 satisfying si ≤ 12 − 12(2(12 + a)
1
2 − (1− 2ei) 12 )2.
Voters with ei > 12 and s
i ≤ 12: These voters have utility of voting for x
given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 1) =

(12 − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 si > 12 − a
(12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for L2 given by
U(1, 1, 0, 1) = (2ei − 1) 12 .
Since 2ei − 1 ≤ 1 for all ei, all voters with si ≤ 12 − a prefer x to L2. The set of
voters with si > 12 indifferent between voting for x and L2 is given by s
i = 34 −
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a
2 − 12((2ei− 1)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is monotonically
decreasing in si and the utility of voting for L2 is monotonically increasing
in ei, voters with si > 34 − a2 − 12((2ei − 1)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for L2 and those
with si ≤ 34 − a2 − 12((2ei − 1)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 and si > 12: These voters have utility of voting for x
given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 1) =

(32 − a− 2ei)
1
2 +(
1
2 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a
(12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for L2 given by
U(1, 1, 0, 1) = (2si − 1) 12 .
All voters with ei ≤ 12 − a prefer voting for x to L2. The set of voters
with ei > 12 − a who are indifferent between x and L2 is given by si =
1
2 +
1
2((
3
2 − a − 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is mono-
tonically decreasing in ei and the utility of voting for L2 is monotonically
increasing in si, voters with si > 12 +
1
2((
3
2 − a− 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for L2
and voters with si ≤ 12 + 12((32 − a− 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei > 12 and s
i > 12: These voters have utility of voting for x
given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 0) = 2(1
2
− a) 12
and utility of voting for L2 given by
U(1, 1, 0, 0) = (2ei − 1) 12 + (2si − 1) 12 .
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The set of voters indifferent between x and L2 is given by si = 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 −
a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is constant and the utility
of voting for L2 is monotonically increasing in both ei and si, voters with
si > 12 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote for L2 and voters with si ≤ 12 + 12(2(12 −
a)
1
2 − (2ei − 1) 12 )2 vote for x. 
Lemma 13. Assume there exist candidates L1, x, and y with ideal policies
(0, 0), (12 − a, 12 − a), and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively.
1. If a ≤ 16 , L1 obtains votes from all voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2
satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2, voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2
and si > 14 +
a
2 satisfying s
i ≤ 14 − a2 + 12((12 + a − 2ei)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2, and
voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 and s
i ≤ 14 + a2 satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2ei − 12 +
a)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2.
Candidate y obtains votes from all voters with ei > 12 + a or s
i > 12 + a.
Candidate y additionally obtains votes from voters with 14 +
a
2 < e
i ≤
1
2 − a and si > 12 − a satisfying si > 14 + a2 + 12((2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 −
a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2, voters with 14 +
a
2 < s
i ≤ 12 − a and ei > 12 − a satisfying
ei > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((2s
i − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2, and voters with
ei > 12 − a and si > 12 − a satisfying si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 −
a)
1
2 )2.
The remaining voters vote for x.
2. If a > 16 , L1 obtains votes from all voters with e
i ≤ 12 − a and si ≤ 12 − a
satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2, voters with ei ≤ 12 − a
and 12 − a < si ≤ 14 + a2 satisfying ei ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 − (12 +
a − 2si) 12 )2, and voters with 12 − a < ei ≤ 14 + a2 satisfying si ≤ 14 + a2 −
1
2((2a)
1
2 + (1− 2ei) 12 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2.
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Candidate y obtains votes from all voters with ei > 12 + a and s
i > 12 + a.
Candidate y also obtains votes from voters with ei > 12 + a and
1
4 +
a
2 <
si ≤ 12 + a satisfying si > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. Voters with
si > 12 + a and
1
4 +
a
2 < e
i ≤ 12 + a vote for y if ei > 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 −
(12 + a)
1
2 )2. Voters with 14 +
a
2 < e
i ≤ 12 + a and 14 + a2 < si ≤ 12 + a vote for
y if si > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2. Voters with ei > 12 + a and
1
2 − a < si ≤ 14 + a2 vote for y if si > 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Voters with
1
4 +
a
2 < e
i ≤ 12 + a and 12 − a < si ≤ 14 + a2 vote for y if si > 12 − 12((2ei − 12 −
a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Voters with 12 − a < ei ≤ 14 + a2 and 14 + a2 < si ≤ 12 + a vote
for y if si > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((1− 2ei)
1
2 +(12 − a)
1
2 )2. Voters with 12 − a < ei ≤ 14 + a2
and 12 + a < s
i vote for y if ei > 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2.
Proof: Note that ei = maxj∈X
∣∣ej − ei∣∣ and si = maxj∈X ∣∣sj − si∣∣. Candidates
have positions (0, 0), (12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a). Thus, all citizens with
ei ≤ 14 + a2 have ei = 12 + a and citizens with ei > 14 + a2 have ei = 0. Similarly,
citizens with si ≤ 14 + a2 have si = 12 + a and citizens with si > 14 + a2 have
si = 0. The frames divide the unit square into four subpopulations by
ei and si. Candidate x lies in the group of citizens with ei = si = 0 if
1
4 +
a
2 ≤ 12 − a, or a ≤ 16 . Alternatively, if a > 16 , x lies in the group of
citizens with ei = si = 12 + a. Candidate y always lies in the group of citizens
with ei = si = 0 and candidate L1 is always in the group of citizens with
ei = si = 12 + a.
Consider the case with a ≤ 16 :
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2: These voters have utility of voting for
x given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a) = 2(2a)
1
2
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and utility of voting for y given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a) = 0.
Clearly, none of these voters will vote for y. Their utility of voting for L1 is
given by
U(0, 0,
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a) = (
1
2
+ a− 2ei) 12 + (1
2
+ a− 2si) 12 .
The set of voters who are indifferent between x and L1 is therefore given by
2(2a)
1
2 = (
1
2
+ a− 2ei) 12 + (1
2
+ a− 2si) 12
which reduces to si = 14 +
a
2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2. Since these voters
all have the same utility of voting for x whereas their utility of voting for L1
is strictly decreasing in ei and si, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a−
2ei)
1
2 )2 vote for L1 and those with si > 14 +
a
2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2 vote
for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2: These voters have utility of voting for
L1 given by
U(0, 0,
1
2
+ a, 0) = (
1
2
+ a− 2ei) 12 .
Their utility of voting for x is given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a, 0) =

(2a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 + a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 − a
(2a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 si > 12 − a
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and their utility of voting for y is given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0) =

(2si − 12 − a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 + a
(12 + a)
1
2 si > 12 + a
and thus all voters with si ≤ 12 − a prefer x to y. Voters with si > 12 + a prefer
x to y if (12 + a)
1
2 < (2a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 . This condition holds by concavity, and
thus these voters prefer x to y. By continuity and monotonicity, voters
with si ∈ (12 − a, 12 + a] prefer x to y as well.
Since the utility of voting for L1 is bounded above by (12 + a)
1
2 , all voters
with si > 12 − a prefer x to L1. The set of voters who are indifferent between
x and L1 is given by voters satisfying si ≤ 12 − a and (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 = (2si −
1
2 + a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 . After some algebra, this condition can be rewritten as si =
1
4 − a2 + 12((12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is increasing
in si and constant in ei, and the utility of voting for L1 is decreasing in ei
and constant in si, voters with si ≤ 14 − a2 + 12((12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for
L1 and voters with si > 14 − a2 + 12((12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 and s
i ≤ 14 + a2: These voters have utility of voting
for x given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 1
2
+ a) =

(12 − a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a
(2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a
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and utility of voting for y given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0,
1
2
+ a) =

(12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a.
These voters also have utility of voting for L1 given by
(
1
2
+ a− 2si) 12 .
It is immediately clear that voters with ei ≤ 12 − a prefer voting for x to y.
Voters with ei > 12 + a have utility (
1
2 + a)
1
2 of voting for y and (12 − a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2
of voting for x. By concavity of U(.), these voters prefer x to y as well. By
continuity and monotonicity of U(.), voters with ei ∈ (12 − a, 12 + a] prefer x
to y; thus, none of these voters vote for y.
Voters with ei > 12 − a have utility (12 − a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 of voting for x and
(12 + a − 2si)
1
2 of voting for L1. Since (12 + a − 2si)
1
2 is bounded above by
(12 + a)
1
2 , these voters prefer x to L1. Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a have utility
(2ei− 12 + a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 of voting for x and (12 + a− 2si)
1
2 of voting for L1. The set
of voters who are indifferent between x and L1 is therefore given by si = 14 +
a
2 − 12((2ei− 12 + a)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is monotonically
increasing in ei and the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing
in si, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for L1 and voters
with si > 14 +
a
2 − 12((2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2a) 12 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 and s
i > 14 +
a
2: These voters have utility of voting
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for x given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 0) =

2(12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a, si > 12 − a
(12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
(2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a, si > 12 − a
(2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 + a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
Their utility of voting for y is given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0, 0) =

2(12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a, s
i > 12 + a
(12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a, s
i ≤ 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a, si > 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a
and their utility of voting for L1 is U(0, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
First, note that none of these voters will vote for L1. It is also clear
that if ei > 12 + a and s
i > 12 + a, these voters prefer y to x. Similarly, if
ei ≤ 12 − a, and si ≤ 12 − a, these voters prefer x to y. Voters with ei > 12 + a
and 12 − a < si ≤ 12 + a have utility (12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y
and 2(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x and thus prefer voting for y. Symmetrically,
voters with si > 12 + a and
1
2 − a < ei ≤ 12 + a prefer y as well. Voters with
ei > 12 + a and s
i ≤ 12 − a have utility (12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for
y and (12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 + a)
1
2 of voting for x. These voters are indifferent
between x and y if a = 12 ; since a <
1
6 by assumption, these voters prefer y
to x. Symmetrically, voters with si > 12 + a and e
i ≤ 12 − a prefer y to x as
well.
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Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and 12 − a < si ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 −
a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y and (2ei − 12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 of voting for
x. The set of indifferent voters is given by si = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((2s
i − 12 + a)
1
2 −
(2si − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically
decreasing in si and the utility of voting for x is increasing at a slower
rate in ei than the utility of voting for y, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((2si −
1
2 + a)
1
2 − (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2 prefer voting for x and voters with si >
1
4 +
a
2 +
1
2((2s
i − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2 prefer voting for y.
Voters with si ≤ 12 − a and 12 − a < ei ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 +
(2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y and (12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 + a)
1
2 of voting for x. The
set of indifferent voters is given by ei = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((2s
i − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2si − 12 −
a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically increasing
in ei and monotonically increasing in si at a faster rate than the utility of
voting for x, voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((2si − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 −
a)
1
2 )2 prefer voting for x and voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((2s
i − 12 + a)
1
2 − (2si −
1
2 − a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2 prefer voting for y.
Voters with 12 − a < si ≤ 12 + a and 12 − a < si ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 −
a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y and utility 2(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x. The
set of indifferent voters is given by si = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2.
Since the utility of voting for y is monotonically increasing in both si and
ei, and the utility of voting for x is constant in both variables, voters with
si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2 prefer voting for x. Voters with
si > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2 prefer voting for y.
Consider now the case with a > 16 .
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si ≤ 14 + a2: These voters have utility of voting
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for x given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a) =

2(2a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
(2a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 ei ≤ 12 − a, si > 12 − a
(1− 2ei) 12 + (2a) 12 ei > 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a
(1− 2ei) 12 + (1− 2si) 12 ei > 12 − a, si > 12 − a
and their utility of voting for y is 0. None of these voters, therefore, vote for
y. Their utility of voting for L1 is given by
U(0, 0,
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a) = (1
2
+ a− 2ei) 12 + (1
2
+ a− 2si) 12
First, note that (12 + a− 2x)
1
2 is bounded above by (1− 2x) 12 . Thus, voters
with ei > 12 − a and si > 12 − a prefer x to L1. Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≤
1
2 − a have utility 2(2a)
1
2 of voting for x and utility (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 +(12 + a− 2ei)
1
2
of voting for L1. The set of voters who are indifferent between x and L1 is
given by si = 14 +
a
2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting
for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and si and the utility of voting
for x is constant, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2 vote for
L1 and voters with si > 14 +
a
2 − 12(2(2a)
1
2 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 − a have utility (2a)
1
2 + (1 − 2si) 12 of
voting for x and utility (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 +(12 + a− 2si)
1
2 of voting for L1. The set of
indifferent voters is given by ei = 14 +
a
2 − 12((2a)
1
2 +(1− 2si) 12 − (12 + a− 2si)
1
2 )2.
Since the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and
si and the utility of voting for x is decreasing monotonically in si at a slower
rate than L1, voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 − (12 + a − 2si)
1
2 )2
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vote for L1. Voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 − 12((2a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 − (12 + a− 2si)
1
2 )2 vote
for x.
Voters with si ≤ 12 − a and ei > 12 − a have utility (2a)
1
2 + (1 − 2ei) 12 of
voting for x and utility (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 +(12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 of voting for L1. The set of
indifferent voters is given by si = 14 +
a
2 − 12((2a)
1
2 +(1− 2ei) 12 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2.
Since the utility of voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in both ei and
si and the utility of voting for x is decreasing monotonically in ei at a slower
rate than L1, voters with si ≤ 14 + a2 − 12((2a)
1
2 + (1− 2ei) 12 − (12 + a − 2ei)
1
2 )2
vote for L1. Voters with si > 14 +
a
2 − 12((2a)
1
2 + (1− 2ei) 12 − (12 + a− 2ei)
1
2 )2 vote
for x.
Voters with ei ≤ 14 + a2 and si > 14 + a2:
These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a, 0) =

(1− 2ei) 12 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 − a
(2a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 − a
and utility of voting for y given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0) =

(12 + a)
1
2 si > 12 + a
(2si − 12 − a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 + a
Finally, these voters have utility of voting for L1 given by
U(0, 0,
1
2
+ a, 0) = (
1
2
+ a− 2ei) 12
First, note that x is preferred to L1 by all voters. If ei > 12 − a, the utility
of voting for x is (1− 2ei) 12 + (12 − a)
1
2 which is strictly larger than the utility
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of voting for L1 for any a < 12 . If e
i ≤ 12 − a, the utility of voting for x is
(2a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 . If ei = 0, the utility of voting for L1 is (12 + a)
1
2 . By concavity
of U(.), x is preferred to L1 for the voters with ei = 0. Since the utility of
voting for L1 is monotonically decreasing in ei and the utility of voting for x
is constant in ei, x is preferred to L1 by all voters.
Note that the utility of voting for y is increasing in si for voters with
si ≤ 12 + a and constant for voters with si > 12 + a. By the same argument as
above, x is preferred to y when ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 + a. Thus x is preferred
to y for all voters with ei ≤ 12 − a.
Voters with ei > 12 − a have utility (1 − 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x.
Consider voters with si ≤ 12 + a. The set of indifferent voters is given by
si = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((1 − 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is
decreasing in ei and the utility of voting for y is increasing in si, these
voters vote for x if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12((1− 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2 and they vote for y if
si > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2((1− 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 )2.
Voters with si > 12 + a have utility of (
1
2 + a)
1
2 of voting for y. The set of
indifferent voters is given by ei = 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility
of voting for y is constant and the utility of voting for x is monotonically
decreasing in ei, voters with ei > 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for y. Voters
with ei ≤ 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for x.
Voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 and s
i ≤ 14 + a2:
These voters have utility of voting for x
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 1
2
+ a) =

(12 − a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 si > 12 − a
(12 − a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 si ≤ 12 − a
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and utility of voting for y given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0,
1
2
+ a) =

(12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a
Their utility of voting for L1 is given by
U(0, 0, 0,
1
2
+ a) = (
1
2
+ a− 2si) 12
First note that x is preferred to L1 by all of these voters for any a < 12 . If
si > 12 − a, by inspection it is clear that x is preferred to L1 for any a < 12 .
The utility of voting for L1 is bounded above by (12 + a)
1
2 . If si ≤ 12 − a, then
by concavity of U(.) x is preferred to L1.
For voters with si ≤ 12 − a, x is preferred to y. The utility of voting for y is
bounded above by (12 + a)
1
2 , and the utility of voting for x is (12 − a)
1
2 + (2a)
1
2 .
By concavity of U(.), these voters prefer voting for x to y.
Voters with si > 12 − a have utility (12 − a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 of voting for x. If
ei > 12 + a, these voters have utility (
1
2 + a)
1
2 of voting for y. Thus, the set of
indifferent voters between x and y is given by si = 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2.
Since the utility of voting for y is constant and the utility of voting for x is
monotonically decreasing in si, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2
vote for x and voters with si > 12 − 12((12 + a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for y.
Voters with si > 12 − a and ei ≤ 12 + a have utility (12 − a)
1
2 + (1− 2si) 12 of
voting for x and (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters
is given by si = 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting
for y is monotonically increasing in ei and the utility of voting for x is
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monotonically decreasing in si, voters with si ≤ 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 − (12 −
a)
1
2 )2 vote for x. Voters with si > 12 − 12((2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 − (12 − a)
1
2 )2 vote for y.
Voters with ei > 14 +
a
2 and s
i > 14 +
a
2:
These voters have utility of voting for x given by
U(
1
2
− a, 1
2
− a, 0, 0) = 2(1
2
− a) 12
and utility 0 of voting for L1. Thus, none of these voters vote for L1. Their
utility of voting for y is given by
U(
1
2
+ a,
1
2
+ a, 0, 0) =

2(12 + a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a, s
i > 12 + a
(12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 ei > 12 + a, s
i ≤ 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a, si > 12 + a
(2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + 2si − 12 − a)
1
2 ei ≤ 12 + a, si ≤ 12 + a
Note that all voters with ei > 12 + a and s
i > 12 + a vote for y. Voters
with ei ≤ 12 + a and si > 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 of voting
for y and 2(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x. The set of indifferent voters is given
by ei = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for x
is constant and the utility of voting for y is increasing in ei, these voters
vote for x if ei ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. They vote for y if ei >
1
4 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2.
Voters with ei > 12 + a and s
i ≤ 12 + a have utility 2(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for
x and utility (12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y. The set of indifferent
voters is given by si = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of
voting for x is constant and the utility of voting for y is increasing in si,
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these voters vote for x if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. They vote for y
if si > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2.
Voters with ei ≤ 12 + a and si ≤ 12 + a have utility 2(12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x
and (2ei− 12 − a)
1
2 + (2si− 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y. The set of indifferent voters
is given by si = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2. By the same argument
as above, these voters vote for x if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2.
They vote for y if si > 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − a)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2. 
Lemma 14. Assume that there exist two candidate x and y with ideal poli-
cies (12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a), with a ∈ [0, 12) respectively. Assume
that there exist two candidates with ideal policies (0, 0) and (1, 1). Fix a
citizen z with ideal policy (ez, sz) satisfying ez ∈ (0, 12 − a) and sz ∈ (0, 12 − a)
or ez ∈ (12 + a, 1) and sz ∈ (12 + a, 1). For all citizens with ideal policy (ei, si)
satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 , and ∀i such that ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 , i does not
vote for z.
Proof: Let candidate z have ideal policy (12 − b, 12 − b) where b ∈ (a, 12). The
utility to voter i with ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
3
2
− b− 2ei) 12 + (1
2
− b) 12 ei > 1
2
− b
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
1
2
+ b)
1
2 + (
1
2
− b) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
− b
The same voters’ utilities of voting for candidate x are
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (
3
2
− a− 2ei) 12 + (1
2
− a) 12 ei > 1
2
− a
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (
1
2
+ a)
1
2 + (
1
2
− a) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
− a
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On inspection, it is clear that for all voters with ei > 12 − a, x  z. Ad-
ditionally, note that (12 + x)
1
2 + (12 − x)
1
2 is monotonically decreasing in x.
Thus, all voters with ei ≤ 12 − b prefer x to z as well. It remains to be shown
that voters with ei ∈ (12 − b, 12 − a] prefer x to z. These voters have utility
(12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 of voting for x, and utility (32 − b− 2ei)
1
2 + (12 − b)
1
2 of vot-
ing for z. Their utility of voting for z is bounded above by (12 + b)
1
2 + (12 − b)
1
2 .
Since (12 + x)
1
2 + (12 − x)
1
2 is monotonically decreasing in x and b > a by as-
sumption, these voters prefer x to z.
Now consider a voter i with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 . The utility to voter i of
voting for candidate x is
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (
1
2
− a) 12 + (1
2
+ a)
1
2
1
2
− a > si
Ui(ex, sx, ei, si) = (
1
2
− a) 12 + (3
2
− a− 2si) 12 1
2
− a ≤ si
The utility to voter i of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
1
2
− b) 12 + (1
2
+ b)
1
2
1
2
− b > si
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
1
2
− b) 12 + (3
2
− b− 2si) 12 1
2
− b ≤ si
As above, it is clear that for voters with si > sx or si ≤ sz, candidate x
is preferred to candidate z. Voters with si ∈ (12 − b, 12 − a) obtain utility
(12 − b)
1
2 +(32 − b− 2si)
1
2 of voting for candidate z and utility (12 − a)
1
2 +(12 + a)
1
2
of voting for candidate x. Note that (12 − b)
1
2 +(32 − b− 2si)
1
2 is bounded above
by (12 − b)
1
2 + (12 + b)
1
2 . Since b < a by assumption, and (12 + x)
1
2 + (12 − x)
1
2 is
monotonically decreasing in x, these voters prefer x to z as well.
To complete the proof of the lemma, it remains to be shown that candi-
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date y, having ideal policy (12 + a,
1
2 + a) is strictly preferred by these voters
to any candidate z with ideal policy (12 + b,
1
2 + b), where b > a. The utility
to voter i with ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 of voting for candidate y is
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (
1
2
− a) 12 + (2si − 1
2
− a) 12 si ≤ 1
2
+ a
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (
1
2
− a) 12 + (1
2
+ a)
1
2 si >
1
2
+ a
The same voter’s utility of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
1
2
− b) 12 + (2si − 1
2
− b) 12 si ≤ 1
2
+ b
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
1
2
− b) 12 + (1
2
+ b)
1
2 si >
1
2
+ b
For all i with si ≤ 12 + a and si > 12 + b, it is clear that voting for y is
preferred to voting for z. For voters with si ∈ (12 + a, 12 + b], voting for y is
preferred if (12 − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 ≥ (12 − b)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − b)
1
2 . Note that the right
hand side of this inequality is bounded above by (12 − b)
1
2 + (12 + b)
1
2 . Thus,
all voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 prefer to vote for y
instead of z.
Consider now voters with ideal policy ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 . These voters’
utility of voting for candidate z is
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (
1
2
+ b)
1
2 + (
1
2
− b) 12 ei > 1
2
+ b
Ui(ez, sz, ei, si) = (2ei − 12 − b)
1
2 + (
1
2
− b) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
+ b
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These voters utility of voting for candidate y is
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (
1
2
+ a)
1
2 + (
1
2
− a) 12 ei > 1
2
+ a
Ui(ey, sy, ei, si) = (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (
1
2
− a) 12 ei ≤ 1
2
+ a
Clearly, for any voters with ei > 12 + b or e
i ≤ 12 + a, voting for y is
preferred to voting for z. Voters with ei ∈ (12 + a, 12 + b] obtain utility of
(12 + a)
1
2 + (12 − a)
1
2 from voting for y, and utility (2ei − 12 − b)
1
2 + (12 − b)
1
2
from voting for z. Since (2ei − 12 − b)
1
2 + (12 − b)
1
2 is bounded above by
(12 + b)
1
2 + (12 − b)
1
2 , these voters prefer voting for y as well. 
Lemma 15. Assume there exist two candidates x and y with ideal policies
(12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. Assume that there exist two
candidates with ideal policies (0, 0) and (1, 1). Let s¯ = e¯ = 12(
2√
2
− (12 +
a)
1
2 )2+ 14 +
a
2 . An entrant with ideal policy (
1
2 ,
1
2) obtains all votes from voters
with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 , and from all voters with
ideal policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 . An entrant with ideal policy (12 , 12)
also obtains votes from voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [1− e¯, e¯] or
si ∈ [1− s¯, s¯]. Finally, voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [12 − a, 1− e¯]
and si 6∈ [1− s¯, s¯] vote for the entrant if si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (
3
2 − 2ei− a)
1
2 )2 and
voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [e¯, 12 + a] and si 6∈ [1− s¯, s¯] vote for the
entrant if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12( 2√2 − (2ei −
1
2 − a)
1
2 )2.
Proof: First, note that all voters have utility 2√
2
of voting for a candidate
with ideal policy (12 ,
1
2). By Lemma 14, the median entrant obtains all votes
from citizens with ideal policies (ei, si) satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 or ei ≤ 12
and si ≥ 12 .
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Consider citizens with ideal policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≥ 12 . Note
that all of these citizens prefer y to x. These citizens can be broken up into
four subsets by whether ei ≥ 12 + a, si ≥ 12 + a, both, or neither. Citizens
with both ei and si ≥ 12 + a have utility of 2(12 + a)
1
2 of voting for y, and
therefore the median entrant receives no votes from this group. Consider
now the subset of citizens with ei ≥ 12 + a and si ≤ 12 + a. These citizens
have utility (12 + a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y and 2√
2
of voting for the
median entrant. The set of indifferent citizens are those with si = s¯ =
1
2(
2√
2
− (12 + a)
1
2 )2 + 14 +
a
2 . Since the utility of voting for y is increasing in s
i,
all citizens with ei ≥ 12 + a and si ≤ s¯ vote for the median entrant. Similarly,
the subset of citizens with ei ≤ 12 + a and si ≥ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 −
a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 of voting for y and 2√
2
of voting for the median entrant. The
set of indifferent citizens are those with ei = e¯ = 12(
2√
2
− (12 + a)
1
2 )2 + 14 +
a
2 .
Since the utility of voting for y is increasing in ei, all citizens with si ≥ 12 + a
and ei ≤ e¯ vote for the median entrant. Finally, citizens with si ≤ 12 + a
and ei ≤ 12 + a have utility (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − a)
1
2 of voting for y and
2√
2
of voting for the median entrant. Thus, the set of indifferent citizens
are given by si(ei) = 12(
2√
2
− (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2 + 14 +
a
2 . Since the utility of
voting for y is increasing in ei and si, all citizens satisfying si ≤ 12 + a and
ei ≤ 12 + a with si ≤ 12( 2√2 − (2ei −
1
2 − a)
1
2 )2+ 14 +
a
2 vote for z, while those with
si > 12(
2√
2
− (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2 + 14 +
a
2 vote for y.
Now consider citizens with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 .
These citizens all prefer x to y. Similarly, they can be broken up into four
subsets by whether ei ≤ 12 − a, si ≤ 12 − a, both or neither. Citizens with both
ei and si ≤ 12 − a have utility 2(12 + a)
1
2 of voting for x, and therefore prefer x to
z. Citizens with ei ≤ 12 − a and si > 12 − a have utility (32 − 2si − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2
162
of voting for x. The set of indifferent citizens are those with si = 1− s¯ =
3
4 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (
1
2 + a)
1
2 )2. Since the utility of voting for x is decreasing in
si, all citizens with ei ≤ 12 − a and si ≥ 1 − s¯ vote for the entrant, while
those with ei ≤ 12 − a and si < 1− s¯ vote for x. Citizens with si ≤ 12 − a and
ei > 12 − a have utility (32 − 2ei − a)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 of voting for x. The set of
indifferent citizens is given by ei = 1− e¯ = 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (
1
2 + a)
1
2 )2. Since
the utility of voting for x is decreasing in ei, all citizens with si ≤ 12 − a
and ei ≥ 1− e¯ vote for z, whereas citizens with si ≤ 12 − a and ei < 1− e¯
vote for x. Finally, citizens with si > 12 − a and ei > 12 − a obtain utility
(32 − 2si − a)
1
2 + (32 − 2ei − a)
1
2 of voting for x. The set of indifferent citizens
is given by si(ei) = 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (
3
2 − 2ei − a)
1
2 )2. All citizens with si and ei
satisfying si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (
3
2 − 2ei − a)
1
2 )2 vote for z, whereas those with
ei and si satisfying si < 34 − a2 − 12( 2√2 − (
3
2 − 2ei − a)
1
2 )2 vote for x. 
Lemma 16. Assume there exist two candidates x and y with ideal policies
(12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. Assume that there exist two can-
didates with ideal policies (0, 0) and (1, 1). An entrant z with ideal policy
(12 − b, 12 − b), where b ∈ (0, a), obtains votes from all voters with (ei, si) satis-
fying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 or ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 . Let e = s = 34 − a2 − 12(2(12 + b)
1
2 −
(12 + a)
1
2 )2. Let e¯ = s¯ = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 − b)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. Additionally, all voters
with ideal policies satisfying ei ∈ [e, e¯] or si ∈ [s, s¯] vote for z. Finally, voters
with ei ∈ [12 − a, e] vote for z if si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12(2(12 + b)
1
2 − (32 − 2ei − a)
1
2 )2, while
voters with ei ∈ [e¯, 12 + a] vote for z if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 − b)
1
2 − (2ei − 12 − a)
1
2 )2.
Proof: Follows the exact same argument as Lemma 15. The only dif-
ference is the utility voters have for z. Voters with ideal policies satisfying
ei ≥ 12 and si ≥ 12 have utility 2(12 − b)
1
2 of voting for z, whereas voters with
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ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12 and si ≤ 12 have utility of voting for z given by
U(ez, sz, ei, si) =

(32 − 2ei − b)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − b)
1
2 ei ≥ 12 − b, si ≥ 12 − b
(32 − 2ei − b)
1
2 + (12 + b)
1
2 ei ≥ 12 − b, si < 12 − b
(12 + b)
1
2 + (32 − 2si − b)
1
2 ei < 12 − b, si ≥ 12 − b
2(12 + b)
1
2 ei < 12 − b, si < 12 − b
As before, by Lemma 14 voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 and voters with
ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 vote for z. 
Lemma 17. Assume there exist two candidates x and y with ideal policies
(12 − a, 12 − a) and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. Assume that there exist two
candidates with ideal policies (0, 0) and (1, 1). An entrant z with ideal policy
(12 + b,
1
2 + b), where b ∈ (0, a) obtains all votes from voters with ei ≥ 12 and
si ≤ 12 and from voters with ei ≤ 12 and si ≥ 12 . Let e = s = 34 − a2 − 12(2(12 −
b)
1
2 + (12 + a)
1
2 )2. Let s¯ = e¯ = 14 +
a
2 +
1
2(2(
1
2 + b)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2. Additionally,
voters with ei ∈ [e, e¯] or si ∈ [s, s¯] vote for z. Finally, voters with ei ∈ [12 − a, e]
vote for z if si ≥ 34 − a2 − 12(2(12 − b)
1
2 − (32 − 2ei − a)
1
2 )2, whereas those with
si ∈ [s¯, 12 + a] vote for z if si ≤ 14 + a2 + 12(2(12 + b)
1
2 − (12 + a)
1
2 )2.
Proof: Follows the same argument as Lemma 15. The only difference
is the utility voters have for z. Voters with ideal policies satisfying ei ≤ 12
and si ≤ 12 have utility 2(12 − b)
1
2 of voting for z, whereas voters with ideal
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policies satisfying ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 have utility of voting for z given by
U(ez, sz, ei, si) =

2(12 + b)
1
2 ei ≥ 12 + b, si ≥ 12 + b
(12 + b)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − b)
1
2 ei ≥ 12 + b, si < 12 + b
(2ei − 12 − b)
1
2 + (12 + b)
1
2 ei < 12 + b, s
i ≥ 12 + b
(2ei − 12 − b)
1
2 + (2si − 12 − b)
1
2 ei < 12 + b, s
i < 12 + b
As before, by Lemma 14 voters with ei ≥ 12 and si ≤ 12 and voters with ei ≤ 12
and si ≥ 12 vote for z. 
Proof of Proposition 11: Lemmas 9 through 17 characterize vote
shares for candidates in equilibrium, for any linear entrant, and if any
equilibrium candidate exits. Assume F(ei, si) is symmetric over the line
si = 1− ei.
Suppose there exists four candidates, L1, L2, x, and y with ideal poli-
cies (0, 0), (1, 1), (12 − a, 12 − a), and (12 + a, 12 + a) respectively. In order for
this to be an equilibrium where candidates L1 and L2 lose with certainty,
candidates x and y must both win with positive probability. If not, by ex-
iting, they would guarantee the victory of the other moderate, and thus
have no effect on the outcome of the election, but save cost c. In equilib-
rium, candidates x and y receive a payoff of 12b − c − 12d(x, y). By exiting,
each candidate would receive −d(x, y). Therefore, in order to sustain this
equilibrium, we require b ≥ 2c− d(x, y).
Candidates L1 and L2 obtain a payoff of −12(d(Li, x) + d(Li, y))− c in equi-
librium. Since the equilibrium is fully symmetric, consider, without loss of
generality, candidate L1. By exiting, L1 shifts the frame of reference for all
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voters who have ei ≥ 12 or si ≥ 12 . As noted above in Lemma 13, by exiting
candidate L1 tilts the perception of y favorably relative to x for all voters
whose frame changes. Candidate x, however, obtains votes from all voters
who previously voted for L1. If the set of voters who would have voted for
L1 is larger than the set of voters for whom the change in frame causes
them to vote for y, then L1 obtains −d(L1, x) by exiting, which is strictly
larger and thus this cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, only distribu-
tions and candidate configurations which satisfy vy(L2, x, y) > vx(L2, x, y)
and vx(L1, x, y) > vy(L1, x, y) can support this equilibrium. If those con-
ditions are satisfied, L1 obtains −d(L1, y) by exiting. Since this is a lin-
ear equilibrium, d(L1, y) can be decomposed as d(L1, x) + d(x, y). Thus, in
order for L1 and L2 to find it optimal to enter, it must be the case that
−12 [2d(L1, x) + d(x, y)]− c ≥ −d(L1, x)− d(x, y), or 32d(x, y) ≥ c.
Finally, if any potential candidate can enter and win the election, they
obtain a payoff of b− c by doing so. In equilibrium, they would obtain a
payoff of −12 [d(x, i) + d(y, i)]. They will not find it optimal to enter if b ≥ c−
1
2d(x, i)− 12d(y, i). No other sure losers would like to enter. The frames are
invariant to any other entrant since the distribution is bounded at 0 and 1
in each dimension. If they are extreme with respect to party competition,
they exclusively cannibalize votes from their preferred moderate. Since
F(.) is symmetric over the set of voters indifferent between x and y, any
centrist sure loser who has preferences over x and y extracts strictly more
votes from her preferred moderate. 
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Teaching Assistant, International Corporate Governance, Harvard Uni-
versity, Summer 2011.
PUBLICATIONS
Solow, BL, Solow, JL, and Walker, TB, 2011. “Moving On Up: The
Rooney Rule and Minority Hiring in the NFL", Labour Economics
18.3:332-337.
WORKING PAPERS
“Aggregate Uncertainty in Runoff Elections and Open Primaries", Octo-
ber, 2015.
“Candidate Entry in Non-Majority Runoff Elections", October, 2015.
“Extremist Politics and the Preference for Compromise" (joint with Alex
Poterack), November, 2015.
WORK IN PROGRESS
“Public Goods Provision and Induced Risk Aversion"
“The Compromise and Attraction Effects: Evidence from Off-Broadway
Theater" (joint with Pietro Ortoleva)
“Gerrymandering and Political Polarization"
“Strategic Voting in the Citizen-Candidate Model"
(joint with Laurent Bouton and Micael Castanheira)
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CONFERENCES AND EXTERNAL PRESENTATIONS
2016: Midwest Economic Theory Conference, UNSW, Queensland, Syra-
cuse, Wake Forest
2015: Georgetown Center for Economic Research, Eastern Economics
Association
2014: Lindau Nobel Laureates Meeting on Economic Sciences, Western
Economics Association, Warwick Economics PhD Conference
2008: Western Economics Association Annual Meeting
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:
Co-Organizer of Political Economy Reading Group; Officer of the BU
Graduate Economics Association
COMPUTER SKILLS: Stata, Matlab, MS Office, and LATEX
CITIZENSHIP: USA
REFERENCES
Professor Barton Lipman Professor Laurent Bouton
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Boston University Georgetown University
270 Bay State Rd Intercultural Center 580
Boston MA 02215 USA 37th and O Streets, N.W.
Phone: +1-617-353-2995 Washington D.C. 20057
Email: blipman@bu.edu Phone: +1-202-687-6109
Email: boutonllj@gmail.com
Professor Juan Ortner
Department of Economics
Boston University
270 Bay State Rd
Boston MA 02215 USA
Phone: +1-617-353-6323
Email: jortner@bu.edu
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